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Introduction
The delegation of legislative power to federal government agencies
has spawned a vigorous debate over judicial review of the agencies' exer-
cise of that delegated power. When Congress delegates power to agencies
in nonspecific, ambiguously worded delegating statutes it ultimately
leaves unelected judges with the task of allocating the power between the
executive and judicial branches. Judicial deference is the courts' legi-
timization of an agency's exercise of its delegated authority.'
When a court speaks of judicial deference to an agency decision, it is
describing either a process or a conclusion. As a process, deference lim-
its the scope of judicial review over an agency's decision.2 As a conclu-
sion, deference accepts a delegate agency's interpretation of its enabling
statute.3 In either case a reviewing court does not independently search
for the "correct" decision dictated by the delegating statute but, instead,
1. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLuM. L. Rnv. 1, 6 (1983):
"A statement that judicial deference is mandated to an administrative 'interpretation' of a
statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial conclusion that some substantive law-
making authority has been conferred upon the agency."
2. See infra text accompanying notes 168-191.
3. See, e.g., Batterton. v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977) (the Court implies that deference
compels the acceptance of an agency statutory interpretation at odds with the statutory lan-
guage); see also infra text accompanying notes 193-208.
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accepts the delegate's conclusion, so long as that conclusion accords with
whatever standards short of certainty the court articulates.
In some cases, judicial deference has permitted an agency to exercise
virtually unconstrained discretionary legislative power. This occurs when
an agency is authorized to determine the nature and extent of its power
and to act accordingly.4 In other cases, however, the courts have refused
to defer to the agency's interpretation by maintaining the right to deter-
mine independently the meaning of the delegating statutes.5 When
courts refuse to defer, the courts can be viewed as exercising a form of
unconstrained legislative power.
This Article examines the judicial responses to the issue of whether
a court should defer to the statutory interpretation of an agency exercis-
ing delegated legislative authority. In particular, the Article identifies
two models of deferential judicial review: traditional deference6 and dis-
cretionary deference.7 These models serve as organizational frameworks
for categorizing the variety of Supreme Court decisions that have ad-
dressed the deference issue. The models are drawn largely from the his-
torical development of the concept of judicial deference in United States
Supreme Court case law. The features of each model are the product of
judicial responses to the growth in administrative lawmaking.
In traditional deference, the Court's decision to defer in review of
administrative adjudications depended initially upon the distinction be-
tween agency findings of fact and conclusions of law.8 Like appellate
review of trial court proceedings,9 the Court deferred to the adjudicator's
factual conclusions. This "traditional model" became problematic as the
legislative-administrative lawmaking process increasingly blurred the
4. The idea that an agency could define through interpretation of vague statutory lan-
guage the scope of its delegated authority, and thus could provide the basis for a judicial
determination of whether the agency had acted ultra vires, was first sanctioned by the Supreme
Court in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See infra text accompanying notes 365-
368; see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (three
judge court) (court accepts the history of administrative experience with wage and price con-
trols as the source of boundaries of agency power delegated by a broad and vague statute).
5. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951) (the Court supplied the statutory
meaning, ignoring the agency interpretation); see also infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text
(discussing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 22-30. Questions of law encompassed issues con-
cerning the meaning of statutes, common law, and the Constitution, the extent of administra-
tive jurisdiction, and protection against an agency's capricious decision or abuse of discretion.
K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958 & Supp. 1982).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 31-35.
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distinction between law and fact and shifted from adjudication to
rulemaking. The Court was challenged to extend its deference to agency
decisions that were not purely factual. The result was the creation of a
new category of "law-fact" to which, the Court reasoned, deference was
owed.10
The modem "discretionary deference model"'" is grounded in the
Court's choice to limit its review of an agency's interpretations of the
agency's own statutory directives or authority. As conclusions of law
such agency interpretations of statutes were not traditionally entitled to
deference. In this model the court has two choices: to deny deference
and adjudicate the matter independently, or to defer, using one of two
standards. Since deference is discretionary, a court may deny it alto-
gether. In such a situation, the court could adjudicate the issue and ar-
rive at its own decision. However, if the court elects to defer, it may
choose between two types of discretionary deference: "weighted defer-
ence" and "presumptive deference."' 2
Under weighted deference, the court accords varying levels of signif-
icance to an agency's conclusions. The court first inquires into the deci-
sionmaker's qualifications and the nature of the decision to determine
whether to defer. Then, based upon these criteria, the court determines
what weight to accord the agency's conclusion. This weight is roughly
analogous to the level of judicial scrutiny afforded to a challenged deci-
sion. Under weighted deference the court theoretically may defer, yet
still conclude after limited scrutiny that it cannot uphold an agency's
decision.
By contrast, presumptive deference is result-oriented. When the
court chooses to accord an agency presumptive deference, it appears that
the decision to defer compels it to uphold the agency's conclusion. Pre-
sumptive deference, however, may exist in part to allow a court to accept
an agency decision that is not justifiable on the merits.
Identification of the two deference models and application of them
to the body of case law serves to explain and to organize the judicial
responses to the issue of deference to agency decisions involving the in-
terpretation of statutes.'" The models, however, offer little help in pre-
dicting the outcome of individual cases, nor are they designed to suggest
10. See infra text accompanying notes 52-71.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra notes 168-218 and accompanying text.
13. The taxonomy described in this Article is illustrated as follows:
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
what the court should do. 4 The fault lies not with the judicial deference
models but with the Supreme Court's failure to provide its own analytical
framework for understanding the nature and meaning of the decision
whether to defer."5 Present judicial responses to congressional delegation
of its legislative power have resulted in deferential judicial review in theo-
retical disarray. Pinpointing the problems contributes to the search for
solutions.
The purposes of this Article are threefold. First, objectively applica-
ble criteria need to be developed to govern both the decision to defer and
the nature of deferential review. Models aid in identifying areas of incon-
sistency, ambiguity, and unpredictability in the case law.
Second, the framework of judicial review of administrative lawmak-
ing needs to be examined, particularly the outmoded review structure of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 16 The issues involving defer-
TRADITIONAL DISCRETIONARY
MODEL DEFERENCE
MODEL
No
Deference
Weighted Presumptive
Deference Deference
Weighted
I Presumptive I
IHybrid j
14. The author subscribes to the same limitations expressed by Professor Frug in his anal-
ysis of administrative and corporate law doctrines by means of models that serve to examine
the justifications offered for the bureaucratic form. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1281-82 (1984).
15. Professor Colin Diver has observed that courts' decisions to defer are based upon "too
many factors of indeterminate relative weight to allow for a simple resolution of the deference
dilemma." Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549,
593 (1985). See id. at 562 n.95 for a partial list of these factors.
16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In a recent thoughtful article, Professor
Ronald Levin highlights many of the APA's weaknesses as he proposes a more coherent
framework for distinguishing between questions of law and fact for determining the propriety
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ence transcend the distinction between adjudication and rulemaking
found in the judicial review provisions of the APA. Thus, review under
the traditional deference model is distorted by the need to categorize the
nature of the proceedings and the emergent decision.17 Moreover, since
deference under the APA turns on the distinction between law and fact,
discretionary deference escapes statutory direction. 18
Third, in addition to the twofold choice between court and agency
for assignment of statutory meaning, the Article seeks to illuminate a
third alternative: returning the disputed matter to Congress for
reconsideration.19
This Article is divided into three parts. Part One presents and ana-
lyzes the development of the deference concept and the traditional model
of deferential judicial review. Part Two lays out the discretionary defer-
ence model. It explores the modern practices and consequences associ-
ated with deferential review, concluding with an examination of three
Supreme Court cases that highlight the judicial choices in this model.2"
Part Three addresses the problems raised by the Supreme Court's present
reviewing practices, and outlines a proposed deference-delegation model
of deference by a reviewing court. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law,
74 GEo. L.J. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Levin, Questions of Law]. His introduction also collects
statements by many leading administrative law commentators which illustrate that "[s]cope of
review doctrine has always been one of the whipping boys of administrative law." Id. at 1-2.
Professor Levin has also led the efforts of the American Bar Association to revise the APA's
scope of review provisions in accordance with modem developments. See Levin, Scope-of-
Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 239
(1986) [hereinafter Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine]. In general, Professor Levin's proposed
amendments would preserve the traditional framework more than the proposals advanced in
this Article. See infra Part III.
17. Consequently, the models presented do not rely upon this distinction. In the tradi-
tional model, regardless of whether the proceedings involve rulemaking or adjudication, judi-
cial deference is grounded in the separation of law and fact. However, under the APA, the
scope of the deferential review accorded to factual decisions depends also upon whether the
agency proceedings fall within the formal adjudicatory requirements of the APA, which apply
as well to formal rulemaking.
18. Modem discretionary deference is primarily concerned with conclusions of law, which
are not traditionally accorded deference. Consequently, most cases of discretionary deference
involve agency statutory interpretations profferred as part of a rulemaking proceeding. In the
context of informal rulemaking, therefore, the propriety of judicial deference does not require
the court to characterize the application of a statute to the facts as a factual decision. On the
other hand, few discernible criteria appear to govern the court's decision to defer to the
agency's statutory interpretation.
19. By focusing on the consequences of the judicial decision to defer, this study identifies
cases in which deference excuses the constitutionally assigned legislative responsibility of Con-
gress. The judicial refusal to defer or to supply meaning for meaningless statutory language
would halt agency action until Congress provided more specific, less ambiguous statutory di-
rectives of authorization.
20. See infra notes 230-333 and accompanying text.
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of judicial review. In this model courts would follow a rule of deference
under which most, if not all, statutory interpretations would be made by
the agency charged with administration of the statute. Under such a
rule, a court unable to accept an agency interpretation would remand the
matter to the agency for further consideration.
The model also identifies circumstances under which courts should
both refuse deference and independent interpretaion of a disputed stat-
ute. In such cases, the court would effectively return the matter to Con-
gress for clarification before the delegate would be permitted to act.E1
The deference-delegation model legitimizes the practices of judicial defer-
ence by limiting the congressional delegation of broad legislative power.
It also offers a consistent framework for judicial responses to challenged
agency lawmaking decisions. As this Article illustrates, the establish-
ment and efficient operation of the "administrative state" require judicial
definition and enforcement of the constitutionally ordained legislative re-
sponsibilities of all three branches. The proposal suggested in this Arti-
cle would help achieve this goal.
I. Traditional Deference
The model of traditional deference to agency decisions is premised
upon the notion that an adjudicator is in a better position than a reviewer
to determine the facts of a controversy. Because a trial judge as an adju-
dicator hears witness testimony and examines all the materials submit-
ted, she is in a better position than appellate judges to evaluate the
evidence and make findings of fact warranted by that evidence. 2 On the
other hand, appellate judges are deemed better suited to review the trial
record dispassionately for errors concerning interpretation of law or ap-
plication of law to the facts.23 Thus, traditional deference was based
upon a fundamental division between questions of law and findings of
fact. Review of factual findings was limited, 4 while matters of law were
21. Unlike the historical nondelegation doctrine, which implied a judicial hostility to the
concept of administrative agencies exercising legislative power, see, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a princi-
ple universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of govern-
ment ordained by the Constitution."), the deference-delegation model envisions a
reconstructed delegation doctrine under which delegation of legislative authority by Congress
to administrative agencies is both constitutionally permissible and desirable. See infra notes
362-417 and accompanying text.
22. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 592-94 (2d ed. 1984).
23. Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70 (1944).
24. "If the action rests upon administrative determination-an exercise of judgment in an
area which Congress has entrusted to the agency-of course it must not be set aside because
Winter 19871 JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
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"independently" determined by the court.2 5
The law-fact dichotomy of the traditional model produced two pri-
mary misconceptions. First, it advanced the notion that a sharp line of
distinction exists between what is fact and what is law.26 In truth, the
separation of the factual and legal components of a challenged agency
decision is often impossible.27 Second, it maintained the idea that a re-
viewing court is generally more competent to interpret the statutes that
authorized the agency action under review.28 However, frequently a
the reviewing court might have made a different determination were it empowered to do so."
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE ACTION 546 (1965) ("The administrative [agency] is the sole fact finder. The judi-
ciary may set aside a finding of fact not adequately supported by the record, but, with certain
exceptions, its function is at that point exhausted. It has, as it were, a veto but no positive
power of determination.").
25. The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some
court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied .... But supremacy of
law does not demand that the correctness of every finding of fact to which the rule of
law is to be applied shall be subject to review by a court.
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See NLRB v. Highland Park Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485 (1947); L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 547; J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
152 (1938). In practice, however, courts did not always use their own judgment to determine
statutory meaning independently of the agency's construction. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402,
411-12 (1941) (the Court refused to alter an administrative decision where Congress specifi-
cally delegated the determination of statutory exemptions to the administrative agency). See
K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at §§ 3.06-3.07; see also infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
26. Historically the law-fact determination was viewed as "the keystone upon which the
system of appellate review in the courts has been built." See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at
592; see also L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 546; Nathanson, Reviews, 70 YALE L.J. 1210, 1211
(1961).
In truth, the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact really gives
little help in determining how far the courts will review .... When courts are unwill-
ing to review, they are tempted to explain by the easy device of calling the question
one of fact; and when otherwise disposed, they say that it is a question of law.
J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 55 (1927). See also Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action-Remarks
Before the District of Columbia Circuit Judicial Conference, 34 FED. B.J. 54 (1975).
27. The definition and identification of what is "fact" and what is "law" for purposes of
judicial review has long been a matter of controversy. See L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 546-55;
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 647-68. See also Levin, Questions of Law, supra note 16, at 9-
11. "In a sense, this absence of a shared vocabulary [for defining 'questions of law'] leaves one
with the Humpty Dumpty-like privilege of making the phrase whatever one chooses it to
mean." Id. at 9. Similarly, judicial decisions have recognized that fact finding involves both
different decisional components as well as different kinds of fact. See NLRB v. Marcus Truck-
ing Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590-92 (2d Cir. 1961); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554,
559-60 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
28. See J. LANDIS, supra note 25, at 152. But see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 593
(courts were thought to possess greater competence and expertise to determine the applicable
law). See also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 136 (1944) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) ("The question who is an employee.., is a question of the meaning of the Act and,
[Vol. 14:289
court is in no better position than the agency to determine the meaning of
a broad and general statutory delegation of decisionmaking authority.
Preservation of the distinction between fact and law is attractive
nonetheless because it permits the court to retain control over the out-
come of challenges to individual agency decisions. A reviewing court can
assert its control in two ways. By labelling a decision "fact," a court can
limit its review and accept an agency decision even if there is insufficient
evidence to support the result.29 Also, by expanding or contracting the
scope of its limited review, the court itself can control whether it will
find sufficient evidence to reverse an agency decision. 0
To understand the limitations of traditional deference principles as a
coherent and consistent model for predicting the propriety and scope of
judicial deference in particular cases, it is appropriate to examine the ori-
gins and modem context of the traditional deference model.
therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative question.") (discussed infra notes 54-61 and
accompanying text).
29. "It is sometimes said that a question is fact or law depending on whether the court
chooses to treat it as one or the other." L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 547. Similarly, a "review-
ing court may substitute its judgement if it chooses to turn the question of inference into a
question of law." K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at § 29.05. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 90 (1941) ("What one judge regards
as a question of fact another thinks is a question of law.") [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE REPORT]. Despite the report's admission ofjudicial confusion and inconsistency, the
distinction was preserved in the Administrative Procedure Act, the drafting of which was
heavily influenced by the Committee's report. The distinction between fact and law for pur-
poses of deference is found by implication in the "Scope of Review" provisions of the APA. 5
U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). There are separate directives to a court to set
aside an agency decision that is "unsupported by substantial evidence" (id. at § 706(2)(E)), or
is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" (id.
at § 706(2)(A)), and a decision that is "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right" (id. at § 706(2)(C)). See infra note 65.
30. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REPORT, supra note 29, at 90. Courts have readily
admitted or agreed with commentators that the scope of review defies definition of general
applicability in all cases of judicial review. See Schotland, supra note 26, at 54, 59 (describing
the scope of review as a "spectrum" with "mood-points" of degrees of judicial aggressiveness
or restraint). This analysis was cited with approval by the D.C. Circuit in Industrial Union
Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473-74 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Professor Schot-
land's useful perceptions are many, but none more so than his reminder that the concept of
scope of review defies generalized application, and demands, instead, close attention to the
nature of the particular problem faced by the agency.").
Even under limited review the court may scrutinize the record and determine that the
agency finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary or unreasonable. The
sufficiency of the evidence to support a factual finding is theoretically considered a question of
law. L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 595. Consequently, the court may exercise its own judgment
as to whether there is adequate support for the agency's conclusion. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (discussed infra Part II).
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A. Origins: From Fact and Law to "Law-Fact"
1. Early Judicial Efforts to Restrain Agency Power
In the early days of administrative law, courts were called upon to
review agency decisions reached after formal administrative adjudicatory
hearings.31 These hearings were similar to a trial court proceeding before
a judge sitting without a jury.32 The early cases of judicial review
evinced a judicial dilemma. On the one hand, analogy of the administra-
tive adjudication to the trial court favored a limited review by the appel-
late court of the adjudicator's factual conclusions.33 On the other hand,
judicial suspicion of administrative governance and encroachment on ju-
dicial prerogatives motivated arguments against any limitation of re-
view.34 A special scrutiny developed which, if not as extensive as
independent determination of all contested issues, was more than a deter-
mination of the competency of the administrative decisionmaker. This
extensive judicial review or reconsideration made the administrative
mechanism less efficient and hence less attractive as an alternative forum
for dispute resolution.
Judges, suspicious of politicians' expanded use of administrative
agencies following the Supreme Court's removal of restraints on both
government intervention and the delegation of legislative power,36 could
only restrain agency power by controlling the outcomes of individual
agency decisions.
31. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COM-
MENTS 298 (7th ed. 1979) [hereinafter GELLHORN].
32. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REPORT, supra note 29, at 68-73.
33. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Questions of Fact, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1031 (1956).
34. Initially, judicial hostility to government intervention and administrative regulation
was manifest by striking down regulatory legislation using doctrines such as substantive due
process and nondelegation. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 434-46 (1978).
As the Court retreated from attacking the regulatory statutes, it turned its attention to the
content of the adminstrative agency decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 37-41.
35. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
36. The leading decisions heralding the demise of substantive constitutional review of leg-
islative decisions to regulate socio-economic matters included: Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.
236 (1941); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). In the
1940's, the Supreme Court upheld delegations of legislative power in five principal cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of statutes. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948)
(recovery of excess profits on war goods); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (rent
control); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (wartime price controls); FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (natural gas rates); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adminis-
trator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941) (wages and hours in textile industry). In addition, in Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), the Court dismissed a challenge to a depression statute author-
izing the appointment of conservators to run banks in danger of failing.
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
A majority of the Supreme Court flirted briefly with the idea of re-
serving certain factual findings for independent judicial determination.
The constitutional and jurisdictional fact doctrines authorized a trial de
novo on challenged facts involving either constitutional rights of affected
interests or agency jurisdiction to regulate a particular matter.37 How-
ever, the initial narrowness of these doctrines has never been expanded,
largely due to both procedural and philosophical reasons: judicial con-
trol over the administrative fact finding process proved unworkable al-
most immediately, 38 and judicial attitudes changed with the appointment
of Justices more familiar with and favorably disposed towards adminis-
trative governance. 39 Nevertheless, the Court, wary of increasing gov-
ernment regulation, had established, however briefly, a mechanism for
controlling the substance of an agency decision.'" Although the doc-
trines are no longer effective, they have never been expressly overruled.4
2. New Deferential Review
Judicial acceptance of the concept of limited review of agency fact
finding did not produce a consistent body of case law regarding the ex-
tent and scope of judicial review. The analogy of judicial review of
agency decisions to appellate review of trial court decisions proved in-
37. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
38. The Supreme Court has not followed the constitutional fact doctrine of Ben Avon
since 1936. See Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349 (1936). As Justice
Harlan observed, "it is almost impossible to conceive how this Court might continue to func-
tion effectively were we to resolve afresh all the underlying factual disputes in all cases contain-
ing constitutional issues." Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 294 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
In 1944, Justice Frankfurter noted that the opinion in Crowell v. Benson "and the casuist-
ries to which they have given rise bear unedifying testimony of the morass into which one is led
in working out problems of judicial review over administrative decisions by loose talk about
jurisdiction." City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 695 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
39. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), in which
Justice Frankfurter extolled the promise and potential of administrative governance. Justice
Frankfurter had taught Administrative Law at Harvard Law School prior to his appointment
to the Supreme Court. Justice Douglas, also a Roosevelt appointee, had been Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
40. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 94 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). To do so they had ignored
the warning that "to permit a contest de novo in the district court of an issue tried, or triable,
before the deputy commissioner will ... gravely hamper the effective administration of the
Act." Id.
41. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 627, 639-47; see also Schwartz, Does the Ghost of
Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 163 (1949).
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complete42 for two reasons. First, unlike a trial judge or jury, the agency
decisionmaker was supposedly an expert on the subject matter of the
decision. Presumably the knowledge and judgment of agency personnel
prompted the congressional delegation of decisionmaking authority.
Such delegations generally led to agency decisions that are qualitatively
and quantitatively different from those made by judges.43 Thus, in the
event of a conflict between the expert's judgment and a court's judgment
concerning a particular conclusion drawn from the evidence, courts con-
ceded that Congress expected that the agency's conclusion should
prevail. 44
Second, the detailed instructions to the jury or a body of judicial
precedent generally dictated the nature and content of the required trial
court findings.45 A reviewing court could then evaluate the explicit or
implicit factual findings in the decision of a judge or the verdict of a jury
according to the legal rules articulated.46 By contrast, agency factfinders
42. See L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 615-18; H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1345 (tent. ed. 1958). It is
noteworthy that an agency's decision is likely to have more extensive application and, hence,
greater long-term impact, than that of a jury.
43. See GELLHORN, supra note 31, at 675-80.
44. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Justice Frankfurter
asserts that the substantial evidence test of judicial review was not "intended to negative the
function of the Labor Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by
experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry
the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect." Id. at
488. See also Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 449 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concur-
ring). Justice Rutledge, joined by Justice Frankfurter, objected to the Court's evaluation of
the merits of the Board's position and to the opposing position of the court of appeals. He
argued that-
[The] judgment [of the Board] should be conclusive upon any matter ... open to [a]
reasonable difference of opinion. Their specialized experience gives them an advan-
tage judges cannot possibly have, not only in dealing with the problems raised for
their discretion by the system's working, but also in ascertaining the meaning Con-
gress had in mind in prescribing the standards by which they should administer it.
Id. But see L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 613 ("But expertness is not a magic wand which can be
indiscriminately waved over the corpus of an agency's findings to preserve them from review.
The so-called areas of expertness are not marked off by bright lines; they are inextricably
woven into the whole fabric of judgment.").
45. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.14 (3d ed. 1985). The judge's
charge to the jury should tell the jury which questions they ought to decide, what the issues
are, and what rules of substantive law they should apply to the findings of fact they make. The
judge may indicate what inferences may be drawn from the facts, and which inferences are
stronger than others. The judge may also comment on the weight of the evidence and express
her own opinion, further influencing the fact finders.
46. In light of the facts as they appear in the record and the instructions to the jury on the
issues and substantive law, a reviewing court can determine whether the jury "might reason-
ably" have found as they did. See id. at § 12.8.
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supplied the rules governing their decisions.47 The agency's selection or
interpretation of law could only be evaluated according to the incomplete
directives of the delegating statute.48 The statute rarely provided the
same basis for review of agency application of law to fact as did a court's
instructions to the jury.
Consequently, expertise justified and necessity dictated a limited ju-
dicial review distinct from the historical analogue of judicial review of a
trial court proceeding. Moreover, expertise and necessity also influenced
the judicial determination of which agency decisions were entitled to
what scope of limited review.49
a. Expanding Judicial Deference
There were two problems in identifying the agency decisions entitled
to deference. First, decisions of fact5" entitled to deference were often
inseparable from decisions of law for purposes of review.5" Secondly,
when they could be separated from the pure factual findings, there was
47. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See infra text accompanying notes
367-368.
48. See, e.g., FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1943) (criterion of
"public convenience, interest or necessity" is not an indefinite standard but one to be inter-
preted by its context); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600-01 (1944) (applying
statutory standard of "just and reasonable rates").
49. On the role of expertise in determining the scope of judicial review, compare Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945) ("One of the purposes which led to the
creation of [administrative] boards is to have particular decisions under the particular statute
made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject
which is entrusted to their administration.") and NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S.
344, 349 (1953) ("[I]n devising a remedy the [Labor] Board is not confined to the record of a
particular proceeding. 'Cumulative experience' begets understanding and insight by which
judgments not objectively demonstrable are validated or qualified or invalidated."), with
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325 (1951) ("it would be strange indeed if the
courts were compelled to enforce without inquiry an order which could only result from pro-
ceedings that.., the [Labor] Board was forbidden to conduct") and Dobson v. Commissioner,
320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943) ("where no statute or regulation controls, the Tax Court's selection
of the course to follow is no more reviewable than any other question of fact"). But see
Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judi-
cial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 473 (1954) ("Administrative expertise is a slogan
which served well in a period of struggle to establish some degree of authority for the emerging
new tribunals. Perhaps the time has come for reexamination of the content of this slogan.").
See also infra Part II.
50. Professor Jaffe defines the pure question of fact as "the assertion that a phenomenon
has happened or is or will be happening independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its
legal effect." L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 548.
51. This law-making aspect of the fact-finding process is particularly pronounced in
administrative factfinding; for we have a fact finder who combines expertness and a
responsibility for policy making. His experience tends to beget rules for drawing in-
ferences, his devotion to the purposes of the statute tends to beget presumptions for
resolving doubtful questions in favor of his theory of statutory purpose.
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concern about the court's competence to review the agency's implicit
legal conclusions. The absence of congressional clarity did not make the
court more capable than the agency of finding statutory meaning. If
Congress had neither addressed the subject matter nor considered
whether to delegate discretion over the matter, there was no "law" for a
court to interpret.
Courts responded to this problem by expanding the situations in
which they deferred to agency decisions. As the Supreme Court accepted
and embraced administrative governance and delegation of legislative
power, it also extended deference to agency decisions that were not
purely factual. In Gray v. Powell,5" the Supreme Court articulated the
principle of expanded deference: "In a matter left specifically by Con-
gress to the determination of an administrative body, ... the function of
review placed upon the courts ... is fully performed when they deter-
mine that there has been ... an application of the statute in a just and
reasoned manner."'
53
Soon after, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.," the Court reaf-
firmed the principle of expanded deference and defined the new category
of "law-fact." 55 The Court announced its willingness to limit its review
of agency decisions involving the "specific application of a broad statu-
tory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute
must determine it initially."56 The Court maintained, however, that "spe-
cific application" was not the same as "statutory interpretation."57
Whereas statutory interpretation remained the exclusive responsibility of
the reviewing court, review of law-fact conclusions would be accepted if
they had "warrant in the record"5" and a "reasonable basis in law."59
Id. at 552. Questions such as whether newsboys were statutory "employees," NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), or whether railroads were exempt from regulation as
"producers" of coal, Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), inseparably intertwined issues of
fact and law. If the court limited its review of the agency's finding that newsboys were em-
ployees, it must defer as well to the agency's implicit conclusion regarding the legal meaning of
employee. L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 552.
52. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
53. Id. at 411.
54. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
55. Id. at 120-25.
56. Id. at 131.
57. Id. at 130-31.
58. "[T]he Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this Att is
to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law." Id. at 131. An
early test required only that a reviewing court search for any evidence supporting the agency's
findings regardless of the quantity and quality of evidence to the contrary. NLRB v. Nevada
Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Union Pacific
Ry. Co., 222 U.S. 541, 547-548 (1912).
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However, the task of defining the scope of this new limited review proved
more difficult than identifying administrative decisions entitled to such
review. The Court continuously modified the content of its review stan-
dard,60 struggling to find a middle ground between the abdication of its
reviewing responsibility and usurpation of the administrative function.6"
Major modification followed the passage of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act in 1946.62 Whereas reviewing courts previously had searched
only for any evidence supporting an agency's findings, the Supreme
Court now directed that courts must take account of whatever in the
record fairly detracts from the weight of the supporting evidence.63 The
59. Interestingly, in several cases arising after the Gray v. Powell and Hearst decisions, the
Court neither limited nor explained its refusal to limit its review of law-fact decisions. See, eg.,
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,
330 U.S. 485 (1947); NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 150 (9th Cir. 1952) (the
cases following and refusing to follow Gray v. Powell are not easily distinguishable). While
some commentators have tried to reconcile these cases, the opinions created divergent defer-
ence principles. See L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 560-64 (offering explanation for different judi-
cial approaches in Hearst and Packard Motor Car); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 660-66;
see also Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 470 (1950); Levin, Questions of Law, supra note 16, at 24-25. One consequence of the
new form of limited review that may have disturbed some members of the judiciary was that
judicial deference in cases such as Gray v. Powell and Hearst effectively institutionalized ad-
ministrative lawmaking. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 135-37
(1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting the majority's apparent acceptance to the contrary, the
dissent argues that the question of who is an employee within the terms of the National Labor
Relations Act is a judicial, and not an administrative question).
60. The Court later replaced the "warrant in the record" standard with the "substantial
evidence" test. The struggle to determine the meaning of the limited review standard contin-
ued regardless of the descriptive phrase used. The history of the review under the substantial
evidence test prior to the adoption of the APA is detailed in Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-91 (1951). Congress itself had rejected the "clearly erroneous"
language used to describe the review of evidence in nonjury trials in favor of "substantial
evidence." Id. at 492-93. See L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 615. The Court, however, did not
desist from efforts to provide a conventionally understood meaning when it stated that "sub-
stantial evidence... must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a
verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." NLRB v.
Columbian Enameling Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (cited with approval in Consolo
v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). This description, however, was inap-
plicable as a guide for limited review of agency law-fact decisions.
61. Compare the Court's justification for a more rigouous review in American Ship Build-
ing Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) (the "deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot
be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia") with its justification for limiting review in Industrial
Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("A due respect for
the boundaries between the legislative and the judicial function dictates that we approach our
reviewing task with a flexibility informed and shaped by sensitivity to the diverse origins of the
determinations that enter into a legislative judgment.").
62. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1946).
63. The APA directed that an agency's factual finding had to be supported by substantial
evidence "on the record considered as a whole." Id. at § 706(2)(E). The Court interpreted
this language as a directive to change its one-sided review. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
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Act also distinguished between findings made after a formal adjudicatory
hearing on the record and conclusions reached in most other types of
informal agency decisionmaking, 4 a new consideration that in time pro-
vided additional confusion regarding the meaning of limited review. Ini-
tially, cases of review had involved primarily formal adjudications in
which the court was presented with a record of the proceedings, which it
reviewed for substantial evidence supporting the agency's decision.
On the other hand, decisions made in informal proceedings were to
be set aside if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."'6 5 However, the Act did not
require an agency to maintain a record in support of its informally made
decisions. As the bulk of agency decisionmaking shifted from formal ad-
judication to informal rulemaking, reviewing courts faced a new standard
of review without any record to which it could apply the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard.6
Review under the arbitrary and capricious standard had no corol-
340 U.S. 494, 487-88 (1951). This new standard was imprecise, however, allowing a court to
manipulate review of supporting and opposing evidence to reach the judicially desired result:
It is fair to say that in [legislative change] Congress expressed a mood.... As legisla-
tion that mood must be respected, even though it can only serve as a standard for
judgment and not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of application. Enforce-
ment of such broad standards implies subtlety of mind and solidity of judgment.
Id. at 487.
64. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557 (1982). The APA review provision directs that an
agency decision should be set aside if "unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
[the formal hearing provisions] of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute." Id. at § 706(2)(E). See also infra note 65 and accompanying
text.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1946). Neither the limited review under the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard nor the substantial evidence standard, however, arguably applied to ques-
tions of statutory interpretation. A separate provision of the APA directed that courts
invalidate agency action "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right." Id. at § 706(2)(C).
66. Agencies both received and assumed more authority to make law by means other than
formal adjudicatory proceedings. The expanded use of informal proceedings, particularly
rulemaking, was encouraged and sanctioned by the courts. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
Moreover, the Court contributed to the simplification of the administrative decisionmaking
process by ruling that a statutory directive for a public hearing preceding issuance of a final
decision did not require a formal on-the-record adjudication. United States v. Florida East
Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). See also Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning,
Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973) (administrative summary judgment permitted to avoid unnecessary
formal adjudications). By allowing preenforcement review of agencies' legislative decisions,
the Court assured federal courts of a continuous supply of cases for review unaccompanied by
a formal record. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967).
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lary in judicial decisionmaking.67 Moreover, it was considered to be a
less stringent standard of review than substantial evidence.68 Thus, the
APA distinction between review of formal and informal proceedings
ironically resulted in informal rulemaking, in which the agency decisions
fall more on the law side of the law-fact equation,69 while receiving less
rigorous judicial supervision than formal adjudication with its emphasis
on the facts. Similarly, agency decisions made with fewer procedural for-
malities received less scrutiny7' than the quasi-judicial adjudication that
yielded a record and an opinion detailing findings of fact and conclusions
of law.71
b. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
Efforts by the Supreme Court to identify the agency decisions enti-
tled to traditional deference and to define the scope of deferential review
in light of the newer informal agency decisionmaking culminated with its
67. As noted earlier, the Court had maintained a supervisory presence in formal adjudica-
tion by defining the substantial evidence standard as requiring a judicial evaluation of the
entire record, including both supporting as well as opposing evidence. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text. The test for upholding the agency's evidentiary conclusions, while impre-
cise, had at least a partial historical corollary in judicial decisionmaking. The Court was thus
able to draw upon conventional terminology to describe the nature of its review of findings of
fact in a formal adjudication.
68. See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The D.C. Circuit conceded that the statutory directive to review the agency's decision made in
informal proceedings under the substantial evidence test is meant to require a more stringent
review than arbitrary and capricious review. The court, however, has a difficult time articulat-
ing the difference.
69. A rule is concerned with generalities and is based upon an agency's judgment about
future results. It is generally applicable to a group or class only prospectively and involves
general rather than particular facts. See Schwartz, Administrative Terminology and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 48 MICH. L. Rnv. 57, 67 (1949). Consequently, an agency's deci-
sion that the rule is within its statutory authority and warranted under the situation is usually
a law-fact decision, if not purely a question of statutory interpretation.
70. In the absence of formalities, the agency decisionmaker could exercise wide discretion
that would be difficult for a court to review. Traditional deference to an informally made rule
meant that the Court presumed that the agency's choice of substantive content was reasonable.
Pacific State Boxes & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935) ("[W]here the regulation
is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the presumption of the existence of facts
justifying its specific exercise attaches alike to statutes ... and to orders of administrative
bodies."). Where the statute and its history were vague or ambiguous, a court could be even
less certain of the correctness of the agency's statutory interpretation than it could be in a
formal, on-the-record hearing that reveals both a factual basis and an explanation for the
agency's decision.
71. Of course, in the absence of a formal record there is less material to review. More-
over, due process arguably requires standard procedures of the formal adjudication to protect
the individual interests that are usually directly at issue in such adjudication. However, the
effect of rules is generally more widespread and their impact is potentially greater since they
provide guidance to a group or class involved in a future activity.
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decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe.72 In Overton
Park, the Court was faced with defining the standard of review in an
informal adjudication. At issue in Overton Park was the Secretary of
Transportation's approval of the use of federal funds to build a highway
that would destroy twenty-six acres of public park land.73 In accordance
with the requirements of the authorizing statutes, the Secretary approved
the destruction of the publicly owned park land after finding that there
was "no feasible or prudent alternative."'74
While the decision to allow the expenditure of federal funds for a
highway through a public park was not a rule," neither was the decision-
making process a formal adjudication.7" In essence, the proceeding was
an informal adjudication. This raised a question as to the proper scope of
judicial review, because the APA only distinguished between formal ad-
judication and formal and informal rulemaking," and thus recognized
no such category.
The petitioners argued for either a standard of review based on the
test of substantial evidence or an independent de novo determination of
whether the Secretary's action was "unwarranted by the facts."7" The
Court rejected this argument in favor of a more limited judicial review.
The Court ruled that since the agency was not required to hold formal
adjudicatory hearings, the agency's findings were subject to the less strin-
gent arbitrary and capricious standard rather than the substantial evi-
dence test.79 This expanded deference, however, applied only to review of
the agency findings of fact.8 0 Although the Court accorded greater defer-
ence to an adjudicatory decision than it had in the past, it did not defer to
the Secretary's statutory interpretation that governed the outcome of the
case. Thus, the Court continued to hold against deference to an agency's
statutory interpretations as long as they could be separated from findings
of fact and decisions of law-fact.8"
72. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Overton Park has been called the "leading federal case on scope
of review." Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine, supra note 16, at 243-44.
73. 401 U.S. at 406.
74. Id. at 405, 407-08.
75. Id. at 414.
76. Id. at 415.
77. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557 (1982).
78. 401 U.S. at 414. The petitioner's argument for independent review was based upon
section 10(e)(2)(F) of the Adminstrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1946), which
requires the reviewing court to hold unlawful and set aside agency actions, findings, and con-
clusions that are unwarranted by the facts, to the extent such facts are subject to de novo
review.
79. 401 U.S. at 415-17.
80. See id. at 416.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
The Overton Park decision is important to an understanding of the
nature of traditional deference in the context of modem administrative
decisionmaking for three reasons. First, the Court confirmed its role in
the legislative process by limiting the category of cases in which it will
find that Congress foreclosed judicial review. The Court found that
Congress had not committed the matter in question solely to the discre-
tion of the Department of Transportation.12 Although the Secretary's
decision was discretionary, the Court concluded that it would find judi-
cial review barred only if there was "no law to apply." 3
Second, the Court reaffirmed the distinction between agency deter-
minations of law and fact for purposes of deferential judicial review.
Although the Court admitted that the legislative history of the statutory
provision in question was ambiguous, 4 the Court contradicted the
agency interpretation without any discussion of either the agency's enti-
tlement to deference or the Court's refusal to defer. The Court simply
substituted its own interpretation, reserving deference for scrutiny of the
facts.8 5
Although the Court asserted that "[c]ertainly, the Secretary's deci-
sion is entitled to a presumption of regularity,"81 6 it nevertheless inserted
its own meaning of the ambiguous statutory language.8 7 Thus, the pre-
sumption, and hence, limited judicial review, was applicable only to the
issue of the reasonableness of the Secretary's belief that he was acting
within the scope of authority as determined by the Court. Judicial defer-
ence did not extend to the Secretary's explanation of what Congress
meant when it chose its language. This line of inquiry is not necessarily
inconsistent with either the principles of traditional deference or review
82. 401 U.S. at 410.
83. Id. The Court's insistence that an agency's exercise of discretion is generally review-
able assured the continuing availability of judicial review. Even if Congress increasingly dele-
gated wide discretion in broad and ambiguous language, the Court announced that it would
rarely find review foreclosed because there was no "'law to apply.'" Id. Significantly, the
Court demonstrated the existence of "law to apply" by disagreeing with the Secretary's inter-
pretation of the statutory requirements. Id. at 411-13. See infra text accompanying notes 84-
85. But see Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64
TEX. L. REv. 469, 518-20 (challenging the Overton Park reasoning and arguing that the Court
should find a matter committed to agency discretion, and thus unreviewable, where a statute
contains meaningless substantive standards to enable review).
84. 401 U.S. at 412 n.29.
85. In Overton Park, the Secretary of Transportation maintained that the determination of
whether there was "no 'feasible' alternative" required him to weigh the environmental detri-
ment against the costs of alternatives. The Court summarily rejected the view that "such wide-
ranging endeavor was intended." Id. at 411.
86. Id. at 415.
87. See supra note 85.
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provisions of the APA. On the other hand, the Court could have charac-
terized the decision as law-fact and accorded it deference. In choosing to
preserve the classical distinction, however, the Court cited no reference
or authority that would place this inquiry in a precedential context. 8
Interestingly, the preservation of nondeferential review of the Secretary's
statutory interpretation in Overton Park has largely been overlooked.
Lower courts continually cite the case to support the principle of defer-
ence to an agency decision concerning statutory meaning. 89
The third important feature of Overton Park is the Court's func-
tional definition of limited review of informal agency decisions. The
Court sought to define the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.9° Re-
view, it stated, should be "searching and careful." 91 This directive,
though frequently cited,92 falls short of a definitive explanation of the
APA standard for review of informal decisionmaking. In fact, the
Court's use of contradictory language subsequently opened a new line of
inquiry regarding the meaning of the Overton Park standard.93
Overton Park is generally perceived as an expansion ofjudicial defer-
ence to agency decisions. Actually, the expansion, if any, was limited to
review of factual findings in informal adjudicatory decisions. Neverthe-
less, the misperception of the expanded deference framework triggered
significant consequences. Led primarily by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, some judges sought to
regain control over agency decisions and decisionmaking processes
which, in their view, had been lost as a result of the Court's broad defini-
88. The Court cited to Professor Jaffe's treatise on judicial review. 401 U.S. at 416 (citing
L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 359). The cited passage, however, refers to a discussion of the
availability of judicial review for an agency's exercise of discretion, rather than to the scope of
such review.
89. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of Social Serv. v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich.
1983); United Neighbors Civic Ass'n of Jamaica v. Pierce, 563 F. Supp. 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1983);
City of Loveland v. Pierce, 564 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Warren County v. North Caro-
lina, 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
90. See supra text accompanying note 79.
91. 401 U.S. at 416.
92. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Getty v.
Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 805 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Friends of the Earth v.
Hintz, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986); Texarkana Livestock Comm'n v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 613 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Tex. 1935); Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v.
Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
93. See infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text. Significantly, the Court did not apply
the newly defined standard to the facts of the case. Instead, it remanded the case to the district
court. 401 U.S. at 420. The refusal to remand to the agency-as suggested by the dissent, id.
at 421 (Black, J., dissenting)--for reconsideration in light of the Court's statutory interpreta-
tion, deprived the agency of the opportunity to apply the law to its findings of fact.
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tion of deference.94
B. The Retreat: From Deference to "Hard Look"
The debate over interpretation of the review standard announced in
Overton Park ensued openly among the judges of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit.95 Their disagreement illustrates the ambiguity that remained
unresolved despite the Supreme Court's attempt in Overton Park to ex-
plain the nature of limited review. Significantly, however, none of the
judges retained the Overton Park distinction between law and fact. In-
stead of independently determining statutory meaning, the judges treated
such questions as law-fact included within the deference accorded the
agency decision. The efforts of the District of Columbia Circuit judges
most likely provided the basis for subsequent Supreme Court deference
decisions.96
Shortly after Overton Park, Judge McKinnon termed limited review
"formalistic muttering." 97 Though he echoed the Supreme Court's lan-
guage that judicial review should be "searching and careful,"98 he main-
tained that the court's review should not be limited to a finding that an
executive judgment was reasonable or not clearly erroneous. 99
A second interpretation of the review standard is illustrated by his
colleague, Judge Bazelon, who emerged as the leading spokesman for
defining the court's task as ensuring that the administrator provide "a
94. This was particularly true after the arbitrary and capricious standard of Overton Park
was subsequently extended to the review of informal rules. See discussion infra Part II.
95. There are six law review articles by judges of the D.C. Circuit alone, explaining their
responses to judicial review of administrative decisions. See Bazelon, The Impact of the Courts
on Public Administration, 52 IND. L.J. 101 (1976) [hereinafter Bazelon, Public Administration];
Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977);
Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 UCLA L.
REV. 432 (1976); Leventhal, En vironmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 509 (1974) [hereinafter Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking]; Wright,
Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 ADMIN. L. REV. 199
(1974); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974).
96. See, eg., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
sel, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (rejecting the D.C. Circuit's order to the agency to provide
additional hearing procedures and directing the agency to respond in greater detail to all of the
challenger's objections); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (the Supreme Court accepts "hard look" review of agency rules);
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (dis-
cussed infra notes 239-287 and accompanying text).
97. City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1074 (1972).
98. Id. at 744.
99. Id. at 744-45.
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framework for principled decision-making.""l°° He complained that rea-
sonableness, defined in terms of the rational basis test of Gray v. Pow-
ell, °10 was too strict." 2 Judge Bazelon took issue with both the propriety
and the competency of courts to engage in in-depth evaluation of the
substantive conclusions underlying an agency's legislative decisions.103
He maintained that if courts ensured the integrity of the administrative
process, the importance of judicial review would diminish."°
A third interpretation of judicial review of an agency decision was
the "hard look" doctrine,10 5 propounded by Judge Leventhal. Under
this approach a court, if necessary, would "penetrate to the underlying
decisions of the agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a
reasoned discretion, with reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the
ascertainable legislative intent."' 6 If the required judicial study of the
agency's record took a court into complex technical and specialized mat-
ters,10 7 Judge Leventhal suggested that judges might employ technical
specialists-such as economists or engineers-as nonlegal clerks to help
decipher the complex or technical issues that must be considered in the
course of a review under the hard look standard.10 8
The hard look doctrine ignored the distinctions between review of
formal and informal agency decisions and the respective substantial evi-
dence and arbitrary and capricious standards.10 9 The doctrine thus
100. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
This meant that "[c]ourts should require administrators to articulate the standards and princi-
ples that govern their discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible." Id. at 598 (foot-
note omitted). The courts could then ascertain whether the administrator had based his or her
decision on the proper criteria.
101. 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941) (the review function of the courts has been performed when,
inter alia, it has been determined that a statute has been applied in a just and reasoned
manner).
102. Bazelon, Public Administration, supra note 95, at 106.
103. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-51 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). This approach was curtailed by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
104. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d at 98.
105. The doctrine was first articulated in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
106. Id. at 850 (footnote omitted).
107. Id.
108. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking, supra note 95, at 550-54.
109. The D.C. Circuit first mandated this standard of stricter scrutiny in a case involving
formal adjudication. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). It subsequently applied the doctrine to informal rulemaking
as well. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37 n.79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
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emerged as a "judicial gloss" on the APA, 0 identifying the manner and
nature of judicial review regardless of the descriptive label attached to
the scope of review."' Under the hard look doctrine the court specified
what reviewing courts should look for when called upon to review an
agency decision.112 Compared with the standard articulated in Overton
Park, the hard look doctrine is not a complete narrowing of deferential
review. The application of law to fact as a category of administrative
decisionmaking is still entitled to deference.' 13 The court dictated that
law-fact decisions should be included in the heightened, yet deferential,
review it was describing.' 14
The relationship between the reviewing court and the deciding
agency was fundamental to the court's opinion regarding the nature of
review. The court expressed this relationship in summing up the func-
tion of the reviewing court:
The process thus combines judicial supervision with a salutary
principle of judicial restraint, an awareness that agencies and
courts together constitute a "partnership" in furtherance of the
public interest, and are "collaborative instrumentalities of justice."
The court is in a real sense part of the total administrative process,
and not a hostile stranger to the office of first instance." 15  ,
By its use of the "partnership" metaphor, the court appeared to change
the emphasis of judicial review 1 6 from concentrating on whether the
110. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 177, 183
("The procedural and substantive elements of the hard-look doctrine are a controversial gloss
on judicial review for arbitrariness, which is authorized by the APA.").
111. The hard look doctrine is applicable to review of an adjudicatory decision for substan-
tial evidence as well as of informal decisions for arbitrariness. See supra notes 109-110; see also
infra Part II, for a discussion of the hard look doctrine in review of informal rules.
112. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d at 850-51. Judge Leventhal ex-
plained the "salient aspects" of hard look review as follows:
It begins at the threshold, with enforcement of the requirement of reasonable
procedure, with fair notice and opportunity to the parties to present their case. It
continues into examination of the evidence and agency's findings of facts, for the
court must be satisfied that the agency's evidentiary fact findings are supported by
substantial evidence, and provide rational support for the agency's inferences of ulti-
mate fact....
The function of the court is to assure that the agency ... articulate with reason-
able clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the significance of the crucial facts, a
course that tends to assure that the agency's policies effectuate general standards,
applied without unreasonable discrimination.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 851.
115. Id. at 851-52.
116. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1971), in which Judge Bazelon wrote: "We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history
of the long and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts." He
went on to criticize the courts' practice of "regularly [upholding] agency action, with a nod in
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agency decision was entitled to deference, to ensuring that the reviewing
court take an active role in the administrative decisional process.1 17
With this emphasis on active review rather than deference, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did little to clear
up the confusion as to the meaning of deference. The heightened review
under the banner of hard look clearly served the ends of those judges
who sought a legitimate basis for disagreement with an agency deci-
sion.118 The hard look doctrine signalled a retreat from the judicial ex-
pansion of the deference concept that occurred particularly during the
twenty-five years following the end of World War 11.119
In sum, the hard look doctrine as applied in the context of tradi-
tional deference was a reaffirmation of the judicial prerogative to review,
in its entirety, the basis of an administrative decision, including those
findings previously entitled to deference. The doctrine represented a sig-
nificant assertion of judicial authority because it was articulated by the
court that received the largest number of appeals from administrative
decisions. By emphasizing the responsibility of the judiciary to examine
the basis of an agency's decision rather than the limitations upon the
power of judicial review, the court effectively arrested further expansion
of traditional deference.
C. The Present Status of Traditional Deference
After Overton Park and the hard look doctrine, traditional deference
permitted judges to retreat from the type of judicial deference that they
believed allocated too much power to the administrative decisionmaker.
Following this retreat, several observations assist in understanding the
traditional deference model and its position in administrative law.
First, arbitrary and capricious emerged as the standard of review of
most agency decisions. This standard applied to fact findings and law-
the direction of the 'substantial evidence' test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative
expertise." Id. He concluded: "To protect [fundamental personal interests affected by the
expanding character of administrative litigation], it is necessary, but not sufficient, to insist on
strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action." Id. at 598.
117. The fear to which hard look responded was expressed in the court opinion announcing
the doctrine. The court stated: "The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed
to slip into a judicial inertia." Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 850 (quoting Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesell-Schaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968)). See also Leventhal, Envi-
ronmental Decisionmaking, supra note 95, at 511-12.
118. By claiming that an administrative decisionmaker had failed to take "a 'hard look' at
the salient problems, and [had] not genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking," a judge
could declare that the agency conclusion was either arbitrary and capricious or not supported
by substantial evidence. Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851.
119. See supra note 109.
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fact decisions in all types of administrative proceedings except the rela-
tively few formal adjudications. The arbitrary and capricious standard
allowed a degree of assimilation between all forms of informal adminis-
trative decisionmaking, since it applied to review of both legislative rules
and adjudicatory orders. 120
Secondly, although once considered less stringent than substantial
evidence review, the arbitrary and capricious standard, as modified by
hard look, is potentially less deferential than the original substantial evi-
dence standard. This is because the hard look doctrine offers a court the
opportunity to take an active role in evaluating, and hence, controlling
the outcome of an agency decision.121 Only the likelihood of an appeal
and the prospect of reversal inhibit the opportunity for unrestrained judi-
cial activism.
Third, the traditional deference model still depends upon the dis-
tinction between fact and law. The labeling approach has permitted ex-
pansion of agency decisions entitled to deference by the creation of the
law-fact category as a gloss on decisions additionally considered as
fact. 22 On the other hand, a court's treatment of an agency's decision as
primarily involving law permits the court to change the outcome of a
case by substituting its own judgment for that of the agency's.1 23
Maintaining distinctions that are no longer significant, such as those
between questions of fact and matters of law, as well as between formal
and informal administrative proceedings, distracts attention from the
need to examine the consequences of a legislative process characterized
by a wholesale delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.
Both the development and the continuation of the traditional deference
model reveal judicial attempts to respond to the congressional delegation
of broad legislative power. Unfortunately, the response lacks sufficient
coherence and consistency either to allocate clearly the delegated legisla-
120. Although courts appear willing to limit review of both rules and orders, the courts
maintain a distinction between deference in the traditional model and the modem discretion-
ary deference model. See discussion infra Part II.
121. A judicial disagreement with an agency decision could easily be masked beneath a
probing review. An extensive decisionmaking record is likely to yield evidence upon which a
court could conclude that the agency decisionmaker failed to take a hard look at the issue that
is the subject of the agency-court disagreement. See, eg., Kaufman, Judicial Review ofAgency
Action: Judge's Unburdening, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 201, 209 (1970): "With the voluminous
records which burden the arms of the law clerks and the minds of the judges in agency cases,
three enterprising lawyers (for once their minds are made up, judges become advocates and
write their decisions accordingly) can usually find error upon which to base a reversal."
122. See supra text accompanying notes 54-61.
123. Traditional deference requires neither a description by a court of what constitutes law
as opposed to law-fact, nor an explanation of its refusal to defer to an agency's legal
conclusion.
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tive power between the executive and judiciary or to require Congress to
reassume some of the responsibility for clarifying statutory content.
II. Discretionary Deference
When a court is not compelled to defer by any principle of history,
legal doctrine, or explicit legislative direction, its decision to defer is
descretionary. A court that chooses to limit its review rather than con-
duct a full independent evaluation of the challenged agency decision is
exercising discretionary deference.
Discretionary deference developed out of the distinction in the tradi-
tional model between review of law and fact.124 Where the administra-
tive elaboration of the statutory or common-law norm was a matter of
law, independent of any factual findings,125 a challenge to the agency
conclusion was to be resolved by a court exercising independent
judgment. 126
124. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text; see also Levin, Questions of Law, supra
note 16, at 10-13, for a discussion of the "venerate pedigree" of the distinction between law
and fact and efforts to define "law."
125. Deference to an agency statutory interpretation and other legal rulings was distinct
from the law-fact decision in which law was applied to the agency's findings of fact. Law-fact
decisions were categorized as facts for purposes of limiting review in accordance with the
traditional model. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
126. See supra note 25; see also Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (maintaining that the issue of what the statute means by "trade or business" is
separable from the factual issues and thus open to full review by the Court). Recent decisions
in which the Court indicated it had special responsibility for reviewing questions of statutory
meaning include: IEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981);
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978); and Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-Schaft v. FMC,
390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968).
The refusal to defer to an agency decision meant, at a minimum, that if a court disagreed
with an agency interpretation it could substitute its own conclusions for that of the agency
decisionmaker. In FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), the Court faced the first challenge to
the Federal Trade Commission's power to restrain "unfair methods of competition." Noting
that these words were not defined in the statute and that their exact meaning was in dispute,
the Court maintained that "[i]t is for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine
as a matter of law what statutory words they include." Id. at 427. This position has essen-
tially been repudiated. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); Atlantic
Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965).
In its broadest sense, independent review meant that a court was required to ensure that
the administrative interpretation was correct rather than merely reasonable, rational, fair, or
not incorrect. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975), in
which the Court concluded that the agency interpretation was "correct." Elsewhere in the
opinion, however, the Court found "at the very least [the agency interpretation] was suffi-
ciently reasonable that it should have been accepted by the reviewing courts." Id. at 75. See
also American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 423 (1983)
("We need only conclude that [the agency interpretation] is a reasonable interpretation of the
relevant provisions."); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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Discretionary deference originated as a separate line of inquiry from
the issue of deference defined in the traditional review model. In tradi-
tional deference, an agency decision labelled "fact" received limited judi-
cial scrutiny, 2 7 while discretionary deference required a court to justify
its decision to limit its review. In the traditional deference model, the
scope of limited review was defined by either the substantial evidence or
arbitrary and capricious standard. 128 By contrast, in discretionary defer-
ential review, the variety of considerations invoked to justify deference
in turn fostered a variety of descriptions of the scope of that deferential
review. 129
The concept of discretionary deference gradually emerged as the
dominant form of modern deferential review for all agency decisions.
The court was still expected to justify its decision to defer, but the justifi-
cation was generally associated with the court's explanation for the scope
of its remaining inquiry. The elevation of deference to normative status
made the justification of a judicial decision not to defer more significant
than a court's reasons for deferring.
Three choices formed the basis of the discretionary deference model:
(1) independent determination; (2) weighted deference; and (3) presump-
tive deference. In the first of these choices the court retains the preroga-
tive to determine for itself the matter at issue but should justify its
decision not to defer.130 If the court chooses independent determination,
it may adopt the agency decision as its own or use its own methods of
interpretation to reach either the same or a different conclusion. The
court thus remains free to substitute its own judgment for that of the
agency.
The weighted deference and presumptive deference choices form a
bipartite paradigm of modern deferential review. Each refers to a cate-
127. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
128. Although the content of each formula evolved through application over time in a
series of cases, there remained essentially two descriptive standards. Each standard was appli-
cable to an objectively determinable set of circumstances. Scalia & Goodman, Procedural As-
pects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REv. 899, 934-35 (1973).
129. Although the term "arbitrary and capricious" is frequently used to refer to the scope
of deferential discretionary review, this rhetorical formula is described and applied in different
ways. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir.
1979) ("[TIhe concept of 'arbitrary and capricious' review defies generalized applications and
demands, instead, close attention to the nature of the particular problem faced by the
agency."); see also Note, Judicial Review of Informal Administrative Rulemaking, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 347, 350.
130. If the court engages in review under the traditional model it may not separately ad-
dress its decision not to defer. Under the traditional model, history or tradition implicitly
rationalizes independent judicial resolution of a disputed statutory interpretation. See supra
notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing Overton Park).
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gory of judicial choice involving both a court's decision to defer and the
scope of the inquiry once the decision is made. Each of these choices will
be examined in detail below. 131
The remainder of this Article examines this discretionary deference
model. 132 The discussion is presented in three sections. The first briefly
traces the evolution of the concept of discretionary deference. 133 This
discussion reveals the rationales used to justify a court's decision to allo-
cate unchecked lawmaking power to the agency and illustrates how the
concept of discretionary deference serves as a rationalization for a court's
failure to require Congress to provide more specific statutory directives.
The second section examines the choices of presumptive deference
and weighted deference which form the bipartite paradigm of modem
deferential review. 13' The analysis of these choices essentially provides a
retrospective understanding of a court's choice for the form of deference
accorded to a particular agency decision. Admittedly, the paradigm
identifies the types of deferential review but does little to assist prediction
of when a court will choose a particular type of deference.1 31
131. See infra notes 168-227 and accompanying text.
132. The model presented here offers an organizing framework for the body of case law in
which courts face the questions of whether to defer to an agency decision, and if so, what that
deference means. The categories of choices that comprise the model are drawn essentially
from examination of Supreme Court decisions. It is not suggested that the Court has con-
sciously defined these categories. Rather, the model is imposed upon the body of case law as a
device for understanding the nature of judicial deference to agency decisions not traditionally
entitled to deference. The model is also constructed to provide a basis for discussing the
Court's motivation for developing and maintaining judicial discretion to defer. The cases cited
are for purposes of illustration. The objective is not to categorize or collect all applicable cases.
It should be recalled that the discretionary deference model is part of a larger reviewing
context in which the court effectively allocates ultimate lawmaking power between the three
branches of government. The choice between deference to an agency's statutory interpreta-
tion, independent determination, and the refusal either to defer or to interpret the statute so as
to prohibit agency action, is a decision to hold the agency, the court, or the Legislature, respec-
tively, responsible for statutory content and meaning. Within this framework, the model of
discretionary deference presented here provides a context for analysis of the allocation of law-
making power between the judicial and executive branches. Examination of this distribution
of power reveals as well judicial conceptions regarding the legislative responsibility of Con-
gress. See infra notes 348-349 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial enforcement
of congressional legislative responsibility.
133. See infra notes 137-167 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 168-218 and accompanying text.
135. This weakness is a fault of the model only to the extent that courts have fostered this
unpredictability. The analysis of the deferential paradigm reinforces the suspicion that mod-
ern deferential review provides a principled basis for justifying the choice, once made, of
whether to defer. The making of that choice, however, has been deliberately left unpredict-
able. Professor K.C. Davis recently observed:
Clearly the scope of review of questions of law defies encapsulation in a formula.
Courts may substitute judgment, but the patterns of refraining from full exercise of
that power varies with the inclination of courts about the substantive questions. Sub-
The consequences of the absence of a coherent and predictable
framework for prospective analysis of individual cases is illustrated in the
third section's examination of three recent Supreme Court cases. 136 Each
opinion represents one of the three choices that form the model of mod-
em discretionary deference.
A. Development of the Discretionary Deference Concept
Two themes characterize the judicial justification of discretionary
deference: expertise and necessity.
L Expertise
In the early cases that form the foundation of modem discretionary
deference, the Supreme Court decided to defer to the agency's conclu-
sions that were not purely factual. The 1944 case of Skidmore v. Swift &
Co. 137 reviewed an agency decision that was not reached pursuant to a
formal adjudicatory hearing. 138 Consequently, to defer to the agency's
stitution of judgment is common, but varying degrees of deference are accorded ad-
ministrative determinations. And many opinions refuse to clarify the choice between
substitution of judgment and the use of the reasonableness test.
K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at §§ 29.00-.06 (Supp. 1982).
136. See infra notes 230-333 and accompanying text. The cases are: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. I, 467 U.S. 137 (1984); and Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. II, 467 U.S. 207 (1984).
137. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
138. The administrative position in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. was expressed in an interpre-
tive bulletin and informal ruling. At issue was the application of these views by a trial judge.
Cf NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). The distinction between an
agency interpretation as an interpretive rule and as an element of fact finding lies in the nature
of the proceeding in which the interpretation is announced. The different procedures do not
satisfactorily explain, however, why the Court presumes that limited review is appropriate
where the interpretation is announced as part of an adjudication, but may choose not to defer
where the interpretation is offered in another context.
In Skidmore, the Court suggests that the difference in judicial review is affected by con-
gressional intent. The Court notes, for example, that "Congress did not utilize the services of
an administrative agency to find facts and to determine in the first instance whether particular
cases fall within or without the Act. Instead, it put this responsibility on the courts." 323 U.S.
at 137. The explanation, however, is not applicable in cases where the administrative interpre-
tation is not embodied in an adjudicatory order or legislative rule due solely to the circum-
stances in which the matter was presented to the agency and subsequently to the court. See,
eg., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Moreover, basing the
decision to defer upon congressional intent, particularly in the broad statutes of the post-New
Deal era, often resembles an exercise in metaphysics. See Nathanson, supra note 59, at 491.
The APA recognizes interpretive rules as a distinct subspecies of rules. Although the Act
does not define the term, interpretive rules are exempt from the notice and comment require-
ment of legislative rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1982). The exemption is due to the fact that
an interpretive regulation is only an agency opinion of what the law means, and thus, does not
have the binding force of law. See Continental Oil Co. v. Burns, 317 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D.
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statutory interpretation the Court could not rely upon the reasoning that
Congress had assigned the agency the authority to apply the statute in
the course of an adjudicatory proceeding. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court invoked a variant of the traditional model of deference, premised
upon the agency's expertise. The Court articulated the criteria that
would guide its determination to defer to various types of agency deci-
sions to which it had historically not deferred:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experi-
ence and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
139
The explicit judicial recognition of the propriety of deference to
agency decisions not purely factual included implicit judicial acceptance
of agency lawmaking through statutory interpretation. 4 This willing-
ness to defer marked a significant development in administrative law.
However, the open-ended nature of the deference formula by inclusion of
the phrase "all those factors which give it power to persuade,"1 4 1 compli-
Del. 1970) ("An ... interpretative rule is a clarification or explanation of existing laws or
regulations rather than a substantive modification in or adoption of new regulations. Substan-
tive legislative rules and regulations 'create law ... whereas interpretative rules are statements
as to what the administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation means.' ").
In reality, however, a regulated interest that fails to conform its behavior to the statute as
interpreted by the agency faces the possibility of sanction in an adjudicative proceeding in
which the agency applies the interpretation. Thus, the so-called clarification or modification
embodied in an interpretive rule may operate as a legislative or substantive rule. Presumably,
an agency cannot escape the procedural requirements of rulemaking by designating a rule as
interpretive. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975).
Modem deference distinguishes between legislative and interpretive rules in terms of both
the decision to defer and the weight accorded to each type of rule. Deference to interpretive
rules is always discretionary while certain legislative rules are presumed to be entitled to defer-
ence. Historically, however, since both types of rules involved statutory interpretation, which
was a question of law, the court was theoretically charged with the responsibility for determin-
ing independently the meaning of a disputed statutory provision.
139. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Accord General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-
42 (1976).
140. The Court was willing to allow the agency to assign meaning to vague, ambiguous, or
broad statutory language and thus, to sanction agency lawmaking through administrative rules
or orders based upon the agency's application of its interpretation to the facts of the matter
under consideration.
141. 323 U.S. at 140. For a collection of cases identifying various criteria for deference, see
Annotation, Supreme Court's View as to Weight and Effect to be Given, on Subsequent Judicial
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cated efforts to understand or predict the extent of the Court's willing-
ness to defer on such matters in future cases.
The perception of the administrative decisionmaker as an expert be-
came the principal justification for discretionary deference. This ration-
ale was used by the Court both to excuse Congress from legislative
specificity and to justify the Court's decision to limit its review of the
agency's conclusion. The rationale was as follows: Congress was entitled
to seek the assistance of an expert administrative body that could effec-
tively fashion solutions to the problem identified in the delegating stat-
ute.1 42 The delegate should be permitted to use its expertise free of
judicial interference because Congress so intended.' 43 This legislative in-
tent was implied from the fact that the delegate's action was predicated
upon an administratively assigned statutory meaning.'" Admittedly,
judges were no more competent than agency decisionmakers to deter-
mine statutory meaning or to resolve congressional ambiguity with any
greater degree of certainty. Moreover, courts have noted that judges
lacked the delegate's resources and experience needed to investigate and
evaluate the wisdom or consequences of a particular interpretation.'45
In this argument, expertise provided several justifications for defer-
ence: (1) by deferring, a court was complying with the congressional
intent to seek the assistance of an expert; (2) a court was no more compe-
tent than the delegate to decide questions involving statutory meaning;
and (3) a court was incompetent to review agency decisions that ap-
peared to involve some expert judgment. Of course, since the decision to
defer was discretionary, a court could still assert its competency to de-
cide legal matters.
The frequent failure of courts to defer frustrated efforts to discern a
consistent pattern among the deference decisions. One could identify the
reasons and principles that influenced the decision to defer, but could
Construction, to Prior Administrative Construction of Statute, 39 L.Ed.2d 942 (1975); see also
supra note 15.
142. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
143. "[T]he legislature presumably intended the statute to achieve its apparent objectives to
the fullest extent practicable within the limits clearly defined, and that the best judges of prac-
ticability are those to whom is entrusted the primary responsibility for administration." Na-
thanson, supra note 59, at 491. See also Monaghan, supra note 1; Levin, Questions of Law,
supra note 16.
144. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984); Collins v. SEC, 432 U.S. 46 (1977).
145. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
103 (1983) ("A reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making predictions
within its area of special expertise .... ").
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predict neither their application nor the outcome in a particular case. 14 6
2. Expertise-Policy
To supplement the expertise justification, the Court borrowed the
labeling approach used to limit review under the traditional deference
model, 4 7 and invoked a new label: "policy." Where the agency decision
in question was based upon a variety of considerations and conclusions
not strictly verifiable as findings of fact or indisputable issues of law, the
Court found such "policy" decisions were entitled to deference.1 48
The reasoning underlying the policy labeling approach paralleled
the expertise argument with an added twist. By labeling an agency deci-
sion "policy," the Court created a code word to justify both deferring to
the recipient agency's exercise of delegated authority,'49 and inferring
that the delegating statute is constitutionally legitimate. 5 ° As with the
expertise justification, one argument supporting deference to policy deci-
sions centered on congressional intent. Where Congress delegated con-
146. In his treatise, Professor Jaffe described the differing practices associated with review
of an agency's choice of legal rules to support a decision:
A court might hold that it has the obligation to determine the correctness of every
such rule and independently adopt or reject the rule as its own decision. However,
the practice of the Supreme Court, for example, shows the Court sometimes asserting
the correctness of the agency rule, at other times, going no further than to hold that
the administrator can but is not required to adopt such a rule. It is this latter prac-
tice which has given rise to profound difficulties of description and analysis, and to
intense controversy. It has seemed to some that a court which thus leaves to an
administrator the power to bind and to loose is abandoning the prime function of a
court of law.
L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 557-58 (citations omitted).
147. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 332 U.S. 111 (1944), in which the Court
maintained that the application of law to facts was not statutory interpretation-that is, a
matter of law-and thus, the Court was not constrained from deferring to the agency's deci-
sion. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56; see also supra note 17.
148. An early articulation of the expertise-policy rationale for deference is found in NLRB
v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953) ("'Cumulative experience' begets under-
standing and insight by which judgments not objectively demonstrable are validated or quali-
fied or invalidated."). The need to defer to an agency "policy" decision most likely also
evolved from increasingly broad delegations that made impossible independent judicial review
of all administrative decisions not purely factual. Such review had been advocated in earlier
times. Dickinson, The Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
(Section 10): Background and Effect, in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 584-85 & nn. 54, 55 (G. Warren ed. 1947) (cited in
Levin, Questions of Law, supra note 16, at 12 n.70.
149. In FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981), the Supreme Court rejected
the D.C. Circuit's insistence that the FCC's decision was law and not policy. The D.C. Circuit
had used the distinction to reject the Commission's refusal to consider the diversity in program
format in making radio station licensing decisions. The Supreme Court instead insisted that
the Commission's policy statement was "entitled to substantial judicial deference." Id. at 596.
150. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc.
v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941).
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tinuing regulatory power in nonspecific statutory language, the
legislators included a delegation of policymaking authority. '51 In addi-
tion, the delegate's exercise of discretion in formulating the substance of
the congressionally ordained program was deemed to involve policy deci-
sions, and thus, entitled to judicial deference.152 This reasoning implic-
itly included the perception that the policymaker was an expert on the
matter in question.
The twist was that in order for the nonspecific delegating statute to
be constitutional, the Court needed to find that Congress had articulated
a "policy" to guide the agency's exercise of discretion. '53 The fact that
the delegate acted often implied that Congress had met this responsibil-
ity. 154 This inference had a circular quality to it: the fact that the agency
had interpreted the statute was used as evidence that Congress intended
to delegate the interpretory power. However, since the Court was hard-
pressed to determine the delegate's conformance with the statute, it sim-
plified the task of judicial review by deferring to the agency's policy
decision.
Despite the frequent invocation of the policy rationale, the Court
never really defined the term "policy" in either the statutory or agency
context. Moreover, since the early days of the New Deal, the Supreme
Court failed to find a congressional enactment unconstitutional on the
basis of an insufficiently defined policy. This was so even in cases where
the legislative history indicated an absence of agreement among legisla-
tors over fundamental aspects of the delegated authority. 55 The failure
of Congress to assign priorities to the factors and values intended to
guide the decisionmakers' judgment often left the delegate with virtually
151. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837,
864-66 (1984) (an administrative decision is entitled to deference since the statutory ambiguity
left the policy decision to the agency).
152. See Levin, Questions of Law, supra note 16, at 11 & n.61: "[T]he Court frankly ac-
knowledges that some, but not all, normative decisions that agencies make as they implement
their mandates are matters of agency discretion and may not freely be set aside on judicial
review." (citing INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1981); E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 57 (1977)) (emphasis in original).
153. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
154. Before acting, the delegate had to interpret the statute and then act in accordance with
the proferred interpretation. Consequently, the delegate's decision implied that the statute was
capable of interpretation. A classic example of delegate action implicitly confirming statutory
adequacy is a delegation to administrators to set "just and reasonable" rates. See, e.g., Per-
mian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567
F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978); see also Pierce, supra note 83, at
474 n.18 (illustrating why "just and reasonable" is an empty policy standard).
155. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980) (discussed infra notes 400-414 and accompanying text).
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unfettered discretion. Thus, where discretionary deference was granted,
an administrative policy could dictate both the fact and law decisions of
an agency.
3. Necessity
While expertise as a basis for deference was premised upon the pur-
pose of administrative governance, necessity was occasioned by the in-
crease in the power of federal regulatory agencies. Congressional use of
delegation to order agencies to fashion legislative remedies to pressing
problems brought significant changes in the nature and extent of agency
decisions. These procedural and substantive changes affected courts'
abilities to review agency decisions.
Most importantly, rulemaking, and in particular informal rulemak-
ing rather than formal adjudication, became the preferred form of deci-
sionmaking. 15 6 This increase in rulemaking marked the emergence of a
discretionary deference model independent of the traditional deference
model. In the early days of informal rulemaking the administrative pro-
cedures commanded little attention. Since the agency was not required
to compile a factual record, the court presumed that facts existed to sup-
port the rule. Consequently, deference was almost complete with respect
to agency fact findings and application of law to fact. Under such cir-
cumstances, deference to agency conclusions of law was also required.
Where the court lacked the factual raw materials, it was unable to build a
persuasive case that the agency had misinterpreted the statute.
As the use of informal rulemaking increased, however, the Court
faced the prospect of having to abandon judicial scrutiny.157 To avoid
this, the Court required that the agency provide a record for review.158
Judicial review could now include examination of both the agency's sub-
156. Both the majority of administrative agencies and courts preferred rulemaking to adju-
dication for announcement of decisions of general applicability. See, e.g., National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
157. Where the Court had no record it could not review whether the evidence supported
the agency's factual findings. Moreover, without a discussion of the agency's interpretation of
the pertinent law and the application of that law to the facts of the matter, the Court would be
unable to evaluate the rationality or correctness of the agency's decision. At most, the Court
could review the procedural steps taken by the agency to reach its final decision.
158. The record "requirement" in informal rulemaking has been assumed by the courts
rather than formally required. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (rejecting the
lower court's call for a trial de novo and calling for review on "the administrative record
already in existence"); Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (noting that the full administra-
tive record was before the Court). Initially, reviewing courts built upon the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) provision calling for agency rules to be accompanied by a statement of
the rule's basis and purpose. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982). The D.C. Circuit in particular used
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stantive and procedural decisions. Nevertheless, by the time the record
keeping requirement was established, necessity had already fostered def-
erence as the norm for review of all aspects of the agency's decisions,
including the so-called legal issues not traditionally entitled to deference.
The Court eventually narrowed the scope of review,15 9 and occasionally
disagreed with an agency conclusion,16° but it proceeded from a posture
of deference. Consequently, as a rule, courts neither conducted an unlim-
ited search of the agency record nor sought the "correct" statutory
meaning or application.
Thus, in cases involving review of informal agency rulemaking, the
emergent modem deferential review model was built upon different con-
siderations than those of the traditional model. The distinction between
fact, law-fact, and law was relatively insignificant as a basis for deciding
whether to limit review. Instead, the qualifications of the decisionmaker
and the circumstances surrounding both the congressional delegation
and the administrative decision became the primary focus.16' Under the
new model, moreover, the nature of the deference was considerably less
defined than its traditional counterpart. The expertise and policy label-
ing rationales that served to justify discretionary deference also influ-
enced the scope of the remaining review.
Other explicit and implicit factors appeared to influence the mean-
ing of discretionary deference review in particular cases. Reviewing
courts originated a variety of phrases to describe the purpose of the lim-
ited review. Whether there are any practical differences among the de-
scriptive terms is debatable. Nevertheless, by using different language to
this provision to require that the agency demonstrate the substantive basis of its rule. Cf
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court eventually chastised the D.C. Circuit for imposing procedural re-
quirements upon agency rulemaking beyond those mandated by the APA, it nevertheless as-
sumed the existence of a record requirement. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978). In Vermont Yankee,
the Supreme Court overturned the D.C. Circuit's order that the agency permit cross-examina-
tion of witnesses in an informal rulemaking proceeding. However, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether the record adequately supported
the administrative decision.
Although the Supreme Court has never defined the nature of an informal rulemaking
record, it has rejected lower court efforts to seek information beyond the record presented by
the agency. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976). See generally,
Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975).
159. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (the Court insists that
university faculty are managers barred by the statute from organizing a union, contrary to the
Board's application of its statutory interpretation to its findings of fact).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 138-139; see also infra notes 182-184 and accompa-
nying text.
Winter 1987] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
describe the scope of review in individual decisions, the Court implied
that differences existed. To the extent that a difference was more than
semantic, the choices associated with the various descriptions of deferen-
tial review did not emerge as distinct concepts.162
In effect the choices represent points on a continuum: at one end is
the choice to ignore the agency's interpretation entirely without address-
ing the question of deference;163 at the other is the explicit decision to
decline review by finding the matter solely committed to agency discre-
tion 1 4 or implicitly by treating the decision to defer as determinative of
an outcome upholding the agency decision.1 65 Other descriptions convey
the impression that there are varying degrees of judicial deference-rang-
ing from strict to cursory review-which fall along the continuum.1 66
Discretionary deference at its inception was essentially a patchwork
of ideas about how to allocate the ultimate decisionmaking power be-
tween the judicial and executive branches when Congress failed to per-
form that function.1 67  Where Congress used vague or ambiguous
162. See Coffman, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Interpretations of Statutes, 6 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1983) (citing cases using various descriptions of weight accorded to
agency statutory interpretations, Professor Coffman maintains that "[w]hatever the expression
used, the essential meaning is that the administrator's interpretation will be upheld if it is
'reasonable' "); see also Note, A Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency's Statutory Inter-
pretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469,
471 n. 18 (citing cases other than those of Professor Coffman, the author comments that "[t]he
'reasonableness' standard has assumed many different forms") [hereinafter Note, A Framework
for Judicial Review].
Given the variety of descriptions and expressions, the term "reasonableness" in its present
usage as a concept of deferential review has no meaning and little practical significance. It
exists as a conclusion attached to a court's decision to uphold an agency's interpretation with-
out deciding that the interpretation is the only acceptable meaning of the statutory language.
The descriptive terminology that comprises the reasonableness conclusion, however, appears
to indicate different levels of judicial scrutiny involved in a determination of reasonableness.
See infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 713 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (discussed
supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text); see also Diver, supra note 15, at 563-64.
164. Technically, determination of statutory meaning is not a matter committed to agency
discretion. Cf Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. On the other hand, where the challenge is to an
agency decision that embodies a statutory interpretation, the potential for judicial declination
of review exists if the court deems the agency action "discretionary."
165. See infra notes 193-218 and accompanying text (discussing presumptive deference).
166. See, e.g., Stever, Deference to Administrative Agencies in Federal Environmental,
Health and Safety Litigation-Thoughts on Varying Judicial Application of the Rule, 6 W.
NEW ENG. L. REv. 35 (1983); Coffman, supra note 162; R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P.
VERKUiL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS §§ 7.4.3, 7.7.1 (1985); see also infra notes
169-170 and accompanying text & note 172.
167. "The Court's choice between substituting its judgment for that of the agencies or us-
ing a reasonableness test is not guided by explicit theory but depends upon judicial discretion."
K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at § 30.58. Presently, the justification of deference usually follows a
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statutory language, a reviewing court had to decide whether to determine
statutory meaning itself, or to give the agency's interpretation some role
in resolving the conflict between interpretations advanced by the agency
and the challenger. Eventually, the patchwork narrowed into three
choices, including the refusal to defer. The two other choices, weighted
deference and presumptive deference, form the paradigm of discretionary
judicial deference. Each is examined in the next section.
B. The Discretionary Deference Model
1. Weighted Deference
Weighted deference refers to a court's choice to limit its review by
assigning a "weight" to the challenged agency decision. This weight rep-
resents the level of scrutiny involved in the court's review. 168 The
weighted deference category encompasses most of the cases in which a
court defers to an agency's statutory interpretation.
The possible levels of limited judicial scrutiny under weighted defer-
ence range from cursory to searching review. At one end, the review is
sufficiently extensive to permit the court to disagree with an agency deci-
sion despite the court's claim that it is deferring.169 At the other end, the
review is so limited as to approach an irrebuttable presumption that the
agency's decision is acceptable. 170 Theoretically, the greater the weight
commanded by an agency decision, the less searching is a court's evalua-
tion of the decisionmaker's explanation for its conclusion.171
court's determination that the statutory language in question is without an obvious or explicit
meaning. See Diver, supra note 15, at 560-63.
168. The origins of judicial identification of factors that determine the weight accorded an
administrative interpretation can be traced to Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944) (discussed supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text). See also Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977) ("The regulation at issue in this case is therefore entitled to more
than mere deference or weight."); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976);
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-37 (1974) (varying degrees of deference based upon factors
concerning agency qualifications).
169. See, eg., E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977) (the Court reversed
the lower court's substitution of judgment, but closely scrutinized the agency's interpretation
of the statute in question).
170. See, eg., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) ("Unless de-
monstrably irrational, Federal Reserve Board staff opinions.., should be dispositive. .. ");
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973) ("we
are guided by the 'venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with
its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong
.... ' "); see also infra notes 193-218 and accompanying text.
171. But see Diver, supra note 15, at 566 (claiming that there is no direct evidence that
deferential courts fail to examine precisely the same sorts of material that courts examine when
engaging in independent review).
Winter 19871
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY
The case law is not particularly enlightening in understanding the
weighted deference concept because of the inconsistent terminology
courts have used to define the scope of review, based upon varying de-
grees of deference.172 In addition to this rhetorical confusion, the
172. Professor Davis maintains that one cannot "get at the realities of the scope of [judi-
cial] review [by] taking apart" the many confused verbalisms. K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at
§ 29.2. He notes that such descriptions at their best are broad and general, and at their worst
subtract from understanding more than they add. Id. at § 29.00-.02. The Court has also been
inconsistent with respect to the context in which it applies its descriptive phrases. The Court's
descriptions of weighted deferential review appear to apply in four non-mutually exclusive
contexts. These are functional, quasi-qualitative, doctrinal, and procedural.
Functional formulae describe review that ranges from careful scrutiny to cursory glance.
Quasi-qualitative review refers to descriptions of judicial evaluation standards. Among
the most frequently cited descriptions is the familiar "arbitrary and capricious" standard, an
extension of the traditional deference standard for reviewing decisions of fact and law-fact. See
supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text. Under weighted deference, "arbitrary and capri-
cious" describes the standard for judicial evaluation of an agency's asserted legal basis for its
decision. The quasi-qualitative category also includes evaluative descriptions such as "reason-
able" and "rational."
The doctrinal classifications are the courts' recent efforts to narrow the extent of their
deference. See supra notes 95-119 and accompanying text. In particular, the "hard look"
review, first fashioned in the traditional deference model to limit deference to the law-fact
decisions in formal adjudication, has been extended to agency rulemaking decisions. In Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37 n.79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), the D.C.
Circuit held that hard look modified the arbitrary and capricious standard of review of infor-
mal rulemaking in a manner similar to the modification of the substantial evidence review
standard of adjudication and formal rulemaking. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying
text; see also Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court recently endorsed the use of hard look as a reviewing standard
of informal rulemaking. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983), the Court overturned the Department of Transportation's decision to re-
scind its rule requiring the installation of air bags or passive restraints. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), to which the Secretary of Transportation delegated
his authority concerning the promulgation of safety standards, claimed that the rule, which
had been promulgated during the previous Administration, would not produce significant
safety benefits. Id. at 38. The Court was unwilling to accord the degree of deference that the
agency claimed it was owed according to earlier Court decisions. In particular, the Court
refused to hold that deference to an administrative decision was equivalent to the presumption
of constitutionality due a congressionally enacted statute. Id. at 43 n.9. Although the Court
used the rhetorical label "arbitrary and capricious," the Court's decision indicated that this
review standard was being modified to require a more extensive judicial evaluation of the
agency's decision.
The procedural approach to limiting review is perhaps the most subtle variant of weighted
deference. The level of scrutiny can be substantially affected by judicial assignment of the
burden of persuasion between challenger and agency. For example, descriptions of review
standards requiring that an agency's decision be rationally based or reasonable imply that a
court must find sufficient support for an agency's conclusions in the agency's decisionmaking
record. This means that at least part of the burden rests with the agency. The agency must
make an affirmative showing that the basis of its decision meets the requisite review standard.
See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 653-
54 (1980), in which the Court found that the agency "did not even attempt to carry its burden
of proof." The Court rejected the agency position that the burden was on the regulated inter-
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Supreme Court's failure to provide an analytical framework for predict-
ing the scope of deferential review leaves one to speculate as to an indi-
vidual court's motivation for invoking and applying discretionary
weighted deference in a particular set of circumstances. Moreover, while
the case law identifies the factors favoring deference, the significance of a
decision to accord greater or lesser weight is not always evident.
173
The Court's decision to accord an agency decision weighted defer-
ence is also plagued by analytical uncertainty. The leading Supreme
Court case in the development of modem weighted deference is Udall v.
Tallman. 174 This case is frequently cited for the broad proposition that a
court should defer to a statutory interpretation by agency officials whom
Congress entrusted with the administration of the statutory scheme. 175
However, the decision in Udall was considerably narrower than this
principle and the flexible application of Udall illustrates the unpredict-
ability of the weighted deference choice.
ests to disprove the agency's conclusion. Id. at 653. On the other hand, the burden rests with
the challenger when a court asserts that it will not overturn an agency decision unless the
challenger has demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that there is an unreasonable or plainly
erroneous agency interpretation. See Compton v. Tennessee Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 32 F.2d
561, 565 (6th Cir. 1976) ("including rent supplement payments in the definition of income for
food stamps is [not] plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the vendor payment regulation");
Burglin v. Morton, 527 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The plaintiffs have not made a tender
of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity of administrative action."); see
also Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969) ("unless unreasonable and plainly inconsis-
tent with the ... statutes"); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956) ("if
that definition does not appear too farfetched"); cf. Stever, supra note 166, at 45.
Conceding that the variations of deferential review "are almost infinite," Professor Stever
divides the judicial approaches into three broad categories: "hard look," "quick look," and
"no look" cases.
The four contextual categories are not mutually exclusive, but represent different ap-
proaches used by the Court. They may, for instance, occupy equivalent spots along the spec-
trum of narrow to extensive review. For example, hard look, which this Article classifies as a
doctrinal description, may be equated with the functional description of careful scrutiny. The
observation of the descriptive groups is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of all cases
involving discretionary weighted deference. Rather, the classification offers a perspective on
the present review practices of courts in order to determine whether there is some basis for
achieving a coherent understanding of these practices in a larger analytic framework.
173. The line of cases that identifies criteria for justifying judicial deference is generally not
helpful in assigning priorities among the various factors that favor deference. Consequently,
predicting the nature of the deferential review in particular circumstances is even more difficult
than speculating on whether a court will defer (see discussion of Udall v. Tallman, infra notes
174-181 and accompanying text).
174. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
175. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 544 (1979); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974). The principle in Udall was articulated in dictum. 380 U.S. at
16.
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Udall involved a decision by an administrative official charged with
responsibility under a presidential executive order, not an administrative
legislative rule.176 The interpretation of that order, which was embodied
in the decision, was entitled to deference for two reasons: it was consis-
tent with past agency practices,177 and it induced reliance that would be
detrimental if the Court substituted its own interpretation.'
As noted earlier, subsequent decisions relying upon Udall have not
been so limited. Since all statutes require some interpretation, and all
delegations of legislative power identify the officials charged with ad-
ministering the statutory scheme, Udall's broad proposition can justify
deference in almost every instance of administrative statutory interpreta-
tion. The widespread applicability of this proposition, however, clashes
with the reluctance of at least some courts to curtail its review so
severely. 179
Hence, Udall has spawned two lines of cases. One line establishes
deference as the decisional norm by expanding the factors that justify a
court's decision to accept an agency interpretation. 8 ' The other line dis-
tinguishes application of this norm by identifying the circumstances that
disqualify the administrator from entitlement to deference. 8' While the
two lines of cases are not antithetical, if read together they do not form a
coherent model either for determining when an agency's decision quali-
fies for deference or for predicting the level of scrutiny accompanying a
court's decision to defer.
For example, a court's decision to defer may be considered indepen-
176. 380 U.S. at 5.
177. Id. at 17.
178. Id. at 18.
179. Compare United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555 (1982) (agency construction of a statute
given great deference when followed consistently over a long period), with Morrison-Knudsen
Constr. Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 644 (1983) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (deference given to a relatively recent and inconsistent agency
interpretation).
180. See supra note 175.
181. This second line of cases spawned by Udall is not synonymous with the line of cases in
which the Court independently determines statutory meaning on the grounds that the interpre-
tive function is solely a judicial responsibility. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970);
Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 25 & text accompanying notes 54-59. Commentators and judges often speak of two lines
of decisions involving judicial review of administrative statutory interpretation. In essence
they refer to those in which a court defers and those in which a court exercises independent
judgment. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976);
Diver, supra note 15, at 551. The line of decision discussed here acknowledges deference as a
general proposition but concludes that in the particular case under review, the agency's deci-
sion is not entitled to deference, The court may then provide its own interpretation.
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dently of another court's reasons for not deferring.182 This means that
the criteria supporting deference in one case do not necessarily exclude
deference in a seemingly opposite situation. 83 Where the traditional fac-
tors favoring deference in a particular case are absent, a court may create
new reasons for deferring.' 84 Similarly, even where the traditional factors
warranting deference are present, a court may still decide not to defer.1
8 5
Equally problematical is the fact that the criteria identified in the
case law calls for highly subjective judgments by reviewing judges.1 86 A
consequence of the dichotomous application of Udall is that by manipu-
182. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
183. For example, the Court has asserted that an administrative intbrpretAtion that was
contemporaneous with the passage of the enabling statute, and that has been consistently ad-
hered to since that time, is entitled to deference. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555
(1982). On the other hand, the Court has also deferred to an administrative change in a statu-
tory interpretation despite the fact that the change represents a new policy without an accom-
panying congressional amendment. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968).
184. For example, deference has been justified on the grounds that an agency was engaged
in an experimental attempt to implement a new regulatory concept even though the concept
could n*ot be traced to a specific congressional policy. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. 747 (1968). See also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 44 (1979), in which the
Supreme Court found that deference was particularly appropriate when the issue involved a
matter of public controversy.
185. In Association of American R.Rs. v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
the court ruled that deference was not applicable where the agency "misinterpreted its stat-
ute." This reasoning may be the equivalent of saying that a court need not defer when it wants
to reach a different conclusion. See also Moon v. United States Dep't of Labor, 727 F.2d 1315
(D.C. Cir. 1984), and Trailways, Inc. v. ICC, 727 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1984), in which differ-
ent panels of the same court evaded Udall with little difficulty.
186. In National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 693 F.2d
156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the district court refused to defer to the EPA, based upon its findings
that the Agency's statutory interpretation did not require scientific expertise, was not based
upon policy reasons, was contrary to congressional intent expressed in both the broad and
interim goals, and was inconsistent with the EPA's implemeritation of the Act in other con-
texts. Id. at 1311. By contrast, on appeal, the D.C. Circuit concluded that "great deference"
was owed to the EPA because of, among other reasons, the Agency's scientific and technical
expertise and its contemporaneous and consistent construction of the Act. 693 F.2d at 166-70.
While the district court emphasized congressional purpose in enacting the regulatory scheme,
530 F. Supp. at 1304, the D.C. Circuit emphasized the consequences of the EPA's choice, 693
F.2d at 181-82. The D.C. Circuit characterized the considerations underlying the EPA deci-
sion as based upon "expertise," but the concerns listed appeared to be more political than
scientific. Id. at 182-83.
The district court's decision would have forced the EPA to become an unwilling regulator
in order to further the congressional purpose. The D.C. Circuit avoided this result by constru-
ing congressional intent to give the agency both "substantial discretion in administering the
Act" and "at least some power to define the specific terms" at issue. Id. at 167. The D.C.
Circuit explained that by accepting the Agency's interpretation, priority was accorded to the
spirit of the statute. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit found "special reason to defer" based upon
the fact that Congress did not contemplate the issues associated with regulating this particular
matter. Id. at 182.
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lating the criteria for deferring or refusing to defer, judges may base their
agreement or disagreement with an agency's interpretation upon their
personal evaluation of the wisdom of the underlying agency policies.
Judges can also use deference criteria to mask their displeasure with
congressional legislative programs.1 87 A court's refusal to defer by as-
signing its own statutory meaning can severely restrict the effective scope
of a legislative program.' On the other hand, a court in general agree-
ment with a program's goals can excuse the absence of statutory specific-
ity by finding sufficient factors to warrant deferring to the delegate's
decision.8 9 Even where the court agrees with an agency interpretation,
the difference between deferring to the agency's decision-rather than
affirming by adopting the agency interpretation as its own-is significant
because deference theoretically permits the agency to reinterpret the stat-
ute to reach an opposite result in another case.' 9 °
The use of deference as a justification for upholding agency action
for which there is no evidence of congressional contemplation signifi-
cantly alters the interpretive process in which statutory meaning is de-
duced from the statutory language or legislative history, or both.
Consequently, judicial deference permits, if not encourages, the agency
"to draw upon its practical experience to develop new meanings of [stat-
utory] phrases as time passes."'' The legislative amendment process
can thus continue indefinitely without formal congressional action. Since
the bases for judicial deference elude generalization with any degree of
certainty, one is left to guess whether a court will accept or reject the
agency's efforts.
187. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464
U.S. 89 (1983) (deference not given when the interpretation involved a policy decision more
properly made by Congress); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 713 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall objected to the plurality's
refusal to defer to the agency's determination of safe exposure level by reinterpreting the stat-
ute in an unorthodox manner: "The plurality is obviously more interested in the consequences
of its decision than in discerning the intention of Congress.").
188. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
189. See Arizona Power Auth. v. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 19)77) (the court offered
circular reasoning to justify deference to an administrative interpretation: after cohcluding
that the interpretation was entitled to deference, the court used that conclusion as support for
a finding of reasonableness).
190. For example, in United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), the Supreme Court
deferred to the FDA's interpretation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that new drugs for
the treatment of terminally ill persons were not exempt from the requirement of pre-market
testing. Since the Court found that the FDA was delegated discretion on the matter of testing
new drugs, the FDA theoretically retains the authority to find that the Act permits an exemp-
tion for some other drug. See infra note 194.
191. Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31
ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 339 (1979).
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2. Presumptive Deference
Presumptive deference refers to the category of cases in which the
court's choice to defer compels it to accept the agency's decision. This
category is distinct from weighted deference because here the deference
decision is outcome determinative: presumptive deference permits a
court to uphold a questionable agency interpretation by placing upon a
challenger the virtually impossible burden of proving the agency
incorrect.
The theoretical availability of a challenger's opportunity to rebut
distinguishes presumptive deference from those cases held to be unre-
viewable because the matter was committed to the discretion of the
agency. 192 Nevertheless, the reasoning of presumptive deference and un-
reviewable cases is similar. Both depend on a court's determination that
Congress intended to delegate broad discretionary authority that in-
cluded the power to determine the meaning of the delegated statute. Un-
like cases deemed unreviewable, however, the court need not find an
explicit congressional directive foreclosing judicial review. Instead, the
court maintains that it will intervene if a challenger can show clear evi-
dence that the agency interpretation is contradicted by a specific statu-
tory directive. Such a showing is impossible where the statute contains
only general language and vague or ambiguous directives.
Review under presumptive deference in effect is little more than a
review of the form rather than the substance of an agency's decision. So
long as the agency provides the required explanation of its interpretation,
the court is unlikely to evaluate the reasoning underlying the agency's
conclusion. Consequently, a challenger's only hope of convincing a court
to evaluate the substance of an agency decision is to rebut the presumed
adequacy of the agency's explanation.1 93
The availability of the presumptive deference choice serves two pur-
poses. First, it allows a court to uphold a questionable agency interpreta-
tion by effectively refusing to review the substantive basis of the agency's
192. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). See also supra note 83.
193. Presumptive deference is not synonymous with the presumption of regularity or valid-
ity to which the courts sometimes refer in the course of reviewing challenged agency action.
While there is some dispute over the meaning, and even the existence of the latter presump-
tion, to the extent that it exists the presumption of regularity would appear to be a broader
concept. It encompasses more than the issue of the delegate's statutory interpretation by
presuming that both the procedural and substantive considerations underlying the agency deci-
sion are reasonable in the absence of evidence to the contrary. While this presumption implic-
itly includes the delegate's interpretation of the statute, the issue of statutory meaning may be
isolated from a presumption accorded to the procedures and factual support for the challenged
decision. See Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine, supra note 16, at 282-84; Monaghan, supra note
1.
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decision. Second, it permits a court to legitimize a broad statutory dele-
gation by "bootstrapping" the administrative interpretation onto the
meaningless statutory language. Since the constitutionality of such dele-
gations is rarely challenged, the court need not address the issue of
whether a court could, if asked, determine if an agency action exceeded
the scope of its delegated authority. 194
Admittedly, the judicial choice to accord an agency decision pre-
sumptive deference is questionable. In particular, it raises the issue of
whether the choice exists in order to allow a court to justify upholding an
agency decision that could not be sustained upon a closer judicial exami-
nation. An affirmative answer to this query is supported by the fact that
the judicial decision to accord presumptive deference is generally recog-
nized only retrospectively. The cases do not reveal any judicial acknowl-
edgment that there are objectively determinable circumstances under
which a court is likely to uphold an agency decision by using presump-
tive as opposed to weighted deference. Nevertheless, the case law reveals
instances in which courts are either unwilling or unable to sustain an
agency decision by meaningfully evaluating the substantive basis for the
challenged agency decision.195
The Supreme Court's decision in Batterton v. Francis1 96 illustrates
the presumptive deference paradigm. The case concerned the meaning of
the term "unemployment" as used in the Social Security Act.197 The
challenged agency regulations permitted states to exclude from receipt of
special welfare benefits those classes of persons ineligible for unemploy-
ment compensation under state programs.1 98
194. It might be argued that the agency's initial interpretation serves to clarify the bounda-
ries of its delegated power. Although this approach permits the delegate to define its own
jurisdiction, it also arguably provides the specificity required by regulated interests to predict
the consequences of planned action. The weakness in this argument is revealed by cases sanc-
tioning a delegate's change in its interpretation of the statute without any intervening congres-
sional action. Cf Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). The Court implicitly legitimizes a delegation as well by
according an agency interpretation weighted deference. Unlike presumptive deference, how-
ever, weighted deference preserves some limited review. Thus, the Court at least implicitly
acknowledges that it is capable of determining whether the agency acted ultra vires.
195. In some cases of result-oriented review, the court may appear to review the basis of
the agency's decision. Such review is largely a sham. See infra notes 219-227 and accompany-
ing text (discussing weighted-presumptive hybrid deference).
196. 432 U.S. 416 (1977). For a different interpretation of Batterton, see Levin, Questions
of Law, supra note 16. Professor Levin argues that the Court was mistaken in according defer-
ence to a pure question of law interpretation, which did not involve law application.
197. 432 U.S. at 424.
198. Id. at 420-21. Some states excluded certain classes of "unemployed" persons from
receiving benefits-such as those who voluntarily left their job or who were out of work as a
result of a labor dispute.
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The lower court held that the agency interpretation was incorrect in
part because Congress had intended to establish a national standard that
did not permit variation by individual states. 199 The Supreme Court re-
versed, claiming that it was compelled to defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion.2" Even though the agency's interpretation was "at some variance"
with the legislative history,2"' the Court upheld the regulations. In ef-
fect, presumptive deference permitted the five member majority to up-
hold the agency's decision despite extensive evidence cited by the dissent
that Congress did not intend to permit the states to define the statutory
term in question.2 °z
The Supreme Court's analysis was supported by two considerations
representative of presumptive deference reasoning. First, the Justices
characterized the statutory language as ambiguous.20 3 Second, they de-
termined that Congress delegated legislative authority for the purpose of
authorizing the agency to clarify any statutory ambiguity.2°4 Thus, the
Court concluded: "The regulation at issue in this case is therefore enti-
tled to more than mere deference or weight. It can be set aside only if the
Secretary exceeded his statutory authority or if the regulation is 'arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.' "205
The Court's explanation for this nearly blind deference is problem-
atic. The Court invokes the rhetorical formula of the conventional arbi-
trary and capricious review standard, yet it is not necessarily implying
that all review under that standard compels "more than mere deference."
Both before and after its decision in Batterton, the Court continued to
evaluate many, if not most, of the challenged agency decisions presented.
Consequently, the Batterton opinion represented a distinct type of judi-
cial review: where Congress delegates explicit lawmaking power and de-
liberately uses ambiguous statutory language, the Court may severely
restrict its review of agency decisions that supply statutory meanings.
199. Id. at 428-29.
200. Id. at 425-26.
201. Id. at 430. The Court explained: "Certainly, the congressional purpose was to pro-
mote greater uniformity in the applicability of the AFDC-UF program. But the goal of greater
uniformity can be met without imposing identical standards on each State." Id. at 431. The
Court essentially reasoned that uniformity need not be uniform.
202. Id. at 432-37 (White, J., dissenting).
203. 432 U.S. at 427-28.
204. "Congress itself must have appreciated that the meaning of the statutory term was not
self-evident, or it would not have given the Secretary the power to prescribe standards." Id. at
428. See also Trailways, Inc. v. ICC, 727 F.2d 1284, 1287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where Judge
Wright poses the question as "whether Congress delegated the norm-elaboration function to
the agency."
205. 432 U.S. at 426 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, the Batterton Court's emphasis of the distinction between
legislative and interpretive rules for purposes of deference fails to provide
a satisfactory explanation. The Court maintained that legislative rules
promulgated pursuant to an explicit grant of lawmaking power differed
from the deference owed to interpretive rules.206 However, since the
Court has frequently evaluated agency statutory interpretations pursuant
to delegations of legislative power while claiming it is deferring,20 7 the
Court's distinction between legislative and interpretive rules cannot
mean that all legislative rules are entitled to deference.
The effect of the Batterton analysis is to allow a court to ignore a
specific congressional directive if three conditions are met: (1) Congress
intended to delegate broad legislative rulemaking authority; (2) the chal-
lenged agency decision is an exercise of that delegated authority; and (3)
at least a portion of the statutory language is capable of more than one
meaning. As Batterton demonstrates, even where Congress is unusually
instructive, the statutory ambiguity condition can be satisfied by judicial
creativity. Thus, despite the congressional directive to establish a uni-
form and national standard of eligibility,20 8 the Court refused to imply
that the directive prohibited an agency decision to make the standard
dependent on varying local policies.
Another example of the use of presumptive deference is the case of
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin.209 The respondents in Milhollin chal-
lenged the validity of a consumer credit transaction because the creditor
failed to disclose the existence of an acceleration clause on the face of the
credit agreement. The Federal Reserve Board ruled that neither the stat-
ute nor the regulations containing the Board's statutory interpretation
and enforcement provisions required such disclosure.210
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the Board,211
and offered its own interpretation of the statute. It reasoned that in the
absence of clear statutory language, a court should try to achieve the
206. "By way of contrast, a court is not required to give effect to an interpretive regulation.
Varying degrees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such
factors as the timing and consistency of the agency's position, and the nature of its expertise."
Id. at 425 n.9 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976); Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-37 (1974); and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
207. See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text. The Court has also refused to defer
to agency interpretations embodied in legislative rules. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. I, 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
208. 432 U.S. at 430-31.
209. 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
210. Id. at 559. This ruling was not contained in a regulation issued according to the
rulemaking procedures of the APA. See infra note 214.
211. Milhollin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 588 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1978).
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congressional purpose by choosing the most logical direction. The
Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the matter in question
was not governed by clear statutory or regulatory language, but never-
theless reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Court reasoned that in
light of the "lacuna in the express prescriptions," the lower court "had
no ground for displacing the [Board's] expert judgment. 212
Although the agency's interpretation in Milhollin was not explicitly
contrary to the congressional statutory language or purpose as in Bat-
terton, the Court invoked presumptive deference. It maintained that the
Board's statutory construction was "dispositive"-meaning that it
should be sustained unless it was "demonstrably irrational.1213 Since the
Court noted that Congress had not specifically addressed the matter, ir-
rationality was virtually impossible to demonstrate on the facts.
The Court's justification for its choice of presumptive deference was
based upon a finding that Congress intended the recipient of its delegated
power to exercise discretion free of judicial intervention. 214 Thus, the
Court did not engage in an evaluation of the conformance of the chal-
lenged agency interpretation to the delegating statute.21 5
As in Batterton, which it did not cite, the Court found the same
three conditions for presumptive deference. The Court maintained that
Congress intended the broad delegation of authority, noting that the
Board's decision was an exercise of that authority. Further, the Court
admitted that the statutory language was capable of several acceptable
interpretations.2 1'6 However, the Court in Milhollin added an additional
212. 444 U.S. at 570.
213. Id. at 565.
214. The Court found that the statute signalled "an unmistakable congressional decision to
treat administrative rulemaking and interpretation under [the Truth in Lending Act] as au-
thoritative." Id. at 567-68. It also noted that the legislative history indicated a congressional
"preference for resolving interpretive issues by uniform administrative decision, rather than
through piecemeal litigation." Id. The interpretation in question, however, was offered by the
staff of the Federal Reserve Board without review by the Board. The staff was authorized to
issue unreviewed "Information Letters" in response to inquiries. In Milhollin, the administra-
tive interpretation was, therefore, not issued as a regulation subject to a hearing process or
mandated by a statutory directive.
215. Professor Davis notes that the Milhollin case "establishes a new high water mark of
judicial tolerance for delegation and subdelegation of unreviewable power to make law." K.
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 386. Noting the extent of the judicial deference accorded to an admin-
istrative interpretation that was not the product of an agency rulemaking proceeding, Profes-
sor Davis adds: "In a very broad perspective, the Milhollin case may be regarded as one of the
most extreme decisions the Supreme Court has ever made." Id. at 388-89.
216. The various interpretations of the Act are evinced by the split in the Circuits over
interpretation of the statute. See 444 U.S. at 559 n.6. The Court may have chosen to invoke
presumptive deference in order to avoid choosing among varying interpretations that support
the same outcome.
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consideration: it claimed that deference was compelled by necessity. Ac-
cording to the reasoning underlying this claim, the decision in question
involved judgment in balancing competing considerations. Conse-
quently, the Court asserted that the Board was better suited than the
Court to perform the necessary evaluation.2 17
Because a court need not find affirmative evidence of reasonableness,
presumptive deference decisions may be shorter than those based upon
weighted deference.218 Moreover, because a court need only examine the
statute to determine first, that Congress intended to delegate discretion,
and second, that the statute is either silent or ambiguous regarding the
matter in question, the court can sustain an agency decision that it might
reverse upon closer scrutiny.
A court's choice of presumptive deference over weighted deference
is significant in two respects. First, the choice of presumptive deference
inhibits the ability of future courts to refuse to sustain agency decisions
regarding the same statute. If a court has presumptively deferred to an
agency, a later court must accept all subsequent agency interpretations
unless the court reinterprets the delegating statute. The court is not free
to disagree with the agency decision based upon a judicial evaluation of
the agency's substantive basis for its decision. Moreover, in conformance
with the principles of stare decisis, any subsequent judicial statutory re-
interpretation would have to be based upon a finding either that the ear-
lier court was incorrect in according presumptive deference, or that
Congress did not intend for the delegate to exercise discretion regarding
the particular matter under review. Even if the agency has radically al-
tered the policy upon which it based the earlier action, the court would
be expected to continue to accord agency decisions presumptive
deference.
The second respect in which a choice of presumptive or weighted
deference is significant concerns the relative freedom of a court using
weighted deference. Where the decision to defer does not compel the
court to accept the agency decision, it remains free to defer yet to disa-
gree with the agency. Moreover, in subsequent challenges to a decision
of an agency previously deferred to, the court may conclude that new
considerations require the court to accord "less weight" to the new
217. Id. at 568. The Court maintained that "a court that tries to chart a true course to the
Act's purpose embarks upon a voyage without a compass when it disregards the agency's
views." Id.
218. Once the Court justified its decision to defer, the remainder of the discussion in
Milhollin was perfunctory. In a passing reference, the Court simply stated that the Board's
conclusion was "reasonable." Id. at 569.
agency decision. Consequently, despite an earlier decision to defer, the
court continues at liberty to disagree with an agency decision.
The consequences of the choice between presumptive and weighted
deference are explored further in the next section. It examines recent
Supreme Court decisions that illustrate each of the choices available to a
reviewing court. First, however, to understand fully the discretionary
deference model, a brief digression about the "weighted presumptive"
hybrid is necessary. The purpose and extent of a court's use of presump-
tive deference is illustrated by the judicial creation of the hybrid
approach.
3. The Weighted-Presumptive Hybrid
The weighted-presumptive hybrid is an approach to judicial review
that uses the form of weighted deference and the language of presump-
tive deference. A court might invoke the hybrid approach to sustain an
agency decision that does not meet the conditions for presumptive defer-
ence because it is not embodied in a legislative rule. In such a situation,
the court uses deference to justify its acceptance of an agency decision
that, but for the presumption of acceptability, could be successfully
challenged.
The use of weighted deference to create a presumption of acceptabil-
ity of a challenged agency decision merits separate discussion because it
represents a distinct approach to judicial review. It does not, however,
represent a choice separate from presumptive deference.2" The hybrid
approach employs deference to determine the outcome of judicial review,
however, it requires a slight detour in judicial reasoning for the court to
reach its conclusion. Although the court claims to be examining the evi-
dence supporting the agency's decision, the discussion is unnecessary.
The judicial evaluation of the reasonableness of the agency decision is
largely superfluous. The court need only conclude that the statutory lan-
guage is broad or ambiguous, and a successful challenge becomes virtu-
ally impossible.
The hybrid approach is illustrated in National Wildlife Federation v.
Gorsuch.2 0 The form of the court's opinion was dictated by the agency
action under review. The case arose as a challenge to an agency's refusal
to act. The refusal amounted to an interpretive ruling, a type of agency
decision specifically distinguished from the legislative rules to which the
219. The hybrid approach is distinguished from presumptive deference in form rather than
substance.
220. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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court in Batterton had accorded presumptive deference. 221
Gorsuch involved the refusal by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to regulate changes in water quality caused by hydro-
electrical dams. Nothing in the applicable statute, the Clean Water
Act,222 or its legislative history suggested that Congress had ever consid-
ered the problem. The Act required the EPA to regulate "pollutants
added" to the water from "point sources. ' 223 The EPA's interpretation
that dams were not "point sources" resulted in a refusal to regulate.
Interestingly, if the EPA had chosen to regulate dams by issuing
emission standards, the Court could have accepted the decision on the
basis that the Agency's decision was a legislative rule entitled to pre-
sumptive deference. In that case, the Court could reason that the Act
delegated broad discretionary power in ambiguous language; therefore,
the EPA's interpretation embodied in its legislative rule compelled judi-
cial approval. One consequence of the Gorsuch Court's use of the hybrid
approach to sustain the opposite EPA decision is to allow the Agency
unrestricted power of statutory interpretation.224
The District of Columbia Circuit's approach in Gorsuch trans-
formed a congressional mandate to regulate pollution sources into a
choice left to the Agency's discretion.22 5 Instead of reading the mandate
in conjunction with the long-term and interim goals expressed in the stat-
221. The Agency's decision was based upon its interpretation of the statute. The interpre-
tation was not embodied in a rule subject to notice and comment proceedings. The court also
rejected using the presumptive deference standard of Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin. See
supra notes 209-217 and accompanying text.
222. Clean Water Act, § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
223. 693 F.2d at 165. "Point source" is defined in the statute as "any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel [or]
conduit... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (14) (1982).
224. Since the D.C. Circuit's opinion followed the form of a weighted deference decision, it
was obliged to discuss its conclusion that the Agency's interpretation was "reasonable." 693
F.2d at 177. Despite the additional discussion, however, the opinion appeared outcome deter-
minative based upon the court's decision to defer. The D.C. Circuit in Gorsuch cited Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin and its narrower standard of review, but rejected it stating, "we
believe that this standard was meant to apply only to the Truth in Lending Act .. " Id. at
171 n.46. It is this rejection of the presumptive deference of Milhollin that places Gorsuch in a
seemingly separate category. Nevertheless, the court limited its inquiry into the conformance
of the Agency's interpretation with the delegating statute by according the Agency's decision
"great deference." Id. at 166-67 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965)).
225. The D.C. Circuit's approach stands in sharp contrast to that of the district court. See
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1982). The lower court re-
fused to accept the Agency's interpretation because it found that interpretation "more tor-
tured" and "overly literal and technical" than if the Act were read to include water pollution
caused by dams. Id. at 1307. The D.C. Circuit's reversal does not contradict the district
court's characterization. Instead, the appellate court's finding of reasonableness is supported
by a strained judicial explanation of both the congressional intent and the statutory language.
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ute, the court framed the issue as whether the Agency's construction
"plainly frustrate[s] the general congressional purposes underlying the
Act."226 By making the standard for reversal so difficult to meet, the
court was able to uphold an interpretation that failed to further the statu-
tory goal and most likely diminished efforts to accomplish the congres-
sional purpose. Although the court examined the basis of the Agency's
decision, judicial deference in this case caused the court to go to great
lengths to sustain that decision.
The effect of the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Gorsuch
on legislative responsibility is much the same as if it had presumptively
deferred. The decision both condoned congressional inaction and ex-
cused the Legislature's failure to consider the political and economic
consequences of its regulatory scheme. Unlike the legislative rule in-
volved in the Batterton case, however, the Gorsuch court accorded the
equivalent of presumptive deference to a statutory interpretation not sub-
ject to a rulemaking proceeding. Thus, the public was not given an op-
portunity to scrutinize and comment on the agency decision.
Admittedly, if the court had independently reached the conclusion
that Congress did not delegate the power to regulate pollution caused by
dams, the immediate result of the case would have been the same. Nev-
ertheless, responsibility for the omission in the regulatory scheme would
rest with Congress. If Congress then decided to regulate dam pollution,
elected officials would have to consider the political and economic conse-
quences associated with that decision. If, on the other hand, the court
took the statute at its word and read the Act as intending to regulate
sources of pollution, it could not uphold the Agency's interpretation.
See 693 F.2d at 170-83. The D.C. Circuit's "limited inquiry" regarding the reasonableness of
the EPA's decision included the following findings:
-Dam induced water conditions are not substances "added" to water, and thus, although
pollution, they are not "pollutants;"
-Congress could have chosen language to make the definition of "pollutant" broader if such
was its intent. The use of both "pollutant" and "pollution" implies that they are different.
Moreover, congressional drafters' use of the word "means" as opposed to "included within the
meaning of 'pollutant'" excludes any meaning not stated. Thus, it may not be expanded to
incorporate water conditions rather than added substances.
Admittedly, this literal reading augurs against the hypothesis that the court would have
upheld the opposite EPA decision. As Batterton illustrates, however, where the court deter-
mines that presumptive deference compels acceptance of an agency interpretation, it matters
not that the court would reach a different interpretation. If the court chose to evaluate the
substance of the EPA decision to regulate, it could emphasize the legislative history and pur-
pose rather than the plain language of the statute. Moreover, in Gorsuch the court's concentra-
tion on the words of the statute follows only after it has established that Congress intended the
Agency to have substantial discretion in interpreting the Act. The court's focus on statutory
language is for the purpose of upholding the Agency's decision.
226. 693 F.2d at 177.
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Without the presumption of reasonableness, there is little in the statute
or its history to support the Agency's decision to exclude dam pollution
from regulation. Only with the presumption could the court argue that
since Congress failed to consider the matter, there is no evidence ex-
pressly contradicting the Agency's interpretation.227 Like presumptive
deference, the hybrid approach effectively excuses both Congress and the
courts from responsibility for limiting agency lawmaking power.
4. Afterword
"Real life" cases of judicial review do not always fit neatly within
the categories defined in the model of discretionary deference outlined in
the preceding discussion. As noted in the Introduction to this Article,228
the Supreme Court's failure to define an analytical framework for decid-
ing the issue of deference inhibits efforts to understand some actual court
decisions within the context of the model.
One area of difficult analysis is the distinction between independent
determination and weighted deference. This distinction is lost when a
court upholds a challenged agency interpretation without discussion of
the scope of judicial review. Whether the court independently deter-
mined that the agency conclusion was correct or whether its affirmation
was based upon deference can only be hypothesized. Moreover, this dis-
tinction may be equally unclear in cases where a court disagrees with an
agency decision by providing what it asserts to be the correct interpreta-
tion of the delegating statute. Where the court does not remand the deci-
sion to the agency, the reason for the court's refusal to accord weighted
deference to the agency's interpretation cannot be determined.229
It may also be difficult to discern whether a court has chosen pre-
sumptive deference or weighted deference in a particular case. This is
especially true in cases where the court's decision might be classified at
the end of the weighted deference spectrum where judicial scrutiny is
most circumspect. The subtle distinction between the absence of evi-
dence sufficient to prove error in the agency's interpretation and the fail-
ure to demonstrate that an agency decision is unreasonable is not often
227. The D.C. Circuit distinguished the "grand goal" of Congress from a mandate of full
compliance. It found that the substantive provisions in the Act appeared to fall short of com-
pletely achieving the statute's announced goal. Thus, the court concluded that it could not
find that the Agency's interpretation "plainly frustrates" the congressional purpose. Id. at
178-79. This "plainly frustrates" standard places a higher burden on the challenger of an
agency decision than one that requires a showing that the interpretation is contrary to statu-
tory purpose.
228. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 135 & 181.
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discussed in judicial reasoning. Moreover, the distinction is less certain
due to the presence of the hybrid approach. Despite the ambiguity, pre-
sumptive deference, with its higher burden of proof on the challenger, is
distinctly reserved for those instances in which the agency's decision is
acceptable to a court that requires a challenger to provide evidence of
explicit prohibition in an inexplicit statute.
Even if some cases may elude categorization, the model focuses at-
tention on the nature of considerations inherent in modem cases involv-
ing the issue of judicial deference. At a minimum, the model permits
examination and understanding of the immediate and long-term conse-
quences of the present judicial approach. In addition, the model enables
identification of the areas that must be addressed in order to achieve con-
sistency and predictability in judicial review of agency lawmaking.
The model also illustrates the consequences of the modem congres-
sional practice of broadly delegating legislative power. The judicial re-
sponse of deference has permitted elected officials to retreat from both
responsibility and accountability for statutory content. The relationship
between delegation and deference and the areas of reform suggested by
the model discussed in this section will be examined further in Part
Three. Before doing so, it is instructive to examine concrete examples of
the analytical confusion wrought by the Supreme Court in confronting
the deference issue in an isolated and ad hoe fashion.
C. Application: Supreme Court Cases
1. The Choice of Paradigmatic Cases
Three cases decided by the Supreme Court in the final days of the
1983 Term illustrate the three choices that comprise the model of discre-
tionary deference discussed in the preceding sections.230 In each case the
Court responds differently to the issue of whether it will defer to the
agency's interpretation of the statutory delegation.
The Court, however, fails to reconcile its choice of approach in one
case with its choice of a different approach in the others. Consequently,
the individual opinions explain the basis for the Court's response under
the circumstances of the case presented, but offer few clues towards pre-
dicting the application of that explanation to other cases. Read together,
the decisions reinforce the elusive nature of an analytical framework for
230. The cases are: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 1, 468
U.S. 137 (1984); and Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. II,
468 U.S. 207 (1984).
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predicting when a reviewing court will accept, reject, or modify an
agency's interpretation of its enabling statute.
In the first of these cases, Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,231 the Court upheld EPA regulations that allowed
states to use a "bubble concept 232 in controlling sources of pollution
emission under the Clean Air Act.233 Presumptive deference was ac-
corded to the EPA's interpretation of the statute. Consequently, the
Court focused its review primarily on justifying its decision to defer,
from which judicial approval of the EPA's decision followed. This re-
sult-oriented deference permitted the Court to reject the interpretive
analysis developed by the District of Columbia Circuit in several earlier
cases.234 It also disapproved the lower court's heightened scope of re-
view. The Court did not simply find the statute silent or ambiguous on
the matter, but conceded that Congress might have been unwilling to be
more specific in framing the EPA's mandate under the Act.
The other two cases discussed in this section were handed down on
the same day, review decisions of the same agency, concern the same
statute, and are captioned by the same name, but reach opposite conclu-
sions with respect to judicial deference. In the first of the two Securities
Industry235 cases, the Supreme Court refused to defer to the Board's de-
termination that commercial paper was not a "security" within the
meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act.2 36  The Court thus reversed the
Board's determination that the Act does not prohibit commercial banks
from marketing such financial instruments, and instead, the Court sup-
plied its own meaning for the disputed statutory term. As an acknowl-
edgement of the modern approach in which deference is the decisional
norm, the Court sought both to discredit the Board's entitlement to def-
erence as well as to demonstrate that the Board's interpretation was
incorrect.237
231. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
232. See infra note 242.
233. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172(b)(6), 91 Stat. 685, 747
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)).
234. See infra note 247.
235. 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
236. Id. at 142-44. See infra note 292.
237. The Court characterized the Board's defense of its interpretation as a change in its
original argument. Because of this change, the Court reasoned that the Board was not entitled
to deference. 468 U.S. at 143-44. The Court next took issue with the Board's conclusions and
consequently supplied its own interpretation. Id. at 144-60. As will be explained infra, the
Court's characterization of the Board's position was disingenuous and its techniques of inter-
pretation were questionable. See infra notes 297-318 and accompanying text.
In the second Securities Industry2 38 case, the Court deferred to the
Board's decision that a bank holding company could acquire a retail se-
curities brokerage because the latter business was "closely related" to
banking. By according weighted deference to the Board's interpretation,
the Court found that it was reasonable to conclude that the Glass-Stea-
gall Act did not prohibit the challenged acquisition.
Taken together, the three cases perpetuate, rather than resolve, the
dilemma created by the failure of Congress to guide the exercise of dis-
cretion delegated to an administrative decisionmaker. Although each de-
cision reinforces the concept of deference as the threshold concern of
judicial review of administrative decisionmaking, the opinions reveal as
well the emptiness of the criteria invoked to justify a court's decision
regarding whether or not to defer. Consequently, in the absence of a
requirement for greater statutory specificity provided by Congress, allo-
cation of the ultimate legislative responsibility between the executive and
judicial branches remains largely a guessing game.
2. Presumptive Deference: The "Bubble Case"
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.239
serves as an exemplary case of judicial review of an agency legislative
decision for two reasons. First, the opinion contains a "restatement" of
judicial deference that attempts to impose a categorical framework on
the body of case law.2"° Unlike the analysis presented in this Article,
however, the Court's restatement tries to synthesize traditional independ-
ent judicial determination and modern discretionary deference to the ad-
ministrative interpretation rather than recognizing the two approaches as
separate choices. Second, the Court's decision to uphold the challenged
agency regulations is based upon presumptive deference.241 The Court's
use of presumptive deference allows it to excuse Congress from making
the fundamental choices essential to achieving the congressional legisla-
tive objectives. Moreover, such deference leaves the agency with broad
discretionary lawmaking power subject to few, if any, constraints.
Both aspects of the Court's opinion are important illustrations of
judicial deference analysis presented in this Article. Each will be sepa-
rately examined following a brief outline of the material facts in the case.
The challenge in Chevron was to the EPA's regulations permitting
states to use the "bubble concept" in controlling pollution emitting de-
238. 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
239. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
240. Id. at 842.
241. Id. at 844-45. See supra notes 193-218 and accompanying text.
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vices.242 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 197743 established a regu-
latory structure requiring certain states to develop a permit program for
"construction and operation of new or modified major stationary
sources" of air pollution. 2" The EPA regulations promulgated to imple-
ment this program allowed a state to use a plantwide definition of "sta-
tionary source. '245 The Court acknowledged that this "bubble concept"
meant that some new or modified sources of pollution in states that had
not attained national air quality standards would not be required to meet
the "lowest achievable emission rate" under the current state of the art
for that facility.246
Subjecting all new or modified polluting sources to a permit require-
ment would not have been inconsistent with either the statute or its legis-
lative history.247 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the EPA's reading of
242. Under this concept, the states were permitted to treat all pollution emitting devices
within the same industrial grouping, even if from separate sources, as though they were en-
cased within a single "bubble." Opponents of this EPA interpretation argued that each new or
modified stationary source of pollution was subject to a separate control standard. 467 U.S. at
843. The statutory scheme required the states to submit State Implementation Plans (SIP)
outlining their plans to attain the National Ambient Air Quality Standards set by the EPA.
As part of the SIP, states were to require permits for the construction and operation of new or
modified stationary sources. The statute, however, did not define the term "stationary source"
for purposes of the permit program. The bubble concept evaded the permit requirement for
new or modified pollution emitting devices where the device is added to a bubble considered an
existing stationary source. See infra text accompanying note 246.
243. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129, 91 Stat. 685, 747 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1982)).
244. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 849. As noted earlier, the Act did not define "stationary
source."
245. Id. at 840 n.2.
246. The court of appeals, as well as the challengers to the EPA interpretation, believed
that the paramount intent of Congress was to seek to improve air quality. Hence, the statute
imposed certain technological requirements on new or modified stationary sources of emission.
The requirement that such sources comply with the "lowest achievable emission rate" (LAER)
could not be waived by the states.
The Court rejected the notion that the bubble concept-which measures only sources of
emissions on a plantwide basis-amounts to a waiver of the LAER requirement. Although a
new source may emit more pollution than the lowest achievable rate for that source, the Court
reasoned that the source would not be a stationary source within the meaning of the Act where
the states defined such sources as an entire facility. The respondents argued that allowing a
new pollution source to be offset by a reduction of pollution from an existing source effectively
waived the LAER requirement. The Court dismissed their argument as "a classic example of
circular reasoning." Id. at 861 n.34. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's explanation that
the statute "merely deals with the consequences of the definition of the term 'source' and does
not define the term" was a less than satisfactory rebuttal to the respondent's accusation. Id.
At least the Supreme Court cannot be accused of "employing traditional tools of statutory
construction" to discredit others' attempts to do so. Id. at 843 n.9.
247. The D.C. Circuit held this position with respect to such sources in areas that had yet
to attain the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. See Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The decision in that case was based
upon two earlier D.C. Circuit Court precedents. See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d
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the statute that permitted balancing the environmental interest in up-
grading air quality with the economic interest in not discouraging contin-
uation of capital improvements. Since Congress did not define what was
a stationary source for purposes of the permit program, the Supreme
Court reasoned that this responsibility belonged to the EPA. Signifi-
cantly, both the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Circuit
Court, in two different cases, lamented Congress' failure to provide this
definition. The two courts disagreed, however, on the reviewing court's
role in light of congressional silence.248
The District of Columbia Circuit Court supplied its own definition
of stationary source.249 In so doing, it rejected the EPA interpretation as
incorrect, making only a passing reference to the fact that the court was
not deferring to the Agency's explanation.5 0 The Supreme Court's re-
versal was based primarily on its conclusion that the EPA interpretation
was entitled to presumptive deference.
323 (D.C. Cir. 1979); ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Chevron,
467 U.S. at 840 & n.6.
248. The Supreme Court specifically noted its displeasure with the Legislature's omission:
"We regret, of course, that Congress did not advert specifically to the bubble concept's applica-
tion to various Clean Air Act programs, and note that a further clarifying statutory directive
would facilitate the work of the agency and of the court in their endeavors to serve the legisla-
tors' will." 467 U.S. at 840 n.5 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch,
685 F.2d at 726 n.39).
249. 685 F.2d at 725.
250. Although the D.C. Circuit did not explicitly discuss its refusal to defer or limit the
scope of its review, it mentioned in a footnote that the agency had not engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking since it provided no support for its change or abandonment of its earlier posi-
tion. Id. at 727 n.41. The D.C. Circuit held that the propriety of the bubble concept was to be
determined by "a bright line" between areas in which the air quality was to be maintained and
those in which it was to be improved. In maintenance areas, it ruled that the bubble concept
was mandatory. Id. at 726 (relying on Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir.
1979)). In improvement areas, the court rejected the bubble concept in total. Id. (relying on
ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
The bubble regulations challenged in Chevron were, in effect, the second attempt by the
EPA to implement such a concept. In theASARCO case, the D.C. Circuit had refused to defer
to the EPA regulations that did not distinguish between new sources of pollution and emis-
sions from an entire facility. In that case, the court acknowledged that "considerable defer-
ence" was owed to the Agency interpretation, but devoted its opinion to demonstrating that
the EPA's decision was wrong. The EPA initially adopted regulations incorporating the rea-
soning of the D.C. Circuit. However, the agency later amended these regulations as part of a
reexamination of the burdens imposed by existing regulatory schemes. See 467 U.S. at 857.
When the D.C. Circuit invalidated the regulations based upon its earlier precedent, the Reagan
Administration appealed to the Supreme Court.
Interestingly, as the case was presented to the Supreme Court, the interpretation supplied
by the D.C. Circuit had no defender. Neither the EPA nor its challengers accepted the court's
distinction between maintenance and improvement of air quality for purposes of employing the
bubble concept. Instead, they disagreed on whether the Act authorized use of the bubble
concept in both cases or not at all. Id. at 842 n.7.
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a. The "Restatement" of Judicial Deference
The Court's restatement of the principles of judicial deference dis-
tinguishes among three types of cases.251 In the first category are those
cases in which Congress has directly spoken "to the precise question at
issue. ' 2 2 According to the Court, "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. '253 This
category can be partially analogized to the category defined in this analy-
sis in which a court chooses not to defer.2 54 The Court then exercises
independent judgment to determine statutory meaning. The Court, how-
ever, defines this category so narrowly that it appears to exclude the ma-
jority of cases seeking judicial review.2 5 Indeed, if the congressional
intent is "unambiguous," a challenge is unlikely to arise.256
251. See 467 U.S. at 842-45. The Supreme Court's restatement is hardly a presentation of a
definitive analytical framework for determining the scope of review. For another analysis of
both the substance and applicability of the Chevron model, see Note, A Framework for Judicial
Review, supra note 162.
252. 467 U.S. at 842, 843 n.9.
253. Id. at 842.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
255. The Court cited this category in support of a decision to overrule a Federal Reserve
Board interpretation of the Bank Holding Company Act under which the Board sought to
regulate so-called "nonbank banks." Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimen-
sion Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986). The Court implied that its narrow judicial interpreta-
tion based upon the statutory language should prevail over the agency interpretation based
upon statutory purpose because the language "reflect[ed] hard fought compromises" that the
Court should respect. Id. at 689. The Court's refusal to defer to an agency interpretation
consistent with the broad purpose of the legislation was not really based upon an "unambigu-
ously expressed" congressional intent. In light of the disagreement between agency and court
and the fact that Congress, when it passed the statute, did not contemplate the problem of
"nonbank banks" addressed by the Board, it would be difficult to characterize the congres-
sional intent as unambiguous. Although the Court cites Chevron, its decision in Dimension
sounds more like an application of the so-called "plain meaning" rule. See id. The Court's
invocation of this rule of construction has hardly been predictable or consistent. See Wald,
Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA
L. Ruv. 195 (1983). But cf. Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory
Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. Rnv. 892 (1982). See also supra notes 196-
208 and accompanying text (discussing Batterton v. Francis).
256. An example of what the Court may have had in mind when it identified the category
of "clear" congressional intent may be found in Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), in which
the President's decision to restrict travel to Cuba was challenged as a violation of the Trading
with the Enemy Act (40 Stat. 411, as amended 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1983)). This Act had
been amended to restrict the presidential exercise of emergency economic powers in peacetime.
Moreover, the Act required the President to comply with new conditions and procedures as a
prerequisite for the exercise of such powers. The President conceded that he did not comply
with these provisions, but maintained that his action was exempt under the "grandfather
clause." The grandfather clause exempted from compliance with the Act "authorities ...
being exercised with respect to a country on July 1, 1977." 468 U.S. at 228-29 (citing 50
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In the second and third categories the Court places those cases in
which the statutes are either silent or ambiguous.2 57 These categories are
distinguished on the basis of whether Congress explicitly left a gap in the
statute for the agency to fill, or whether the delegation of legislative
power was implicit in the ambiguous statutory language. According to
the restatement, a court should defer to the administrative interpretation
in both types of cases, but the extent of scrutiny will vary.258
According to the Court's analysis, when the delegation of the inter-
pretive task is express, the court should give agency legislative regula-
tions "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. '2 59 Such scrutiny coincides with the
approach of a court that accords presumptive deference to an agency
decision.260 Indeed, among the authorities cited by the Court is Bat-
U.S.C. § 5). According to the President's argument, the "authority" that allowed him to re-
strict travel to Cuba was being exercised before that date in the form of a general license that
permitted travel and payment of expenses to Cuba. The restriction, therefore, was nothing
more than an amendment of the license.
In a five-to-four decision the Supreme Court upheld this broad interpretation of the
grandfather clause. Despite the fact that the new regulation prohibited an activity previously
permitted, the Court found the statutory term at issue was "clear." Id. at 234-35 n.18. In so
finding, the majority reasoned that there was no need to examine the congressional intent, even
though the legislators' intent may be at odds with the "clear" language. Id. at 236-37.
The majority opinion is a model of form over substance. The clarity that serves as the
foundation of the Court's conclusion is little more than an excuse to approve an interpretation
consistent with the Justices' political philosophy. The legislation was not so clear as to prevent
a contrary interpretation by a unanimous court of appeals and four Justices of the Supreme
Court. The dissenting opinion summarizes the majority approach:
The Court rejects this narrow interpretation in favor of one that loses all sight of the
general legislative purpose of the [new legislation] and the clear legislative intent
behind the grandfather clause. To achieve its labored result, the Court invokes a
series of platitudes on statutory interpretation, but ignores their application to this
case. Ironically, the very pieces of legislative history that the Court cites to justify its
result clearly support the contrary view.
Id. at 255 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Significantly, the majority's argument that deference is owed to the Executive's judgment
in matters of foreign policy is added almost as an afterthought at the end of the opinion. 468
U.S. at 242-43. The dissent does not address the issue. Therefore, both opinions cite the same
legislative history, but use it to support opposite conclusions. See id. at 236-40; id. at 256
(Blackmun, I., dissenting). Moreover, both opinions agree on the general interpretive proposi-
tions, but disagree on the relevance of these propositions to the issue in the case. Cf FEA v.
Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976) (the Supreme Court and the lower court used the
same legislative history to reach opposite conclusions). Consequently, the case undermines any
confidence in the usefulness of the canons of construction or other interpretive devices as a
predictor of when a court might find statutory language sufficiently clear as to assume respon-
sibility for supplying or independently confirming the correct interpretation.
257. 467 U.S. at 843-44 nn.12 & 13.
258. Id. at 843-44.
259. Id. at 844.
260. See supra notes 193-218 and accompanying text.
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terton v. Francis.261 Based upon the Chevron Court's brief description,
however, the meaning of "controlling weight" is not entirely clear.262
Although the "arbitrary and capricious" language also appears in Bat-
terton,263 it is evident from its application in Batterton that the standard
of review was limited to reading the statute to make certain that there
was no explicit prohibition of the Secretary's interpretation.2 4 Since the
deliberate absence of statutory guidance would trigger the judicial deci-
sion to accord the agency interpretation controlling weight, the statute
could not contain an explicit prohibition.
The Supreme Court's restatement implies that cases fall into the
third category-those involving ambiguous statutory language-when
the statute fails to delegate to the agency the specific responsibility for
administrative legislation that would clarify the meaning of the statutory
provision in dispute.265 With respect to review in such cases, the Court
states that "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.
'266
According to the Court, deference in this category extends to all
cases in which implementation of a statutory scheme is entrusted to an
agency so long as the statutory language neither explicitly delegates in-
terpretive authority nor provides a clear and obvious meaning. Unlike
cases involving weighted deference,267 the Court does not envision any
threshold determination of whether or not the agency decision qualifies
for deference. The Court's description ignores the case law in which
courts considered the qualifications of the decisionmaker and the nature
of the agency's decision as the basis of its decision to defer.268 According
to this case law, such considerations also influenced the degree of defer-
261. 467 U.S. at 844 n.12 (citing Batterton, 432 U.S. 416 (1977), which applies a presump-
tive deference standard).
262. Id. at 844.
263. 432 U.S. at 426.
264. Id. Presumptive deference in Chevron was occasioned by the finding of an implicit
delegation of power in Congress' expressed intent that the Act be flexibly administered. Only
in passing did the Court conclude that the Agency's decision was reasonable. This conclusion,
however, was not supported by independent analysis of a legislative or administrative record.
In the context of the opinion, the conclusion emerges after the Court found nothing contradic-
tory in either the statute or its history. See 467 U.S. at 844.
265. 467 U.S. at 844.
266. Id.
267. See supra notes 168-191 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criteria influ-
encing weighted deferential review; see also Diver, supra note 15, at 562 n.95, for a partial
listing of factors cited by the Supreme Court as a basis for determining whether an agency's
decision qualifies for judicial review.
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ence, expressed in the form of the extent of judicial scrutiny, accorded to
the bases for the agency's conclusion.
Thus, the Court's restatement retains no option for a court to refuse
deference in any case in which the statutory language is genuinely in
dispute. Moreover, there is no room in the Court's model for a paradig-
matic case in which neither a court nor an agency is competent to pro-
vide the meaning of a statute that is silent or ambiguous. The Court's
restatement fails to recognize a judicial choice that would require Con-
gress to address the matter before the Court will sanction the delegate's
action.
The Court's restatement also fails to clarify whether a unitary stan-
dard governs the expanded deferential review that comprises the third
category. 269 The Court speaks of a reasonableness determination,270 and
also defines the question as whether "the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." '271 Elsewhere the Court asserts
that "considerable weight" should be accorded to an agency's interpreta-
tion of a statute it is assigned to administer.272 The Court further ex-
plains that the "conflicting policies... committed to the agency's care by
the statute" should not be disturbed "unless it appears from the statute
or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned. ' 271 In the end, the Court's standard for review in
this category amounts to little more than a collection of descriptive
phrases drawn from the body of case law. The restatement fails to ex-
plain how review in this category accommodates and clarifies the variety
of extant review standards.
Unfortunately, the utility of the Court's restatement of judicial def-
erence is undermined by its failure to integrate its review of the chal-
lenged agency decision in Chevron with the principles advanced in the
restatement. The Court's consideration of the disputed issues in the case
is independent of the restatement's analytical framework in both ap-
269. The spectrum of review standards in the weighted deference category defined above is
related to the bases upon which a court determines that the agency is entitled to deference.
Since the category identified by the Chevron Court does not include an initial inquiry of
whether the agency qualifies for deference, it is likely that the Court envisions a single standard
of review, although it is presently described in a variety of ways.
270. 467 U.S. at 845.
271. Id. at 843. The Court cited Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), and other cases to
support the proposition that "[t]he Court need not conclude that the agency construction was
the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading
the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." 467
U.S. at 843 n. 11 (citations omitted).
272. 467 U.S. at 844.
273. Id. at 845 (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382- 83 (1961)).
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proach and language. Even where the Court uses the words of the re-
statement in its reasoning, they are often applied in a different context.
For example, the Court notes that Congress was silent regarding the
applicability of the bubble concept to the permit program.274 Thus, the
Court claims, the District of Columbia Circuit Court was wrong in de-
ciding whether the concept was "inappropriate" in the general context of
the statutory program.275 Instead, the Court asserts that the question is
whether the EPA's view of the bubble concept as appropriate was a "rea-
sonable one."'2 76 This language indicates that the review is for reasona-
bleness, which is the standard applicable to the third category comprised
of ambiguous statutes. The body of its opinion, however, is devoted to
justifying the Court's decision to defer rather than determining the rea-
sonableness of the Agency's decision.
Ultimately, the Court's approach reflects the second category. The
Court concedes that the Agency's choice filled "a gap left open by Con-
gress. ' 277 Moreover, the Court's review emphasizes the absence of any
statutory language, congressional intent, or legislative history that con-
tradicts the Agency's interpretation,278 rather than whether there is evi-
dence that the Agency's interpretation is reasonable. The Court also
implies that its review standard is less stringent than a reasonableness
determination, by drawing upon a rationale not explicitly part of its re-
statement. By characterizing the Agency's decision as a policy choice,27 9
274. Id. The absence of a plain meaning or an unambiguously expressed congressional
intent is a prerequisite judicial finding for deferential review. See Federal Election Comm'n v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981), in which the Court first exam-
ines the statute and its history to conclude that the agency interpretation is neither prohibited
nor authorized. The Court then reviews whether the interpretation is "sufficiently reason-
able." Id. at 39 (citation omitted). The case is cited in Chevron to support both its second and
third categories. 467 U.S. at 843 nn.9 & 11.
275. 467 U.S. at 845.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 866.
278. The Court's examination of the statute served only to provide the background of the
challenge or to show that Congress left open the question of the acceptability of the bubble
concept in the permit program. Id. at 845-51, 859-66. Similarly, the Court reviewed the legis-
lative history to conclude that it is "unilluminating." Id. at 851-53, 859-66. See supra note
258. Thus, the Court did not evaluate whether the Agency's decision conformed to the statu-
tory text or legislative history.
The Court's discussion of the EPA regulations was primarily descriptive. The fact that
the EPA interpretation at issue was different from earlier Agency interpretations is minimized
in the opinion. The Court used the shift in position as evidence of the EPA's flexibility in
interpreting the statute, which accords with the intent of Congress in making the delegation.
At the same time, the Court asserted that the earlier interpretation was based upon an incor-
rect interpretation mandated by the D.C. Circuit rather than by EPA judgment. 467 U.S. at
862-64.
279. 467 U.S. at 864-65.
the Court redirects the issue from formal review of statutory meaning to
respect for an agency's substantive policy decision.
b. The Court's Presumptive Deference
Rather than fitting consistently within one of the categories in the
restatement, the Court's reasoning in Chevron reflects the presumptive
deference approach described above. The Court justified its approach by
finding an implicit delegation of power in Congress' expressed intent that
the Act be flexibly administered. Moreover, as viewed by the Court, the
challenge to the EPA's decision was not directed to its interpretation of
the statute, but to the method used by the Agency to pursue the statutory
goals. By characterizing the question as involving agency judgment as
well as interpretation, the Court refused to address the wisdom of the
policy choice.280 Consequently, the Court declined to evaluate both the
merits of the challenger's argument and the substantive basis for the
Agency's decision. Noting the absence of congressional directives re-
garding the matter in question, the Court further argued that it was re-
quired to respect the Agency's broad discretion in "effectuat[ing] the
policies of the Act." '281
The opinion in Chevron illustrates how presumptive deference dis-
guises the distortion in the legislative process wrought by broad congres-
sional delegations of its power to the executive branch. By focusing only
on justification of its decision to defer rather than on the conformance of
the Agency's interpretation with the statute, the Court essentially ignores
Congress' failure to provide the kind of guidance that would obviate the
dispute. If Congress had identified the fundamental policy directives or
assigned priorities to the competing legislative objectives, the Court
would not have had to allocate that power either to the Agency by defer-
ring, or to itself by assigning its own meaning to the statute.
Significantly, the Court concedes that the failure of Congress to be
more specific may be due to irreconcilable political differences among
280. Id. at 865-66.
281. Id. at 862. This conclusion emerged from the Court's examination of the statutory
language, congressional intent, legislative history, and the failure of Congress "to accommo-
date the conflict between the economic interest in permitting capital improvements to continue
and the environmental interest in improving air quality." Id. at 851. On the subject of statu-
tory language, the Court stated: "To the extent any congressional 'intent' can be discerned
from this language, it would appear that the listing of overlapping, illustrative terms was in-
tended to enlarge, rather than to confine, the scope of the agency's power to regulate particular
sources in order to effectuate the policies of the Act." Id. at 862. Similarly, after reviewing the
legislative history the Court concluded: "We find that the legislative history as a whole is
silent on the precise issue before us. It is, however, consistent with the view that the EPA
should have broad discretion in implementing the policies of the 1977 Amendments." Id.
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legislators rather than lack of competence and the need for expert assist-
ance.2 2 This admission represents a constitutionally questionable di-
mension of the current congressional delegation practices. Elected
officials wanting to avoid responsibility for controversial decisions can
pass them on to appointed officials with the blessing of the Supreme
Court. Instead of questioning the legitimacy of the delegation, the Court
uses the congressional desire to escape responsibility for legislative con-
tent as a justification for refusing to evaluate the merits of the decision.28 '
Thus, the Court dismisses the challenger's argument regarding the inap-
propriateness of the bubble concept by noting that such arguments
should be addressed to the Legislature or the Administration rather than
to the judiciary.2" 4
It is probably also significant that Justice Rehnquist did not partici-
pate in either the consideration or the decision of the case.28 ' He is the
Court's leading advocate for revitalizing a nondelegation doctrine that
would require Congress to make "fundamental policy decisions."2 6 Par-
ticularly in light of the Chevron Court's closing statement, one might
have expected Justice Rehnquist to argue that the challenged regulations
should be invalidated. He would probably have concluded that the stat-
ute was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the ex-
tent that it failed to instruct the EPA on how to accommodate the
conflicting goals of economic growth and environmental protection. Par-
ticularly since the potential consequences of choosing one goal over the
282. Id. at 847.
283. Id. at 865-66. See infra Part III.
284. 467 U.S. at 865-66.
285. Only six Justices decided the Chevron case. Justice Marshall, like Justice Rehnquist,
did not participate in either the consideration or the decision. Justice O'Connor did not par-
ticipate in the decision.
Ironically, the Court's decision was authored by Justice Stevens, who had had some sig-
nificant disagreements with Justice Rehnquist over the issue of deference to administrative
interpretations. Justice Stevens had sought to narrow the apparent discretion resulting from a
vague delegating statute in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). In Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), Justice Stevens authored a
plurality opinion rejecting the agency interpretation in favor of a judicial interpretation
designed to narrow the instances in which the agency could exercise its delegated regulatory
power. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result. See infra note 286 & text accompanying
notes 400-414.
286. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist argued that the provision al-
lowing the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to set safety standards was an
invalid delegation to the extent it gave the agency authority to determine what level of risk was
acceptable. Such a decision, he maintained, required Congressional guidance that was absent
in the statute. See infra notes 405-407 and accompanying text.
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other may be irreversible, according to this argument the choice should
rest with the elected legislators.
Without a challenge to the delegation, however, the Court's conclu-
sion serves as an apology for congressional indecision and an endowment
of unrestrained legislative power to the executive branch. The conclu-
sion of the opinion reads like a vindication of the Court's hesitancy to
become mired in the problem.287
If followed, the Chevron analysis would preclude courts from re-
viewing agency interpretations drawn from silent or ambiguous statutory
provisions, undermine judicial responsibility for allocating the lawmak-
ing responsibility between itself and the Executive, and ignore any no-
tion of congressional legislative responsibility beyond the identification of
a recipient of delegated authority and the drafting of a vague statute.
Even if deference to the bubble idea is appropriate, the Court failed to
explain adequately why deference was appropriate in this case.
3. Traditional Review: Independently Defining "Commercial Paper"
In light of both the inherent and potential problems of the Chevron
decision, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court did not cite the case
when it handed down two decisions involving questions of judicial defer-
ence a week later.2 88 Both opinions were captioned Securities Industry
287. The Court concludes:
In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable ac-
commodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the reg-
ulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a
detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting poli-
cies. Congress intended to accommodate both interests but did not do so itself on the
level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired
the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great
expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in
a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level;
and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and
those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency.
For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but
not on the basis of the judge's personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to
which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of
that delegation properly rely upon the incumbent administration's view of wise pol-
icy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the peo-
ple, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of every-
day realities.
467 U.S. at 865-66 (emphasis added).
288. For an alternative analysis of the impact of the Chevron decision, see Note, A Frame-
work for Judicial Review, supra note 162, at 481-95.
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Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.289 In the
first, the "commercial paper" case, the Court refused to defer and re-
versed the decision of the Agency.290 In the second, the "securities bro-
kerage" case, the Court applied a weighted deference standard, deferring
to the administrative interpretation and upholding the Board's conclu-
sion.2 91 The Court itself offered no principled explanation for its distinc-
tion. Instead, the two cases illustrate the manipulability of the criteria
for weighted deference and further highlight the consequences of con-
gressional nonspecificity.
In the commercial paper case, the Supreme Court by a divided vote
reversed a ruling by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem that commercial paper was not a "security" or "note" within the
meaning of investment transactions prohibited under the Glass-Steagall
Act.2 92 The Board had used a "functional analysis" to conclude that the
sales of such paper by commercial banks more closely resembled tradi-
tional banking operations than the type of risk transactions addressed by
the Act.2 93 The Board thus narrowly read the statutory language prohib-
iting banks from underwriting "securities and stock" or from marketing
"stocks ... notes, or other securities."2 94
For its part, Congress had neither defined these statutory terms nor
specifically considered the status of commercial paper under the Act. To
resolve the issue, the Board had to assign meaning to the undefined statu-
tory terms that enumerated the prohibited activities. In support of its
289. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. I, 468 U.S. 137
(1984) [hereinafter commercial paper case]; Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys. II, 468 U.S. 207 (1984) [hereinafter securities brokerage case].
290. Commercial paper case, 468 U.S. at 142-44.
291. Securities brokerage case, 468 U.S. at 217.
292. The Glass-Steagall Act comprises sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of
1933 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378 (1982)). This case involved sections 16 and 21 of
the Act (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 & 378, respectively).
293. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Board that the marketing of commercial paper
would not "cause the hazards the Act was designed to prevent." A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
294. See Glass-Steagall Act, §§ 16, 21, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378 (1982). The Board offered
several reasons for its decision. First, it noted that since the grouped words all share the char-
acteristic of an investment, the Act is meant to prohibit the underwriting of those notes that
share the investment characteristic. 468 U.S. at 152. Commercial paper, according to the
Board, was more in the nature of a commercial loan than a security investment within the
meaning of the Act. Id. at 150. Second, the Board maintained that a broad interpretation of
the term "security" would bring within the ambit of the statutory prohibition banking activi-
ties in which commercial banks would have traditionally engaged. Id. at 158 n.1 I. Third, the
Board reasoned that its interpretation was consistent with the congressional intent to en-
courage investment in short term obligations. For a discussion of the Board's argument ad-
dressing the safety of commercial paper sales, see id. at 160, 169 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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conclusion that sales of commercial paper were not prohibited, the Board
reasoned that its interpretation was consistent with the congressional in-
tent to encourage investment in short term obligations. 295 Consequently,
the Board allowed the sales of commercial paper to continue.2 9 6
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Legislature failed to de-
fine "securities" or to evince whether the category of prohibited transac-
tions included or excluded commercial paper.29 7 The Court, however,
did not treat the Board's effort to remedy the omission as involving sim-
ply a question of statutory interpretation. Instead, the Court character-
ized the Board's interpretation as defining a statutory exemption through
regulation. 98 Thus, the Court related the issue as one of agency author-
ity rather than as a statutory interpretation inextricably part of a re-
quired agency decision. This judicial characterization provided one of the
pretexts for the Court's refusal to defer.29 9
295. 468 U.S. at 141.
296. Since the Court's decision in this case only determined whether commercial paper was
a "security" within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Court remanded the case to the
district court for a determination of whether the commercial paper placement activities in
question constituted "underwriting, selling or distributing." Id. at 150. The district court
subsequently remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the activities were "under-
writing." The Board's determination was once again challenged, and the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, refusing to defer, reversed the Federal Reserve
Board's determination that these activities were not "underwriting, selling, or distributing."
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 627 F. Supp. 695
(D.D.C. 1986).
297. 468 U.S. at 149.
298. Id. at 149-50. The majority argued that the effect of the Board's decision would be to
convert the statutory prohibition into a regulatory scheme. The implication that the Board's
interpretation would amount to an unauthorized extension of its jurisdiction, however, was
disingenuous. The Court's characterization would only be true if commercial paper was con-
sidered a security. The Board already had some jurisdiction over the subject matter and was
required to make the ruling in question. To permit commercial banks to engage in the sale and
acquisition of commercial paper does not alter the Board's regulatory powers.
The dissent made a similar argument. It asserted that the Board's functional analysis
would not vest the Board with substantial regulatory discretion since the Board's conclusion
was simply a construction of the statute. It added that the Board's issuance of guidelines
regarding sales of commercial paper was pursuant to "distinct statutory authority to restrain
unsafe or unsound banking practices." Id. at 180 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
299. The Court's perspective that the Board lacked authority was not the most natural one.
Since the issue of whether banks could sell commercial paper had been properly presented to
the Board, the Court could not conclude that the Board lacked the jurisdiction or authority to
render an answer, when that authority had been explicitly delegated by Congress under the
Federal Reserve Act, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 259, 261 (1931) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 248,
321 (1982)). Statutory interpretation by the Board was essential to resolving whether a bank's
sale of commercial paper violated the Act. Although the decision is legislative, it is within the
regulatory responsibility delegated by Congress to the Board. The interpretation, however,
need not be characterized as amounting to an exemption from a statutory prohibition. To the
extent that the Board's decision amounted to an exemption, it was because the Board, in an
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As the case was presented, the Supreme Court had essentially three
choices. First, it could defer to the agency interpretation by treating the
decision as an application of law to a particular set of facts or by recog-
nizing the Board's expertise and experience. Although the Board's deci-
sion was not made in a formal adjudication, the Court could nonetheless
characterize the decision as one traditionally entitled to limited re-
view." This choice would allow the Court to limit its review of the
Board's law-fact decision.
The Court could also choose to defer by finding that the decision
was entitled to weighted deference because of the Board's competence. °"
This was a classic case for applying weighted deference analysis. Indeed,
as the dissent noted, the Board possessed expertise and experience in the
complexities and technicalities of the law and the financial world it gov-
erned, as well as "extensive responsibility ' 30 2 for administering federal
banking law.3 °3 Taken together with the lack of clarity in the statute, it
was reasonable to expect the Board's decision to be accorded deference at
the heavily weighted end of the spectrum.3°
The second choice available to the Court was to remand the issue to
the agency for reconsideration. The Court could have relied on the fact
that the Board's argument before the Supreme Court had not been ex-
plored in its initial decisionmaking process.30 5
The third choice was for the Court to engage in traditional in-
dependent review, which would involve reviewing the agency decision to
determine if the Board's interpretation was correct and substituting a ju-
dicial interpretation if the Court disagreed with the agency conclusion.3 6
exercise of its regulatory responsibility, had decided that Congress had exempted the chal-
lenged banking activity. 468 U.S. at 173-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
300. Although the decision clearly involves statutory interpretation, the Court could never-
theless label the question as one of "fact," which is traditionally entitled to limited judicial
review. In that case, review would be under the arbitrary and capricious standard for informal
agency decisions which were not based upon a formal record. See supra notes 31-94 and ac-
companying text.
301. See supra notes 168-191 and accompanying text.
302. 468 U.S. at 161 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
303. Id. at 161-62.
304. In fact, the majority opinion acknowledged as much. It conceded that "[t]he Board is
the agency responsible for federal regulation of the national banking system, and its interpreta-
tion of a federal banking statute is entitled to substantial deference." 468 U.S. at 142. Ironi-
cally, the Court cited Securities Industry II, the securities brokerage case, for the proposition
that deference is generally the norm in judicial review of this type. The Court does not cite
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), or any other case of broad principle.
305. See supra note 294.
306. See supra Part I. The traditional approach also permits the Court to ignore the
agency interpretation and provide its own meaning of the disputed language. Since the mean-
ing of the statutory prohibition was the only issue, however, the case technically would not be
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The District of Columbia Circuit Court chose the first route.30 7 It
reviewed the administrative decision within the particular context in
which it arose.308 Although it raised certain concerns about the effect of
the Board's decision, the court deferred and upheld the agency's conclu-
sion in the case at issue.30 9
The Supreme Court, however, used an unusual approach to justify
its refusal to defer, although it conceded that deference was the norm.
The Court disqualified the Board from entitlement to deference in this
case because the Board had responded in argument before the Supreme
Court to some of the concerns expressed in the dicta of the court of ap-
peal's opinion. The Court claimed that the Board's response represented
a change in "the nature" of the Board's argument,310 and thus, amounted
to a "post hoc rationalization" that was entitled to "less weight" and
"little deference." 31'
a "review." If the Court's initial approach disregards the agency decision, there would be
nothing for it to review.
307. A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
308. The Board's interpretation was a response to a securities industry petition for a ruling
that required the Board to apply law to fact. Concerned about potential competition from
commercial banks, securities industry representatives petitioned for a ruling that the placing of
commercial paper in the commercial paper market was prohibited under the Act. The Board
rejected this assertion, based upon a narrow reading of the statutory prohibition. See supra
text accompanying notes 295-296.
In the context of the petition, the Board was not required to explore all aspects of the
scope and future applications of its ruling to other commercial transactions. Even if the ruling
is considered a general interpretive rule regarding all commercial paper, in the context of this
challenge deference would not be inappropriate under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944). The Board possesses the skill and informed judgment that qualify its decisions for
judicial deference. See supra text accompanying notes 137-142.
309. The Board initially maintained that it need not consider the kinds of concerns raised
by the D.C. Circuit. The court expressed concern that certain kinds of commercial paper not
at issue in the present case may fall within the prohibition of the Act. A.G. Becker, Inc. v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
310. 468 U.S. at 143-44.
311. Id. Implicitly, the Court translated this review standard into no weight and no defer-
ence beyond using the Board's decision as the starting point of its analysis. Moreover, to
achieve its objective, the Court distorted the Board's argument. As mentioned earlier, the
Board maintained that the D.C. Circuit's concerns were not material in light of the Board's
interpretation. In the court of appeals, the Board maintained that since commercial paper was
not a "security" within the meaning of the Act, the Board need not examine the dangers that
the Act was intended to eliminate. The Board did not change its position, and before the
Supreme Court the Board supplemented its original argument in an effort to resolve any
doubts about the conformance of its decision with statutory intent. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, seized upon this additional, and probably unnecessary argument by the Board as a pre-
text for discrediting the Board's position. According to the Supreme Court, the Board
changed its argument by insisting that the activities approved in the actual case involved none
of the hazards that the Court identified as concerns at which the Act is aimed. Id. at 143.
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At most, the Court's reasoning would have supported a remand to
the administrative agency for additional consideration of the agency's
new position.312 The Court, however, did not remand. It chose instead
to substitute its own contrary interpretation. This approach was the least
defensible in the context of modem deferential review.3'1 3
According to the Court's earlier restatement in Chevron,3 14 judicial
substitution of its own statutory interpretation for that of the agency as-
signed to administer the statute should occur only where the statutory
meaning is so unambiguously expressed as to present a clear meaning.315
Barring statutory precision, the Court could have refused to defer based
on either a conclusion that Congress did not intend to delegate discre-
tion, or a finding that the agency failed to qualify for weighted deference
under the criteria identified in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.3" 6 and Udall v.
Tallman.3 7 However, the Court's justification is not grounded on either
Consequently, the Supreme Court determined that this additional elaboration "counsels
against full deference." Id.
312. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80 (1943). In addition to invoking the pretext that the Board had changed its posi-
tion, the Court raised concerns not addressed by the Board. As mentioned earlier, the Board
considered the case in a narrow context by applying its interpretation of the statute to the
particular facts of the case presented. 468 U.S. at 141. The Court, however, spoke of hypo-
thetical situations in which application of the Board's conclusion might be contrary to the
statutory intent. Id. at 156-57. Such hypotheticals were only marginally relevant, if at all,
since the Board was only applyng its statutory interpretation to the facts of a particular case
that the Board was requested to decide. The Board was not bound by its decision in future
cases presenting different circumstances. If the Court's concerns were genuine, principles of
administrative law would have dictated remand to the agency for further consideration of its
decision in light of these concerns.
313. 468 U.S. at 143-44. The problem with the majority's position lies not so much with
the outcome as with the reasoning. The mischaracterization of the issue as agency lack of
authority, see supra text accompanying notes 298-299, and the unconventional disqualification
of the agency from entitlement to deference, see supra notes 310-311 and accompanying text,
are unconvincing rationalizations to support the desired outcome.
314. 467 U.S. at 842-45.
315. Id. See supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text. The disagreement between the
majority and dissent in the commercial paper case illustrates that the statutory language "can-
not bear the only construction... adopted by the [majority of the] Court." 468 U.S. at 181
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In fact, the agency charged with administration of the Act, the
court of appeals, and three Supreme Court Justices disagreed with the Court's ultimate
interpretation.
316. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The criteria of Skidmore, being rather general and imprecise,
allow the Court to argue that the Board lacks the expertise and experience to decide this issue,
particularly since it is a new statutory interpretation applied to recent developments in the
practices of the regulated interest. See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
317. 380 U.S. 1 (1965). Although Udall is generally cited for the broad proposition that a
court should defer to a statutory interpretation by agency officials entrusted with the adminis-
tration of the statutory scheme, see supra note 175 and accompanying text, its applicability can
be narrowed or distinguished. See supra notes 176-188 and accompanying text; see also supra
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of these recognized reasons.
Once the Court mischaracterized the Board's authority as legislating
a statutory exemption, and invoked the pretext that the Board had
changed its position, the Court challenged the substance of the Board's
interpretation, claiming the interpretation had no affirmative support in
the statute.318 In contrast to modem deferential review, the Court im-
plicitly established congressional specificity as a prerequisite for sus-
taining an agency interpretation. The Court could have found that the
agency decision was reasonable in light of the statutory silence. Simi-
larly, it could have determined that nothing in the statutory language or
history contradicted the agency decision. Given the absence of definition
or discussion in the statute, the Justices knew they would not find any
support for the Board's conclusion. However, the Court's reasoning
turned modem deference upside down; the absence of legislative preci-
sion rather than its existence served as an excuse for independent judicial
interpretation.
The dissent in the commercial paper case presented the classic argu-
ments for weighted deference, implying that a delegate's misinterpreta-
tion was for Congress to correct. The contrast between the majority and
dissenting opinions strikingly illustrates the weaknesses in the accepted
legislative process of vague statutory delegations that leave the fashion-
ing of legislative content to the agencies and courts under the guise of
interpretation.31 9 Despite the apparent thoroughness of the analysis in
note 304. While the merits of judicial reasoning distinguishing the applicability of Skidmore or
Udall might be questionable, particularly in a case such as this, the judicial approach is at least
conventional.
318. 468 U.S. at 149-54.
319. The Court's statutory interpretation is also flawed. The Court invokes as rules the
canons of construction, id. at 144-49, and manipulates the application of these canons to sup-
port its conclusions. The disagreement between the majority and dissent illustrates the weak-
ness of reasoning based upon these canons. By selective choice and application of various
canons, the two opinions show how the same basic canon can be read in different ways to
support opposite positions (compare id. at 150-51 (use of the term "security" in other statutes
is used to define the meaning of the same term in the statute at issue), with id. at 174-75
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (the meaning of the term "security" in other statutes is only one
factor to be considered, because the meaning may vary according to the content in which it is
used)), how the use of different canons in similar contexts can lead to inconsistent conclusions
(compare 468 U.S. at 158-59 n. I1 (the "Board's [statutory] argument [is] unpersuasive because
it rests on [a] faulty premise"), with id. at 176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (statutory reading
"only reinforces the Board's conclusion")), and how the canons can be manipulated to oppose
or support the Board's interpretation (see 468 U.S. at 149-54; id. at 179 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing)). Moreover, the majority and the dissenting opinions present striking examples of judicial
manipulation of both the history and the potential associated with the regulatory approach
inherent in the Board's interpretation of its enabling statute. The view of the past and future of
the Board's interpretation in the two opinions provided the justification for their arguments
against and for deference, respectively (compare 468 U.S. at 159-60 (history of the act,
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both the majority and dissenting opinions, or perhaps because of it, one is
left with the impression that the principal deciding factor was the indi-
vidual Justice's preference regarding the substantive law of commercial
banking and the propriety of deference in general.
The marked difference of opinion between the majority and dissent
in the commercial paper case stands in sharp contrast to the unanimous
decision in the securities brokerage case.320 The Justices' decision to de-
fer to the Federal Reserve Board in a second challenge by the securities
industry reinforces the suspicion that judicial personal preference often
motivates the outcome of judicial review of agency decisionmaking.
4. Weighted Deference: When Sales of Securities Need Not Be Investment
Transactions
At issue in the securities brokerage case was the Board's decision
that the acquisition by a bank holding company of a retail securities bro-
kerage did not violate either the Bank Holding Company Act32' or the
Glass-Steagall Act. 22 In the present case, a bank holding company had
applied for approval to acquire the voting shares of a retail discount se-
curities brokerage. The statutory procedures under which the Board ren-
dered its decision clearly recognized the administrative determination as
lawmaking. The Board was specifically authorized to approve exceptions
to the statutory prohibition against acquisitions by bank holding compa-
nies of voting shares of nonbanking entities.323 The Board was directed
although "far from conclusive . . . does support" the majority's view), with id. at 177
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (history of the act "of course does not undermine-it does not even
address" the relevant arguments)).
Ultimately, the difference between the majority and dissent reduces itself to a choice of
priorities. Whereas the majority focuses on the policy implications of the agency's substantive
decision, the dissent emphasizes the intergovernmental relationship of the legislative agency
and the reviewing court. The majority thus provides its own interpretation of the general
policy concerns underlying congressional passage of the enabling legislation. To this end, it
invokes the spectre of possible abuses that could result from extension of the Board's statutory
interpretation. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
521 app. C (1960):
When it comes to presenting a proposed statutory construction in court, there is an
accepted conventional vocabulary. As in argument over points of case-law, the ac-
cepted convention still, unhappily, requires discussion as if only one single correct
meaning could exist. Hence there are two opposing canons on almost every point.
320. 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
321. Under section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982),
banks are prohibited from acquiring the voting shares of a nonbanking company unless ex-
empted under section 4(c)(8). See 468 U.S. at 210.
322. Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982), prohibits a bank holding
company from owning any company that is principally engaged in retail securities brokerage.
See 468 U.S. at 213.
323. 468 U.S. at 210.
Winter 1987] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 361
to determine if the nonbanking activities were "closely related" to bank-
ing. 324 If it so found, the Board could amend its regulations to include
the activity as a permissible nonbanking activity.325 The process was
thus akin to legislative rulemaking in that it simplified the approval pro-
cess for similar applications in the future.32 6
In the securities brokerage case the Board's decision was rendered
after several days of hearing and a recommendation by an administrative
law judge to approve the exception. Representatives of the securities in-
dustry participated in those hearings and subsequently petitioned the
court of appeals and later the Supreme Court for review.327
The petitioners challenged the Board's conclusion that a retail se-
curities brokerage business, which did not facilitate other banking opera-
tions, was "closely related" to banking, and argued that the acquisition
violated the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibition against bank holding com-
panies owning an entity engaged in retail securities brokerage. The peti-
tioners asked the Court to review two different statutory interpretations
of the Board. The Court responded by according one of the interpreta-
tions presumptive deference and the other weighted deference.328 Signifi-
324. For the Board's guidelines in determining whether an activity is "closely related," see
id. at 210-11 n.5.
325. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1986) ("Regulation Y").
326. See 468 U.S. at 211 n.7 (for an explanation of the application procedure); see also 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
327. 468 U.S. at 209.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 292-298. The Court upheld the Board's interpre-
tation of the Bank Holding Company Act by according it presumptive deference. The Court
relied upon model reasoning to justify its choice: Congress committed to the Board the power
to determine which activities may be exempted from the Act's prohibitions through the ad-
ministrative rulemaking process defined in the statute. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982) (cited at
468 U.S. at 210 n.4). The Board's interpretation was rendered in the course of exercising its
power and the statutory language was imprecise. The Court thus concluded that the general
nature of the statutory language vests the Board with "considerable discretion to consider and
weigh a variety of factors in determining whether an activity is 'closely related' to banking."
468 U.S. at 214. The Court rejected the interpretation suggested by the petitioners on the basis
that there was nothing in the statutory language to support a requirement that "closely re-
lated" means activity that facilitates other banking operations. Unlike the commercial paper
case, here the Court placed the requirement of producing affirmative support for a proffered
statutory interpretation on the challenger rather than the agency.
Were this the only issue raised for review, the Court's decision to accord the "greatest
deference" to the Board and to reject the narrow interpretation advanced by the petitioner
would not be easily reconcilable with the commercial paper case. See id. at 215-16. Unlike in
the latter case, the Court's approach to review of the Board's interpretation of the provisions of
the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC) was cursory, and based upon simple reasoning:
Congress has committed to the Board the primary responsibility for administering
the BHC Act. Accordingly, the Board's determination of what activities are "closely
related" to banking within the meaning of [the Act] "is entitled to the greatest defer-
ence."... The Court of Appeals, therefore, properly deferred to the Board's determi-
nation in this case.
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cantly, the Court accorded weighted deference to the Board's
interpretation of the same statute that the Court had independently inter-
preted in the commercial paper case.
In the commercial paper case, the Court majority implied that the
Board's interpretation of the statutory prohibition in the Glass-Steagall
Act was entitled neither to presumptive nor weighted deference. How-
ever, without even citing the commercial paper case, the Court in the
securities brokerage case began its review of whether the challenged
transaction was prohibited by that same statute from a deferential
perspective:
The Board has broad power to regulate and supervise bank
holding companies and banks that are members of the Federal Re-
serve System. In this respect, the Board has primary responsibil-
ity for implementing the Glass-Steagall Act, and we accord
substantial deference to the Board's interpretation of that Act
whenever its interpretation provides a reasonable construction of
the statutory language and is consistent with legislative intent.329
The question posed in the securities brokerage case was whether or
not the entity being acquired engaged in the "public sale" of securities as
prohibited in the Act.330 While there was no escaping the fact that a
retail securities broker sells securities, the Board, the court of appeals,
and the Supreme Court all agreed that the prohibition referred to in the
Act had a narrower definition.331
Id. (quoting Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46
(1981)).
Interestingly, the Court upheld the D.C. Circuit's decision to defer rather than articulate
the decision as its own determination. In the commercial paper case, the Supreme Court did
not specifically address the issue of why the court of appeals decision to defer was incorrect.
Instead, it proceeded to discredit the correctness of the Board's interpretation.
However, in order to approve the acquisition at issue in the securities brokerage case, the
Board also had to find no prohibition in the Glass-Steagall Act. The Court's review, based
upon weighted deference, makes the two decisions nearly impossible to reconcile in light of the
reasons offered by the Court.
Some may argue that the distinction between the two cases lies in the fact that the
weighted deference in the securities brokerage case was accorded to an administrative decision
reached after public hearings, whereas in the commercial paper case, the court refused to defer
to an administrative decision reached without general public comment. The Court, however,
did not base its decision in either case upon the Board's decisionmaking process. While this
distinction may have some initial appeal, it does not withstand scrutiny. The commercial pa-
per case was decided in a narrow context that need not have had broad public application. If
the issue in the commercial paper case really concerned the adequacy of the decisionmaking
procedures, the Court need not have resorted to its elaborate mischaracterizations and pretext.
See supra notes 289-321 and accompanying text.
329. 468 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 219-21.
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The Supreme Court did not attempt to distinguish this decision in
favor of weighted deference from its opposite conclusion in the commer-
cial paper case. Nevertheless, deference to the Board's decision in the
securities brokerage case meant that the Court must have accepted two
propositions fundamental to deferential review, which it had rejected in
the commercial paper case: first, the Court limited its review to the nar-
row context in which the Board decided the issue; and second, the Court
determined only that the Board's interpretation was reasonable.332
While the securities brokerage case appears to fit within the model of
weighted deferential review which encompasses most cases of modem
judicial review, closer examination of the Court's opinion raises some
unresolved questions.
Would the Court have upheld the Board's conclusion if the Board
had reached the opposite decision regarding statutory meaning? Could
the Court have accorded weighted deference and still found unreasonable
the agency's interpretation that the Act prohibited the type of proposed
sales of securities by banks at issue in this case? If so, would the Court
have remanded to the Board or would the Court have substituted its own
interpretation deciding that the acquisition was permissible? Acceptance
of deference as the reviewing norm should encourage a court to remand
the case to the agency. Yet the Court's retention of its prerogative to
332. Consistent with its choice to accord weighted deference to the Board's interpretation
of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Court did not refrain from evaluating the substance of the
Board's decision. Its examination of the merits, however, was limited. Ironically, the Court's
conclusion that the agency was reasonable in determining that a statutory term could be con-
fined by the context of related terms, was based upon the statutory interpretive technique
rejected by the majority in the commercial paper case. Compare 468 U.S. at 218 (relying upon
"'the familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning' ") (quoting Third Nat'l Bank v. Impac, Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977)), with
468 U.S. at 149-52 (rejecting the same principle in the commercial paper case) and id. at 166-
67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (the dissent used the same principle to support the argument
that the Board's interpretation was correct). Although the Court asserts in the securities bro-
kerage case that the Board's interpretation of the disputed term was "supported by the plain
language of the statute.. . [and] entirely consistent with legislative intent," 468 U.S. at 219,
this assertion is little more than conclusory. The Court did not require nor did it provide any
evidence that the statutory prohibition specifically excluded commercial bank affiliations with
entities engaged in the public sale of securities. Instead, the Court noted that the narrow
interpretation was consistent with the long standing interpretation of identical language in
another section of the same act. d. at 218-19. Although such interpretive support was un-
available in the commercial paper case, the Court did not distinguish its deference in the secur-
ities brokerage case on this basis. In addition, unlike in the commercial paper case, the Court
did not require affirmative evidence that Congress intended to exclude trading of securities in
its prohibition of "public sale" of such securities. Instead, the Court was satisfied that Con-
gress had not prohibited the action that the Board had approved. Id. at 219-21 (noting that
the legislative history indicated that Congress was primarily concerned with Activities not at
issue in this case).
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supply its own statutory meaning, such as in the commercial paper case,
renders the outcome of a weighted deference decision largely
unpredictable.
A second type of question arising from the Court's decision con-
cerns the absence of a discernible basis for the Court's choice of weighted
deference over presumptive deference. Why did the Court not choose to
uphold the Board's decision on the basis that its deference to the agency
compelled acceptance of its decision? In the end, although the result in
the securities brokerage case appears consistent with the body of case
law, closer analysis reveals that it is no more principled than the uncon-
vincing reasoning in cases with unconventional outcomes.
5. Summary
The three cases just discussed illustrate the content of a model of
judicial deference that presents the appearance of reasoned decisionmak-
ing in resolving challenges to administrative legislative actions. The
model admittedly provides little more than a facade. Behind the judicial
language cast in terms of general principles, the Court remains free to
fashion its approach to review so as to achieve desired substantive results.
Examined together, the decisions highlight the absence of
determinancy and coherence in allocating the responsibility for assigning
content to broad statutory provisions. The cases also show the failure of
the Court to develop a consistent set of standards for determining the
actual substantive content of broad statutory schemes. Moreover, the
Chevron case in particular reveals Congress' absence from that part of
the legislative process in which a statute is given its concrete meaning.
While the conduct of elected legislators is perhaps understandable in
terms of human behavior, the tolerance of such conduct by judges sworn
to uphold the Constitution is less acceptable.
It is no doubt true that the cases also reveal the variations and the
complexities associated with applying general statutory language to con-
crete situations. Different kinds of situations require different legislative
and administrative approaches, and thus, must provoke different re-
sponses from the court charged with review. Reconciliation of the rea-
soning and outcomes in the cases such as those discussed in this section
does not require an inflexible rule of deference or a bright line dividing
cases of deference from those of independent review. At a minimum,
however, Supreme Court decisions should educate and provide an under-
standing of the constitutional responsibilities of government officials.
This should be done not only to aid such officials in the conduct of their
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duties, but to help the public understand what can be expected from its
representatives in the lawmaking process.
The model presented in this section is flawed but not useless. It
serves two instrumental purposes. First, it focuses attention on the role
of the court in the lawmaking process and the value, as well as the dan-
ger, inherent in its position as legislator of incremental law. The judici-
ary's strength rests in the ability to reinforce the separation between the
three branches of the federal government and to recalibrate the system of
checks and balances in a flexible and responsible manner. The judiciary's
weakness results from the almost invisible manner in which the Court's
incremental lawmaking may permit the accretion of power that upsets
the delicate constitutional balance.333
Second, it directs attention to those aspects of judicial behavior
which are potentially destructive of democratic values. In a democracy
the principal goals of the legislative process are not efficiency or uniform-
ity but rather rationality, accountability, and fairness. The model assists
identification of what and how the courts can contribute practically to
the preservation and restoration of these values. In understanding the
present judicial practices, the process of examining desirable modifica-
tions can begin.
III. A Deference-Delegation Model of Judicial Review
The deference dilemma has captured wider attention recently be-
cause the so-called "modern administrative state" is changing the legisla-
tive process. 334 Congressional use of broad delegations combined with
the reviewing practices of the Supreme Court have occasioned a shift in
the locus of lawmaking power from the Legislature to the other two
333. There are those who argue that courts should take an even more active role in fashion-
ing legislative content. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982). Although Professor Calabresi speaks of judicial involvement in the legislative process
in a different context than that discussed in this Article, he rejects the use of the nondelegation
doctrine as a means of forcing Congress to assume greater responsiblity for statutory content
and meaning. Id. at 163-71. The Calabresi argument favoring judicial activism has many
critics. See, e.g., Cox, Book Review, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1463 (1982); Mikva, Book Review, 96
HARV. L. REv. 534 (1982); Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New
Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1983). While the reviewers criticize the context of Cala-
bresi's discussion, they advocate a greater congressional role in fashioning legislative content.
Significantly, both Professor Cox and Judge Mikva have served in government positions that
enabled them to experience first hand the realities of the political process.
334. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 984 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). For a consummate
study of the development of the present permanent and pervasive federal administrative system
with regulatory powers and policymaking discretion, see Rabin, Federal Regulation in Histori-
cal Perspective, 38 STAN. L. RFv. 1189 (1986).
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branches of government.335 Consequently, the debate over the propriety
and extent of judicial deference cannot be isolated from issues associated
with the transfer of legislative power from Congress to the agencies of the
executive branch.
To recognize that the deference dilemma is a species of the larger
question of how much discretionary lawmaking power the legislative and
judicial branches should permit the executive branch to exercise is not to
suggest that delegation is either unconstitutional or undesirable. It is
generally recognized, however, that the present allocation of lawmaking
power and the restraints, or absence thereof, upon the exercise of such
power are in need of clarification.336 The examination of judicial review-
ing practices detailed in this Article suggests a few starting points for
restoring the checks and balances to the legislative process. There are
two categories of suggested reforms. One category seeks a coherent
model for assigning the interpretive function between agencies and
courts. The second attempts to define and preserve congressional respon-
sibility in the lawmaking process.
335. The majority of legislative commands are no longer made by elected officials. Agency
regulations published in the Federal Register exceed congressional legislation in both volume
and detail. See J. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 1-2 (1983); Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 985-86 (White, J., dissenting). The Federal Register numbered under 3,000 pages in 1936.
In 1977, it surpassed 65,000 pages. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1 (1982). See
also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980). Dean Ely describes the actual law-
making process as being "nearly upside down" from the theory: "Much of the law is...
effectively left to be made by the legions of unelected administrators whose duty it becomes to
give operative meaning to the broad delegations the statutes contain." Id. at 131.
336. The criticisms come from many quarters and the proposed remedies take many forms.
Judges, legal scholars, legislators, and law organizations have offered remedies including legis-
lation, improved administrative procedures, reshaping administrative law concepts, and defin-
ing or redefining the judicial role in reviewing administrative legislation. The literature is too
extensive to be categorized here, but a representative sampling includes: Aranson, Gellhorn &
Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1982); S. BREYER,
supra note 335; Diver, supra note 15; McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated
Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119, 1128-29 (1977); Mikva, supra note 333; Stewart, The Refor-
mation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1695-96 (1975); Stone, The
Twentieth Century Administrative Explosion andAfter, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 513 (1964); Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L. REV. 575
(1972). Proposed legislative remedies have included: the legislative veto declared unconstitu-
tional in Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1984); the "Bumper's Bill" which, in its original form, would
have barred deference to all administrative decisions involving statutory interpretations (see S.
2408, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 29956 (1975)); and proposals to amend the review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (see Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine, supra
note 16).
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
A. Towards a Model of Deference
The present paradigms that determine a court's initial approach to
review are outmoded. The entitlement of an administrative statutory in-
terpretation to deference should not turn on whether the interpretation is
advanced as part of a rulemaking or adjudicatory proceeding. 337 Instead,
the challenge is to identify the cases in which a court can be expected to
defer to an agency's decision. If these cases can be identified, then we
should also be able to identify the normative principles that differentiate
them from cases in which courts fail to defer. Finally, when an agency
decision is entitled to deferential review, the nature and level of judicial
scrutiny must be defined.
The starting point of this analysis is to recognize that deference by
courts to administrative decisions involving statutory interpretation is no
longer purely a matter of judicial discretion. 338 A useful description of
the deference process requires clarification first of the boundaries be-
tween judicial willingness to defer and its refusal to do so, and second, of
the nature of deferential review. The boundaries establish the types of
agency decisions to which a court can be expected to defer. The nature
of deferential review refers to the criteria for judicial affirmance of a chal-
lenged agency decision.339
1. Professor Diver's Proposal: A Presumptive Rule of Deference
In a recent analysis of judicial deference to administrative statutory
interpretations, Professor Colin Diver proposed that courts should pre-
sumptively defer to most agency decisions.34 Under his "presumptive
337. See Levin, Questions of Law, supra note 16, at 23:
In traditional scope-of-review doctrine, the review standards for administrative "or-
ders," which are handed down through case-by-case adjudication, are usually ana-
lyzed apart from the review standards for "rules," which take the form of regulations
of general applicability. This is unfortunate, because the dividing line between ad-
ministrative and judicial authority should not necessarily be affected by the proce-
dural devices an agency uses in implementing its program.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
338. Diver, supra note 15, at 598. See infra text accompanying notes 340-341.
339. So far as possible, this discussion will attempt to avoid the ambiguous rhetoric in
current use, including the notions that administrative interpretations should be given "weight"
and will be upheld if "reasonable."
340. Professor Diver's "presumptive rule of deference" should not be confused with the
presumptive deference discussed in Part Two of this Article. Professor Diver's proposed rule
refers to the instances when a court should defer to an agency's statutory interpretation when
reviewing a challenge to that interpretation. Under a presumptive rule, the court should defer
so long as the decision is within the agency's delegated decisionmaking responsibility and
accumulated experience. Diver, supra note 15, at 592-93. Such deference, however, does not
mean that the court should automatically accept the agency's decision without determining
that the proposed interpretation is reasonable. In the cases discussed in Part Two, presump-
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rule of deference," courts should limit review of agency statutory inter-
pretation where the agency is acting within its delegated policymaking
responsibility and accumulated expertise. 41
Professor Diver's proposal is significant for two reasons. First, it
would establish judicial deference as the norm without requiring the re-
viewing court to justify its decision to defer in terms of agency qualifica-
tions or congressional intention.342 The proposal would thus greatly
simplify the court's determination of whether to defer. A court need
only review the authorizing statute to determine that the agency's deci-
sion is within its subject matter jurisdiction and its policymaking author-
ity.34 3  By drawing the deference rule so broadly, Professor Diver
restricts the instances in which a court may engage in independent inter-
pretation. At the same time, a broad deference doctrine limits the oppor-
tunity for judicial manipulation to reach the substantive results the
judges may prefer.
The second notable feature of the Diver proposal is that it reaffirms
the reviewing role of the court even in deference cases. Although the
proposal is less explicit about the nature of the deferential review, it is
evident that deference is not synonymous with abdication of the review-
ing function. In large measure, the Diver proposal retains the "reasona-
bleness" standard as the basis for judicial affirmance of an agency
tive deference disguised the court's refusal to determine the compatibility between the agency's
interpretation and the statutory text or legislative history. See supra notes 230-333 and accom-
panying text.
341. Diver, supra note 15, at 598. Professor Levin faults the Diver proposal for failing to
distinguish between the different types of law questions presented to a reviewing court. Profes-
sor Levin's proposal abandons the "obsolete framework" in which all "questions of law" are
rigidly distinguished from "questions of fact," see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text,
and identifies a question of law that remains the province of independent judicial determina-
tion. Thus, he proposes that questions of law for purposes of scope-of-review "should be de-
fined as an issue that requires the making of normative judgments, unlike a question of fact,
and that is open to independent reconsideration by a reviewing court, unlike a question of
discretion." Levin, Questions of Law supra note 16, at 12. Questions of discretion, according
to Levin, "are those normative issues which call for an inquiry into the 'rationality' of an
agency's determination." Id. Courts recognize this category de facto when they insist on de-
ferring to an agency's policy decision. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. In contrast
to the Diver proposal, Professor Levin preserves a category of agency decisions for independ-
ent determination of correctness by a reviewing court. While Professor Levin makes a con-
vincing case that some questions of law as he defines them can be separated from the law-fact
decisions traditionally reviewed by the court, this author is unconvinced that it is possible or
advisable to do so in the vast majority of administrative decisions involving an issue of statu-
tory interpretation. For the extent to which the author disagrees with Professor Levin, see
discussion infra notes 345, 356-370 and accompanying text & note 378.
342. See supra notes 168-229 and accompanying text.
343. Diver, supra note 15, at 594-95.
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decision."4 The drawback in this standard is that the elasticity in the
reasonableness test, which Professor Diver admits is difficult to elimi-
nate, permits a court to substitute its own interpretation at the same
time the court claims to be deferring.345
Professor Diver, however, refines the reasonableness standard to
limit the instances of judicial substitution. According to Professor Diver,
a court would be permitted to overturn an agency interpretation only if it
conflicts with the statutory text, history, or context explicitly provided by
Congress. In particular, a court should reject an agency interpretation
that will "unfairly surprise the statute's nonofficial audience" or that was
considered and rejected by the enacting Legislature.346
344. See supra note 162.
345. Diver, supra note 15, at 597. See also supra notes 168-191 and accompanying text.
Professor Levin would remedy this potential for manipulation by assigning to courts the re-
sponsibility of identifying questions of law as a matter of law, not discretion. Levin, Questions
of Law, supra note 16, at 16. With regard to such law questions, a court would be free to
substitute its own judgment if it found the agency interpretation incorrect. Id. According to
Levin, challenges to an agency's understanding of its statutory mandate or to the statutory
requirements governing an agency decision, which a court finds are not left to agency discre-
tion, are matters for a court's independent judgment. Id. at 25-33. Assuming the court could
indeed separate the statutory interpretation from the application of that interpretation to the
facts of a dispute, to a result-oriented court it need not matter whether it invalidates the chal-
lenged interpretation because it is incorrect or unreasonable. In effect, Levin appears to be
arguing that where a court can, through interpretation of statutory text or context, notably
congressional intent, determine that an agency is wrong, it may substitute its own judgment of
what is correct. In such instances, however, a court is likely to reach the same result under the
Diver model by concluding that the agency interpretation is unreasonable. See infra note 346
and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, a principal difference between Levin and Diver remains what each considers
to be the appropriate degree of scrutiny in cases where the dispute centers on whether Con-
gress intended to delegate discretion to the agency to decide a statutory interpretation-applica-
tion question. In such cases, even though an agency is exercising its delegated responsibility
for policymaking (which would merit deference under the Diver proposal), where a court and
agency disagree over statutory meaning Levin suggests that the Court should win. Levin,
Questions of Law, supra note 16, at 18. Neither proposal, however, adequately addresses the
question of the role of a reviewing court in cases where congressional intent and language are
vague and ambiguous such that a court could determine neither correctness nor reasonableness
with any degree of certainty.
346. Professor Diver writes:
The suggestion is that the courts should reject an administrative interpretation that
will unfairly surprise the statute's nonofficial audience. Such an interpretation is one
that cannot be supported by the words of the statute, as the court believes them to be
understood among the relevant "community of interpreters." Such an interpretaton
is presumably also one that, while compatible with the text, was apparently consid-
ered and rejected, or is quite similar to one considered and rejected, by the enacting
legislature, as reliably revealed in the publicly accessible legislative history. Finally,
the courts should find unreasonable an interpretation that runs counter to a well-
focused purpose made manifest in the statutory text or public legislative history.
Diver, supra note 15, at 597-98.
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The limited review defined by Professor Diver fails, however, to ad-
dress the most problematical cases. Reviewing courts faced with an ab-
sence of statutory guidance are unable to determine with any assurance
the compatibility, let alone the correctness, of an agency's interpretation
of the statute. Professor Diver's definition of reasonableness may trans-
late into a judicial standard that requires a challenger to show affirma-
tively that the agency's interpretation contradicts an explicit provision in
the statutory text or history. This refinement of the reasonableness stan-
dard would thus limit the instances of independent judicial interpretation
by placing an almost impossible burden on the challenger.
2. Modification of Present Practices and Professor Diver's Proposal
The deference dilemma and the problematical cases examined in the
preceding parts of this Article suggest several modifications of the pres-
ent reviewing practices and refinements of the Diver proposal. One
change would eliminate presumptive deference. This would reinforce the
principle that a court retains a reviewing responsibility in every case in
which it defers to an agency interpretation. Another change would re-
quire the agency to make an affirmative showing of the reasonableness of
its challenged interpretation, thus clarifying the issues that both chal-
lenger and agency should address upon appeal. A third change would
require a court finding an agency interpretation unreasonable to remand
the decision to the agency for additional consideration. This approach
would both emphasize the agency's interpretive responsibility as the re-
cipient of delegated legislative authority and further restrict the tempta-
tion of courts to substitute their independent judgment of statutory
meaning.
Finally, the problem posed by statutes that lack any basis for deter-
mining the reasonableness of the agency-assigned meaning must be re-
solved. In such cases, deference is inappropriate because the court is
incapable of exercising any reviewing responsibility. The analysis in this
Article suggests that the solution rests outside of the Diver proposal even
as modified. In such cases, the Court should define and enforce the con-
gressional responsibility in the legislative process, so that reviewing
courts can evaluate the reasonableness of an agency's decision. While a
delegation doctrine, as a corollary to the deference rule, is examined in
the following section, the remainder of this section will examine further
each of the modifications suggested above.
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
a. Elimination of Presumptive Deference
The first modification eliminates presumptive deference, or the no-
tion that an agency interpretation is entitled to more than "mere defer-
ence,"347 which has served as a subterfuge for upholding an agency
interpretation that is unlikely to withstand stricter judicial scrutiny.
Moreover, presumptive deference has been accorded an agency decision
for which there is no basis to determine whether it is reasonable. The
elimination of presumptive deference essentially requires that a reviewing
court determine in every case Whether a challenged agency decision
should be upheld, by examining the basis of the agency's decision, rather
than simply concluding the decision is reasonable.
Congressional amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act
would further emphasize courts' reviewing responsibility. In particular,
the provision foreclosing judicial review of agency action "committed to
agency discretion by law" has been a source of confusion and ought to be
repealed.348 The delegation of legislative authority to an administrative
agency always includes the power to exercise discretion. If Congress can
constitutionally foreclose judicial review, it should do so explicitly in the
delegating statute where appropriate. Congress may further amend the
Administrative Procedure Act to clarify that the statute is not an in-
dependent source of judicial jurisdiction where Congress has explicitly
foreclosed review.349 Only where a court is satisfied that Congress has
347. See supra Part II; see also supra note 336.
348. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). But see Pierce, supra note 83. Professor Pierce proposes
that courts should refrain from reviewing the conformance of an agency's policy decision with
a statute drawn in such vague terms as to thwart meaningful review. In such instances, Pierce
argues that a court should hold that Congress has committed the challenged decision to agency
discretion as defined in section 701(a)(2) and has foreclosed review. Id. at 514. While the
Pierce proposal primarily addresses the review of agency choice of policy and does not explic-
itly argue for deference to an agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate (including its
jurisdiction), Pierce implies that a court's declination to review is appropriate where Congress
has failed to provide the specificity necessary to enable meaningful review.
Interestingly, Professor Pierce argues that his proposal for extreme judicial restraint will
have the same consequences as the delegation proposal advanced in this Article. See infra
notes 362-417 and accompanying text. Both proposals seek to require Congress to provide
greater legislative specificity. According to Professor Pierce, Congress would be moved to
such action to prevent the President from "accumulating too much control" over agency deci-
sionmaking. Pierce, supra note 83, at 525. Whereas Professor Pierce relies upon "moral sua-
sion," the delegation model proposed here is more directive: it calls for judicial enforcement of
the congressional responsibility by preventing agency action until Congress provides the requi-
site statutory guidance. For Professor Pierce's argument against resurrection of the traditional
nondelegation doctrine, see id. at 489-504.
349. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Func-
tional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion", 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968); Verkuil,
Congressional Limitation on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TULANE L. REV. 733 (1983).
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intentionally and constitutionally foreclosed judicial review should a
court decline to review the agency statutory interpretation. A court's
decision to defer to an agency interpretation should not masquerade as
review of the substance of the agency decision.
The benefit of judicial review to a challenger of an agency decision is
reduced, however, if the challenger must carry the entire burden of show-
ing that the agency interpretation is unreasonable or incorrect.3 50 While
it is difficult to define the reasonableness standard that is universally ap-
plicable to agency interpretations, the court could make the review pro-
cess more uniform by formalizing the burden of providing the court with
sufficient information upon which to render judgment. 15 1
b. Shifting the Burden of Adequate Support to the Agency
The second modification of the Diver proposal calls upon the court
to insist that an agency demonstrate there is adequate support for its
statutory interpretation.3 2 This requirement would not create an exces-
sive burden, since the agency need only expand its statement of explana-
tion which must currently accompany the issuance of a rule or order.353
A separate section of that statement should cite any affirmative support
for the interpretation found in the statutory text or its history, explain
the compatibility of the interpretation with the statutory purpose or in-
tent, demonstrate how the interpretation furthers the agency's poli-
cymaking responsibilities, and conclude that the interpretation is not
contrary to statutory text, history, or purpose. Such an agency explana-
tion will permit challenges to be raised at the administrative level, as part
of either comments to an agency's proposed rule or order, or a motion
350. The Diver proposal would limit the instances in which a court could overrule an
agency interpretation to cases in which the interpretation is contradicted by the statutory text,
history, or context. One consequence of this standard is that the challenger can demonstrate
the agency interpretation is unreasonable only by showing it is incorrect.
351. Diver, supra note 15, at 598.
352. Admittedly, an adequate support standard for aflirmance is potentially as ambiguous
as the reasonableness standard. A conclusion of adequacy may be based upon subjective judi-
cial judgment. However, two factors will minimize the potential for judicial subjectivity aimed
at ensuring a particular outcome. One is that the court can identify the kinds of documenta-
tion that will satisfy the adequacy standard. Another factor is that the deference model sug-
gested in this Article seeks to discourage rationalizations for outcome determinative judicial
decisionmaking by requiring remand to the agency of decisions that courts find lack adequate
support. See infra notes 356-360 and accompanying text.
353. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982): "After consideration of the
relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose." The record of a formal adjudication resulting in the
issuance of an order or rule must include "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis
therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record." Id. at
§ 557(c)(3)(A).
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for agency reconsideration.354 The agency's response will frame the is-
sues for a subsequent judicial challenge. Moreover, the agency's state-
ment should provide the basis for the judicial findings associated with a
court's decision to defer. Admittedly, requiring an agency to make an
affirmative showing of adequate support for its interpretation gives a
court more leeway to reject the agency's decision even as it embraces the
concept of deference.
Professor Diver predicts that the presumptive rule of deference is
likely to reduce the instances in which dissatisfied parties appeal.355 Yet,
reduction of appeals is even more likely where a prospective challenger is
given a full explanation of the agency's reasoning enabling her to evalu-
ate the potential for a successful appeal. Where an appeal is taken, the
agency's explanation is likely to focus the issues to be addressed by the
challengers, defenders, and reviewers of the disputed interpretation.
c. Remand to the Agency
The third modification of the Diver proposal limits judicial substitu-
tion of independently determined statutory meaning without unduly re-
stricting the opportunity to challenge an agency's decision. Under this
modification, a court that is not sufficiently convinced that the agency's
interpretation has adequate support should remand the decision to the
agency for additional consideration.
Remand under a deferential review model would thus permit the
agency either to try again to convince the court to uphold the agency-
assigned meaning or to offer a different interpretation. Judicial remand
may also encourage an agency to seek more specific congressional au-
thorization for its proposed regulatory action. Statutory specificity would
be desirable both at the inception of the legislative program as well as
when experience reveals the need for changes.
Courts should refrain in most instances from substituting their inter-
pretation for that of the agency. Given the relatively few instances of
plain meaning, a court's insistence that a statutory text supports a single
354. Although a motion to reconsider is generally not essential to the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies that must precede a petition for judicial review, where a challenger has a
strong argument that the agency interpretation is incorrect or unreasonable based upon the
agency's explanation, it may be worthwhile to pursue administrative reconsideration. The ad-
ministrative route would be particularly efficient if courts adopt the proposal of remanding
agency interpretations found unreasonable for further agency consideration. See infra notes
356-360 and accompanying text.
355. Diver, supra note 15, at 591.
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correct interpretation is rarely convincing.3" 6 Remand, by contrast,
forces an agency to offer more convincing support for its choice of statu-
tory meaning while addressing the court's concerns. If it cannot do so,
the proposed agency action must await congressional authorization.357
The deferential review-remand model does not resolve every poten-
tial inconsistency or ambiguity associated with judicial review of agency
statutory interpretation. The nature of the deferential review-the crite-
ria upon which a court bases its decision to uphold or remand an agency
decision-is likely to vary from case to case. Designation of a uniform
standard that requires an agency interpretation to be adequately sup-
ported or to be reasonable does not simplify the process of determining
the level of judicial scrutiny of a challenged decision.3"'
Not all agency decisionmakers possess the same qualifications. Simi-
larly, a reviewing court may be better able to evaluate the agency's deci-
sions in some cases than in others. A model of judicial review would be
useless, however, if the nature of the court's evaluation of whether to
sustain an agency decision remained essentially subjective, dependent
upon the particular knowledge or political philosophy of the reviewing
judges. Judicial scrutiny should depend upon objective criteria that ac-
count for agency expertise and experience with the subject matter of the
decision.359 As a general rule, the greater the agency's special compe-
tence, the less probing need be the court's evaluation of the compatibility
of agency interpretation and statute. For example, an agency interpreta-
tion rendered in the agency's regulatory capacity, based upon knowledge
gained from either experience or technical expertise not possessed by
judges, warrants limited scrutiny.360 Once the court assures itself that
356. In remanding, a court may include its own suggested interpretation. Not infre-
quently, the agency may have the opportunity to consider a variety of possible interpretations
suggested in majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Remand, however, should discour-
age judges from manipulating deference issues and statutory interpretation techniques to
achieve judicially desired modifications in congressionally established regulatory programs.
357. It is possible that in a few cases a judicial conclusion that the statute cannot support
the interpretation essential to the agency's proposed action may render remand futile.
358. Whatever the rhetorical standard, the reviewing court must still determine whether to
uphold the agency's interpretation. Deferential review, however, means that the court need not
be convinced that the agency's choice of meaning is the only correct interpretation.
359. Many factors upon which a court bases its decision whether to defer reappear as crite-
ria for determining the nature of the deferential review. See supra Part II; see also Diver,
supra note 15, at 562 n.95.
360. For example, where an agency with delegated responsibility to regulate the banking
industry has been exercising that responsibility over many years, it has presumably acquired
both intimate knowledge and experience. When called upon in its regulatory capacity to de-
cide whether banks can sell commercial paper without violating statutory prohibitions, and the
statute is silent as to definition of the terms in question, judicial scrutiny should be limited. Cf.
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the agency explanation accords with either the statute or overall agency
policy, the court's interpretive responsibilities should end.
By contrast, judicial scrutiny that subsequently leads to disagree-
ment with an agency interpretation is more significant where the chal-
lenged interpretation is based upon judicial precedent or traditional
interpretive techniques. Particularly where the agency's experience in a
specific matter is minimal, judicial remand permits further agency con-
sideration in light of the court's suggested interpretation.
The remand requirement of deferential review minimizes both the
opportunity and temptation for a court to manipulate the criteria that
justify intense judicial scrutiny. In the absence of statutory plain mean-
ing, the remand requirement reduces the occasions for courts to ignore
agency judgments. Remand also affords both the challengers and de-
fenders of the disputed interpretation the opportunity to respond to the
court's conclusion.
The deferential review-remand model will not unduly jeopardize
agency regulatory flexibility. The desire to maintain this flexibility re-
quires that the nature of the deferential review remain somewhat subjec-
tive. Nevertheless, under the proposed model the predictability of
judicial responses to agency decisions will be enhanced. In most cases,
deference will ultimately result in acceptance of the agency judgment,
although the review process may cause a modification of the agency's
initial judgment.361
No rule of deference, however, can adequately cure the dilemma
created by legislation that yields no clue as to its meaning or applicabil-
ity. In some cases a statute is simply inadequate to permit an agency to
make a satisfactory showing that its interpretation is reasonable. In such
an instance, however, a court can be no more confident of the correctness
of a judicial interpretation than that of an agency.
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. I, 468 U.S. 137 (1984)
(discussed supra notes 288-320 and accompanying text).
361. If the agency persists in its interpretation without offering more convincing substanti-
ation, the court is likely to invalidate again the agency interpretation. Presumably, the agency
would then be left with a choice of changing its interpretation or foregoing its proposed action.
The agency may, however, offer a new argument to justify the previously disapproved interpre-
tation. This may prove adequate to overcome a second challenge where the earlier remand
was prompted by the agency's failure to offer adequate justification or by its reliance upon
reasoning not deserving of limited judicial scrutiny. The newly explained interpretation might
be entitled to limited evaluation if grounded on policies or other matters within agency exper-
tise. Deference would require a court to sustain an agency decision even though it might
disagree with the agency's interpretation. On the other hand, where a court still finds the
interpretation unacceptable, the second (or third) remand would notify the agency that it must
change its interpretation or abandon its proposed action.
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For this reason, efforts to define and enforce the congressional re-
sponsibility in the legislative process remain important. A delegating
statute that contains a discernible meaning is essential to meaningful ju-
dicial review of an agency's interpretation. A reincarnated "delegation
doctrine" would foreclose transfers of lawmaking power that relieve
elected legislators of accountability for fundamental legislative decisions.
Particularly in light of a presumptive rule of deference, such a doctrine is
essential to preserving the integrity of the constitutionally defined legisla-
tive process in which Congress may share, but not abdicate, its lawmak-
ing power. Analysis of the deference dilemma suggests some dimensions
of a reincarnated delegation doctrine, although full elaboration of such a
doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.
B. Dimensions of a Delegation Doctrine
If deference is to be more than unconstrained administrative discre-
tion, courts must be able to apply identifiable criteria for evaluating the
reasonableness of the agency's statutory interpretation. Judicial evalua-
tion of the conformity of the agency's statutory interpretation with a
standard is a charade unless there is a discernible meaning. As long as
we maintain that Congress should have some role in the legislative-ad-
ministrative process, it falls to the judiciary to define and enforce the
legislators' responsibility.
The debate over judicial deference to an administrative statutory in-
terpretation suggests a delegation doctrine that would require Congress
to retain some responsibility for the legislative decisions of its delegate,
offering a reviewing court a third choice when confronted with the defer-
ence dilemma. Instead of having to choose between whether to defer 62
or impose a judicially determined interpretation, a court could choose to
invalidate the statutory delegation. This third choice would be appropri-
ate in certain cases where statutory vagueness or ambiguity prevents a
court from either evaluating the reasonableness or adequacy of the
agency's interpretation, or judicially determining statutory meaning.
For purposes of fashioning a model of deference, we need go no
further than discussing those aspects of a delegation doctrine relating to
judicial review of challenges to agency statutory interpretations. 363 De-
362. Under the model presented in the preceding section, if a court chooses to defer, it
faces the additional choice of either upholding the agency interpretation or rejecting and re-
manding the interpretation to the agency for further consideration.
363. The legacy of the "nondelegation" decisions of 1935-in which the Supreme Court
invalidated parts of the National Industrial Recovery Act-and the ensuing debate over the
power of the "administrative state" create factions on both sides of the question: whether
there should be rigid congressional control of the content of administrative decisions or flexible
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fining a delegation doctrine in terms of the ability of courts to review
administrative compliance with the delegating statute is not a novel idea.
Less than a decade after the Supreme Court invoked the delegation doc-
trine to strike down portions of the New Deal legislation,3 the Court
redefined the doctrine to uphold broad delegations of wartime power us-
ing a standard of "reviewability."365 The Court explained the standard
for determining the constitutionality of a statutory delegation as follows:
Only if we could say that there is an absence of standards for
the guidance of the Administration's action, so that it would be
impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of
Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding [the
Administrator's] choice of means for effecting [the statute's] de-
clared purpose.3 66
In evaluating whether the statute was adequate to allow for judicial
review, however, the Court looked beyond the congressionally prescribed
standards to the "'Statement of Considerations' required to be made by
the Administrator."367 In so doing, the Court allowed the agency to pro-
vide the legislative specificity necessary to evaluate both the constitu-
tional adequacy of the statute and administrative compliance. Thus, the
Court concluded that the statute, read together with the administratively
assigned meaning, was "sufficiently definite and precise to enable Con-
gress, the courts and the public to ascertain whether the Administrator
... has conformed to those standards." 368
administrative discretion to fashion policy. See Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) (discussing the various posi-
tions advanced by participants in the debate). One side of the debate embraces a nondelegation
doctrine that would curtail the congressional practice of broadly delegating decisionmaking
authority to administrators. The opposing side favors abandoning virtually all constraints on
both the substance and method of congressional statutory delegations. See infra note 373.
While the so-called opponents of broad delegation are not as unrealistic about the existence
and durability of the administrative state as the proponents might argue, focusing debate on
the desirability of a nondelegation doctrine is misleading. Indeed, the name has been a misno-
mer since the doctrine was first addressed and developed by the Supreme Court. Moreover,
rarely have Court opinions condemned the concept of discretionary lawmaking by the execu-
tive branch. Rather, the Court has struggled to define what, if any, procedural or substantive
limitations restrict the congressional transfer of its legislative power to the Executive. The
debate over the issue of judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation suggests a
limitation that forms a middle ground in the pro and antidelegation positions.
364. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
365. See, eg., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
366. Id. at 426.
367. Id.
368. Id.
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With the advent of judicial deference,369 the question of the statute's
adequacy was transformed into an issue of statutory interpretation.370 In
deferring to the agency's interpretation, the courts implicitly confirmed
that the statute was sufficiently explicit to enable judicial review. Courts
less inclined to defer and those disagreeing with an agency decision sim-
ply maintained the discretion to substitute their own judicial interpreta-
tion whether the interpretive task involved finding or creating statutory
meaning.
In this process of concentrating on the deference owed to an
agency's interpretation, the standard for evaluating the constitutional ad-
equacy of the statute was lost. The issue of whether the statute could be
interpreted was subsumed by judicial deference to the administratively
assigned meaning, whether or not the reviewing court ultimately ac-
cepted the agency's decision. The willingness of the Supreme Court and
the lower courts to allow either the agency or the courts to create statu-
tory meaning under the guise of interpretation inspired the Legislature
increasingly to delegate power.371 Consequently, to address the issue of
deference without examining the role of Congress in the administrative-
369. The advent occurred not long after the relaxed application of the nondelegation doc-
trine. L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 565 ("In the 1940's judicial deference... became one of the
central credos of our administrative law.").
370. Federal courts deal with the problem of delegated authority as one of statutory inter-
pretation to avoid gratuitous constitutional holdings against delegation. H. LINDE & G.
BUNN, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 537 (1975). See also Note, Rethink-
ing the Non-Delegation Doctrine, 62 B.U.L. REv. 257, 281-86 (1982).
371. The Supreme Court's deparature from rigorous enforcement of the nondelegation doc-
trine, see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 365-368), and subsequent application of a presumption of statutory constitutionality, see
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195-96 (1978), means that legislators generally
have little incentive to provide specific directives to administrators who receive delegated legis-
lative power. Consequently, legislators have availed themselves of the opportunity to "do
something" about a pressing problem by passing vaguely or ambiguously worded statutes so
that they can subsequently disassociate themselves from unpopular consequences of the legisla-
tive program as implemented by administrative agencies. For elected legislators, statutory
specificity poses the risk of losing votes, campaign contributions, and even their office if a
stand on some issue is sufficiently objectionable to a powerful interest group. See E. DREW,
POLITICS AND MONEY (1983). One Congressman explained the reason for vague delegations
as follows:
"[T]hen we stand back and say when our constituents are aggrieved or oppressed by
various rules and regulations, 'Hey, it's not me. We didn't mean that. We passed
this well-meaning legislation and we intended for those people out there ... to do
exactly what we meant, and they did not do it.'"
Cited in J. ELY, supra note 335, at 132 (footnote omitted) (quoting Congressman Flowers).
The absence of a judicially enforced statutory specificity requirement enabled legislators
to compromise on meaningless statutory language and consequently to pass more legislation,
leaving to the delegate the task of creating statutory meaning. The statistics bear out the
popularity of legislating by delegation. Agency regulations published in the Federal Register
presently exceed congressional legislation in both volume and detail. See J. O'REILLY, supra
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legislative process is to permit the trend toward congressional delegation
to continue unabated.372 Moreover, focusing solely on the deference
question limits the debate to which of the other two branches should fill
the legislative void.17
3
A rule of deference that retains the concept of meaningful review
and thus promises some principled restraint of administrative discretion
requires that the delegating statute permit judicial determination of
whether an assigned meaning is reasonable. Enforcing the congressional
responsibility for providing such a statute requires judicial willingness in
appropriate circumstances to refuse both to defer and to assign independ-
ent judicial meaning. In certain cases, the courts should not hesitate to
declare unconstitutional the statute claimed as authority for the chal-
lenged administrative decision to the extent that the statute may be inter-
preted to permit the action in question. A judicial declaration that the
statute violates the delegation doctrine would effectively remand the stat-
ute to Congress for clarification. In effect, the Court would require af-
firmative evidence of Congressional authorization before santioning the
agency interpretation. The challenge, of course, is to define the circum-
note 335, at 1-2. Regulations numbered under 3,000 pages in 1936; in 1977, they surpassed
65,000 pages. S. BREYER, supra note 335, at 1.
372. While many distinguished scholars have addressed the issue of the nondelegation doc-
trine, they have generally sidestepped the relationship of delegation to the judicial practices
associated with review of agency lawmaking. Several commentators have, in varying forms,
argued for retention, resurrection, resuscitation, or renewal of the nondelegation doctrine. See,
e.g., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 336; S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (1975); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 160 (1962); J. ELY, supra note 335, at 131-34; J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITI-
MACY (1978); Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policymaking: Notes on Three
Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 46 (Summer 1976); L. JAFFE, supra note 24, at 28-85
(1965); Koslow, Standardless Administrative Adjudications, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 407 (1970);
Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NEB. L. REv. 469
(1968); Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH.
L. REv. 1223 (1985); Schotland, After 25 Years. We Come to Praise the APA and Not to Bury
It, 24 ADMIN. L. REv. 261, 263-64 (1972); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 41-44; Schwartz,
Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, the Laws, and Delegations of Power,
72 Nw. U.L. REV. 443 (1978); Wright, supra note 336.
373. Administrative standards and procedural safeguards have been suggested as alterna-
tives to vigorous enforcement of a nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Davis, A New Approach to
Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969). In many instances they may no doubt function
effectively to constrain administrative discretion, particularly where the standards provide ju-
dicially enforceable self-constraint. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Vitarelli
v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260
(1954). Professor Diver suggests that departure from a consistent administrative policy or
change in a previously assigned statutory meaning may result in a finding by a reviewing court
that an administrative interpretation is unreasonable. See Diver, supra note 15, at 587-89.
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stances in which the court should make this choice.37 4
Judicial use of such a delegation doctrine would be appropriate in
two instances. One is in cases where there is no evidence that Congress
has authorized the agency's arrogation of subject matter jurisdiction.
Such a case arises when an agency that has received an express delega-
tion of authority over a particular matter asserts authority over other
subject matter not found in the language or history of the delegating stat-
ute. The arrogation of jurisdiction may take two forms. In one form, the
agency asserts that its regulatory jurisdiction implicitly includes the
matter in question because such jurisdiction is reasonably ancillary to
performance of its specified task.3 75 A second form of agency arrogation
of jurisdiction is an agency's invocation of concerns outside the subject
matter of its delegated authority to justify regulation of a matter arguably
374. If we accept that an administrative agency's authority to legislate includes fashioning
policy and creating legal commands, then challenges to an agency's statutory interpretation
raising constitutional issues involve questions of the boundaries of an agency's power. When
the statutory language and history are inadequate to permit a court to discern these bounda-
ries, meaningful review is futile. Deference in such instances would mean acceptance of the
agency's interpretation without any determination of reasonableness. Similarly, a judicially
supplied interpretation is no more accurate or compatible than its administrative counterpart
where the statute admits of no determinable meaning.
375. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Permian Ba-
sin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397 (1967). The most notable example of this type of jurisdictional
extension is the regulation of cable television by the Federal Communications Commission
under a statute passed before the existence of cablecasting. In United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's jurisdiction over cable television to the extent
that regulation of cable was "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commis-
sion's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." 392 U.S. at 178.
Congress had refused the Commission's requests both for legislative guidance on the extent
and scope of its jurisdiction over cable operators and, subsequently, for confirmation of its
regulatory efforts. See Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 164-72. The Supreme Court never-
theless upheld the Commission's interpretation of its delegating statute, which effectively ex-
panded federal jurisdiction over cablecasters. Eventually, the Court apparently abandoned the
ancillary jurisdiction limitation of FCC authority over cable. In its 1984 decision in Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984), the Court indicated that the Commission had
plenary authority over cable telecasting as part of its "'broad responsibilities' to regulate all
aspects of interstate communication by wire." Id. at 700. This decision was part of a process
of FCC extension of jurisdiction which a former FCC Commissioner summarized as follows:
"The FCC's regulation of cable television is justifiable only by reference to a kind of common-
law tradition that gives regulatory agencies organic independence from their original legislative
mandates." Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 174 n.13 (1978). The problems raised by judicial failure to
confront honestly the jurisdictional issues present in various challenges to FCC rules are ex-
amined in Krattenmaker & Metzger, FCC Regulatory Authority Over Commercial Television
Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 403, 486-91 (1982).
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within its statutory jurisdiction.376
Under the delegation doctrine described here, a court confronted
with either form of agency arrogation of jurisdiction should selectively
invalidate the statute claimed as authority. The court's ruling would re-
quire a declaration that the statute is constitutionally inadequate to per-
mit the agency action. Thus, before an agency could again act on the
matter, Congress would need to delegate explicit jurisdiction. Opening
the issue to congressional scrutiny would presumably make legislators
provide the necessary guidance for the agency's exercise of the delegated
regulatory authority.
A second instance for judicial use of a delegation doctrine is in cases
where the agency's choice of means or methods for regulating the sub-
ject matter over which it has jurisdiction represents a new agency policy
not specifically authorized by statute. For example, a statute authorizing
the use of quotas to control oil imports would be constitutionally suspect
to the extent it can be interpreted to permit the imposition of a tax on
imported oil."' Whereas deference and a liberal statutory reading may
permit a court to find reasonable the agency's assertion that it is effectu-
ating the statutory purpose by choosing a method other than that speci-
fied in the statutory text, the asserted authority should be declared
constitutionally impermissible.378 Congress has neither considered nor
376. For example, the Civil Service Commission argued that its broad authority to regulate
the government workforce included the authority to ban employment of all aliens. Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). Its justification, however, was based upon considera-
tions of immigration policy, economic consequences, and foreign affairs, which were not mat-
ters within its jurisdiction. Although the Court reversed the Commission's decision, it
supplied its own interpretation of agency authority rather than holding the statute unconstitu-
tional to the extent it could be interpreted to permit the agency action. The Court used this
jurisdictional argument to disqualify the administrative decisionmaker from entitlement to def-
erence, thus permitting the Court independently to supply statutory meaning. Significantly,
the dissent stressed that the Commission's interpretation was entitled to deference, thus high-
lighting the absence of a normative judicial choice that would return the matter to Congress.
Id. at 124-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Consequently, if the dissent's deference argument
prevails in a similar type of case, or the ideology of the Court shifts slightly and the agency
tries again, it is possible that an administrative-legislative program might receive judicial sanc-
tion despite the absence of congressional consideration of the agency's asserted mandate.
Although the Court's interpretation appears to bar the administrative action in question with-
out additional congressional action, the uniqueness of the judicial reasoning leaves the decision
vulnerable to distinction, if not extinction. The Court's reasoning has been described as "ob-
scure." See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 76-
78 (2d ed. 1980).
377. See, e.g., FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).
378. Since most modem commentators and many courts hold that an agency policy deci-
sion deserves deference from a reviewing court (see, eg., Levin, Questions of Law, supra note
16; Pierce, supra note 83; Monaghan, supra note 1), an agency could assert that its choice of
means-in this case, levying a tax-is a policy choice for effectuating the purpose of the statute
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acknowledged the consequences of the administratively declared legisla-
tive change. In addition, the courts have no basis for evaluating the sub-
stantive basis of the agency's decision, such as the reasonableness of the
tax rate imposed.3 79
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission's use of legislative
rulemaking-after more than forty years of exclusively using adjudica-
tion to identify unfair and deceptive trade practices-should be constitu-
tionally impermissible without congressional authorization. 380  The
agency's use of this new regulatory methodology constituted a policy
change that effectively expanded agency power causing potentially dra-
matic consequences for regulated interests. 81
and thus, is entitled to judicial deference. The problem is that the statute's history may indi-
cate that Congress considered one or more different methods of accomplishing its statutory
objective without considering that method chosen by the agency. The traditional choices for
the reviewing court in such a case would be either to defer to the agency's policy decision on
the grounds that Congress delegated policymaking authority to the agency, or to interpret the
statute for itself and conclude that Congress did not intend to authorize the agency's choice in
this case. The latter judicial choice, although probably achieving the objective of forbidding
the challenged agency action unless eventually specifically authorized by Congress, has two
drawbacks. One is that it conflicts with Professor Diver's presumptive rule of deference since
the agency interpretation underlying its choice of methods is not prohibited by the statute.
Second, the agency remains free to try the taxation method at a later date and hope that its
decision either will not be challenged (this may be arranged through negotiations with regu-
lated interests, see, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (the court sanctions the agreement reached in ex parte meetings between agency officials
and television and advertising interests that restricted but did not ban advertising to children)),
or will receive deference by a different appellate panel, which will either ignore or distinguish
earlier contrary decisions. A judicial declaration that a statute is selectively unconstitutional
to the extent that it may be interpreted to authorize the challenged regulatory method offers a
way out of the dilemma between deference and independent interpretation which results in
unpredictable judicial choices and searches for a mythical coherent congressional intent re-
garding the extent of an agency's delegated policymaking authority.
379. The approach suggested here accords with the Yakus standard, see supra text accom-
panying notes 365-368, because the Court has no basis for evaluating whether the agency's
decision is within the statutory boundaries other than to conclude that the agency's argu-
ment-that its proposed action will achieve the general statutory objective-appears reason-
able. If review is limited only to the latter question of apparent reasonableness, Congress need
only write statutes that identify a problem, such as too much imported oil, and delegate au-
thority to do something about it-anything that to the agency appears to ameliorate the
problem.
380. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert de-
nied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
381. In many cases, an agency's initial choice of regulatory methods would be entitled to
deference in the face of statutory ambiguity. The interpretation can be upheld as reasonable
where it is relatively contemporaneous with passage of the statute, and the agency participated
in the legislative process that developed statutory content. Legislative specificity in such cases
may be desirable but not constitutionally required. On the other hand, where the agency
choice represents new policy uncontemplated by Congress, and poses potentially unfair sur-
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This third choice of selective or limited statutory invalidation is an
alternative to setting aside an administrative rule as ultra vires based
upon a judicially supplied statutory interpretation.382 While the immedi-
ate outcomes of the two judicial conclusions would be the same, the ef-
fects and consequences differ.383 A court that nullifies only the agency
action has concluded that the statute is capable of interpretation,
although it cannot support the interpretation asserted by the agency.
The agency, however, is not barred from trying to take the same or sub-
stantially similar action in the future despite the court's disapproval. It
may offer another interpretation or advance new support for the same
interpretation. With a presumptive rule of the deference-remand model,
discussed in the previous section, an agency should not be discouraged
in most cases from trying again to achieve the objective of its original
proposal.384 Moreover, the agency may negotiate with its opponents in
the earlier judicial challenge and develop a program of action designed to
avoid further litigation. Consequently, the judicial decision provides lit-
tle incentive for congressional clarification unless the agency concludes
prise to affected interests, the statutory authority should be declared constitutionally
inadequate.
382. See supra note 370.
383. An implicit reason for refusing deference in such cases, either by exercising the tradi-
tional independent interpretory function or by applying the delegation doctrine suggested here,
is that the agency arrogation of power or employment of new regulatory methods may pose
unfair surprise to and undue hardship for potential regulated interests. The adversely affected
interests receive greater protection uner the proposed delegation doctrine since one purpose of
the proposed doctrine is to compel Congress to exercise its constitutionally assigned function
in the legislative process. Thus, this greater protection is in effect a constitutional guarantee.
384. The court could, of course, repeatedly hold that the agency has failed to meet its
positive burden of showing that the statute gives it the jurisdiction or authority it claims.
Thus, the immediate effect would be to prohibit agency action until Congress authorizes the
action. These repeated scenarios, however, are not only an inefficient use of both human and
economic resources, but they present the court with an opportunity to change its position. See
supra note 378. Since the question of what constitutes sufficient justification is not objectively
definitive, judges, particularly those who tend to be result-oriented, may accept a modified
agency justification similar to one rejected by a previous court even though the statutory lan-
guage remains vague or ambiguous. While the potential creation of this guessing game is an
undesirable aspect of the deference-remand model, it is outweighed by the likelihood that most
responsible judges would use remand to emphasize the need for further congressional action.
This Article proposes application of a delegation doctrine that would eliminate the guessing
game in those instances where it potentially carries more serious consequences for adversely
affected interests. See supra note 383.
When weighed against the potential loss of a constitutional protection by a regulated
interest, the seemingly "drastic" remedy of declaring a statute unconstitutional is not unac-
ceptably extreme. Moreover, since the declaration of unconstitutionality suggested in this Ar-
ticle is a selective nullification of the statute, which serves only to prohibit the action in
question and does not prevent Congress from authorizing the very action that the agency had
attempted, it is no more extreme than repeatedly rejecting an agency interpretation. It is,
however, arguably a more efficient remedy. See infra note 386.
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that judicial resistance is likely to frustrate all further administrative
efforts.385
On the other hand, a declaration of statutory unconstitutionality
stays agency action pending congressional consideration. The court's
conclusion need only nullify the statute with respect to the preferred in-
terpretation. The statute survives as authority for other agency action
either previously approved or evidently permitted. 8 6
Limited nullification of the statute is preferable to overruling the
agency interpretation where either of two conditions are present. The
first is where the agency legislative decision regarding its methodology
would have a serious impact on those interests required to comply with
the administrative command, and there is no evidence in the statute or its
history that the impact and its attendant consequences were contem-
plated by Congress. Selective nullification may also be appropriate in
other cases without regard to the impact of the administrative legislation.
Yet where Congress has considered and acknowledged the potential con-
sequences of its delegation of broad regulatory authority, judicial remand
to the agency for reconsideration of an interpretation would not severely
disadvantage adversely affected interests. Presumably, where Congress
has considered the impact of possible agency'decisions when enacting the
statutory delegations, those adversely affected by agency action had no-
tice and an opportunity to respond to both the proposed legislation and
its consequences during proceedings on the legislative and administrative
levels.
On the other hand, where administrative legislation will carry con-
sequences that were contemplated neither by the affected interest nor by
its elected representatives, the court should forbid further administrative
action without congressional authorization. Judicial deference or in-
dependent judicial interpretation, even if it results in remand to the
agency, could completely eliminate congressional participation in the leg-
islative process.3 87 An adversely affected interest would be unable effec-
385. In the absence of a clear statutory meaning, the court is urged to exercise restraint in
imposing a judicial interpretation that would render agency reaction futile. See supra notes
347-351 and accompanying text.
386. The normal judicial reluctance to address the constitutional issue when the case may
be decided on nonconstitutional grounds should not apply for two reasons. First, the pre-
sumption of constitutionality is rebutted by the fact that the effect of the constitutionally based
decision is different than that of a decision based on a nonconstitutional statutory interpreta-
tion. Second, selective statutory invalidation does not encroach upon legislative prerogatives
or upset the system of checks and balances. Not only can the statute survive in part, but
Congress is not barred from relegislating the same program so long as it supplies greater statu-
tory specificity. Cf Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
387. See supra note 384.
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tively to hold its elected representatives accountable. Moreover,
deference or remand reduces incentives for prompt congressional
attention. 88
A second circumstance for the judicial choice of statutory nullifica-
tion over independent interpretation is where Congress has deliberately
or "quasi-intentionally" evaded making a fundamental decision concern-
ing the extent of an agency's jurisdiction or methodology. Where delega-
tion of the statutory interpretive responsibility to an agency appears to be
motivated primarily by legislators' desire to escape or to settle a political
controversy, the court should refuse to allow a nonlegislative branch to
resolve the matter.389
A motivation test will pose some difficulty in its initial application.
Over time, however, courts can formulate objective criteria both to aid its
reviewing task and to guide Congress in understanding its duty of legisla-
tive specificity.
For example, a court should evaluate whether the matter in question
is one in which administrative expertise or regulatory flexibility, or both,
warrants the challenged broad delegation. Congress can assist the court's
evaluation by explaining the reasons for its failure to specify the extent of
an agency's jurisdiction or powers. Congress should also acknowledge
the scope and consequences of the interpretive decisions inherent in the
agency's application of the statute to a specific matter. By contrast, a
delegation in which there is no evidence that Congress was incapable of
addressing the matter is suspect and should be declared
unconstitutional.39 °
Admittedly, all delegations of legislative authority emerge as com-
promises between legislators' conflicting desires to direct the administra-
tive action and to permit regulatory flexibility. Particularly with respect
to ongoing regulatory programs, constraining administrative discretion
388. Even a judicial interpretation that appears to render futile further administrative ac-
tion without congressional action does not necessarily bar future agency attempts to take the
same or substantially similar action. Another court may limit, distinguish, overrule, or ignore
an earlier judicial interpretation. A Congress aware of the possibility of judicial modification
has little incentive to achieve the consensus required to guide administrative action. A case in
point is the FCC's regulation of cable television. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392
U.S. 157 (1968). The Court, after initially rejecting the FCC's claim ofjurisdiction, acquiesced
after Congress failed to act on the Commission's repeated request for statutory guidance. See
supra note 375 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 282-283 and accompanying text; see also Gewirtz, supra note 372.
390. Where the legislative record indicates that Congress considered or rejected the inter-
pretation upon which the challenged agency action is based, judicial refusal to uphold the
agency interpretation theoretically will have the same effect as limited statutory nullification.
In practice, however, this may not be true. See supra note 388.
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and limiting governmental intrusion into private activity often conflicts
with the desire to let someone else find solutions to the problem pressing
for legislators' attention. Statutes resulting from the process of compro-
mise, not surprisingly, often tend to be a muddle of contradictory direc-
tions and ambiguously defined discretion.39' Thus, the delegate either
receives or claims the authority to make those decisions that Congress is
either unwilling or politically unable to make. Where the issue concerns
the jurisdictional boundaries or regulatory authority of the administra-
tive agency, however, the courts should not sanction the congressional
giveaway of these decisions without a justification supplied by the legisla-
tors. Moreover, the problem is not resolved by refusing deference and
supplying a judicial interpretation. The search for legislative intent
amidst the compromise of "opposing 'forces' of 'radicalism and reac-
tion' "392 is largely metaphysical.393
The Chevron case394 illustrates judicial sanction of congressional
evasion of decisionmaking. In that case the failure of Congress to supply
a definition of "major stationary [air pollution] source[s]" that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency was charged with regulating did not result
from Congress' lack of either knowledge or ability to understand the is-
sues involved. In fact, the Court, while lamenting the absence of con-
gressional guidance, acknowledged that the omission may have been
intentional due to the legislators' inability to forge a political consen-
sus.395 Nevertheless, the Court stresses that even deliberate congres-
sional evasion of statutory direction warrants judicial deference to the
administrative interpretation.396
An evident interpretation of the statutory directive included regula-
tion of each individual stationary pollution source.397 To the extent that
deference required acceptance of the EPA's choice to use a plantwide
bubble concept balancing environmental and economic interests, rather
391. See, e.g., infra note 411; see also Pierce, supra note 83, at 473-81, for discussion and
examples of statutory standards in congressional delegations of legislative authority to admin-
istrative agencies.
392. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980).
393. Such a search transcends ordinary methods of statutory interpretation requiring one
to search the recondite aspects of legislators' and Legislature psychology, and to consider
highly abstract and abstruse behavioral models. Ultimately, discovery of a cogent and coher-
ent intent is likely to remain a mystery.
394. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). See supra notes 239-287 and accompanying text.
395. 467 U.S. at 847.
396. Id. at 844.
397. The statute directed the agency to develop a permit program under which new or
modified stationary sources of air pollution would be required to meet the "lowest achievable
emission rate." Id. at 853.
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than regulating individual pollution sources, the Court should have de-
clared the Act unconstitutional. The legislative record not only lacked
any evidence that Congress considered the acceptability or consequences
of the EPA's choice of regulatory methods, it lacked criteria for judicial
evaluation of the reasonableness of the EPA's decision.
By contrast, Congress lacked neither the technical nor technological
expertise to decide whether the bubble concept should be an option in the
Agency's regulatory arsenal. Moreover, Congress would be the appro-
priate body to make the policy decision as to which factors should be
considered in the balancing of economic and environmental interests.
Were the Court to deprive the Agency of its claimed power, the Agency
has the choice of either seeking congressional amendment or establishing
a permit program for each major stationary source, or both. All regula-
tory efforts need not cease while the Agency seeks to clarify the nature of
its authority.
398
A judicial declaration that the agency interpretation cannot with-
stand constitutional scrutiny would not have irreversible consequences.
In some cases it may be appropriate for the court to consider whether
the effect of its nullification of agency action would be to frustrate all
regulatory efforts unless or until Congress acted. The possibility that
political stalemate might bar further congressional action because of leg-
islators' inability to agree on specifics, however, is insufficient justifica-
tion for a court's refusal to insist on congressional clarification. The
judicial discretion inherent in all decisions would still permit the court to
defer to an apparent arrogation of regulatory authority when the need for
immediate action is warranted. The Court has long recognized the need
398. Selective nullification under the delegation model suggested here would allow the
Court to hold that the "source" clause of the Clean Air Act is unconstitutional to the extent
that it is assumed to authorize a bubble as the basis for the permit program. Since the case did
not present the issue of whether the agency could justify an interpretation of "source" as a
single source for purposes of the permit program, the Court need not consider whether the
entire clause is unconstitutional on its face. Although Congress did not define "source," in the
proper case it may be possible for the agency to cite legislative history that reveals how legisla-
tors expected the program to operate and what they believed would be the consequences of
agency regulatory decisions. Such history could support an agency interpretation that
"source" reasonably includes single source.
It is no doubt true that in some cases, a selective or partial statutory invalidation may
imply a judicial interpretation of the disputed statutory language. This is also true in many
cases where a court rejects an agency interpretation and remands the matter to the agency. In
both cases, the agency can choose to accept the court's suggested interpretation or can ask
Congress for clarification of its delegated authority. In the case of remand, the agency has the
additional option of trying to convince the court that the court's suggested or implied interpre-
tation is incorrect by repromulgating the rule and offering additional justification. See supra
notes 382-385 & 388 and accompanying text.
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for the Executive to respond to an emergency, particularly in the area of
foreign affairs, as a justification for a broad congressional delegation.399
In contrast to the Court's deference in Chevron stands the only
Supreme Court case in recent years to evoke serious discussion of the
classical nondelegation doctrine. In Industrial Union Department, AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,40 a plurality reversed an agency's
statutory interpretation and provided a tortured independent interpreta-
tion ostensibly to avoid a delegation problem. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Rehnquist argued that the statute was unconstitutional."°
The consequences of the deference dilemma and the shortcomings of
the classical nondelegation doctrine are illustrated by the five opinions in
the case." 2 In three of the opinions, the Justices' insistence on different
interpretations of the statute' 3 highlights their failure to address
whether the statute has a congressionally assigned meaning sufficient to
permit judicial review.'
399. See, eg., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
While "necessity" should continue to justify upholding an executive assertion of authority
under a questionable statutory interpretation, it should be carefully circumscribed. The need
for the federal government to respond to an emergency situation should be distinguished from
a case in which government intervention is merely an expedient solution.
Judicial review of a challenged executive legislative action justified by necessity poses dif-
ferent considerations from a challenge to the constitutionality of a delegating statute. In the
latter instance, the issue of necessity concerns whether Congress was justified in making a
broad or vague delegation due to either the circumstances or subject matter of the legislation.
Absent a showing of necessity, the court should require that Congress justify its failure to
provide statutory specificity sufficient to permit judicial evaluation of compatibility of agency
interpretation and statutory text or legislative history.
400. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
401. Id. at 671-87 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
402. For an analysis of the various opinions, see Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Ad-
ministrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1064, 1065-74 (1981).
403. The plurality, in an extraordinary approach to statutory interpretation, discovers in
the statute's definitions section a threshold finding requirement that limits the occasions on
which the Administrator may exercise the delegated regulatory authority. 448 U.S. at 639-40.
In a concurrence, Justice Powell argues that the statute requires the Administrator to
conduct a cost-benefit analysis before issuing regulations. Id. at 667 (Powell, J., concurring).
Such a requirement is not explicit in the statute.
The dissenters agree with the agency interpretation, but they do so in nondeferential lan-
guage. They argue that the agency interpretation is correct rather than merely reasonable. Id.
at 705 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Overton Park). The dissenters would only defer to the
Administrator's findings that the regulations conform to the statutory requirements. Signifi-
cantly, this deference does not excuse judicial review. Rather, the dissenters would excuse the
Administrator's imprecision in substantiating his conclusions because the issue is "on the fron-
tiers of scientific knowledge." Id. at 704.
404. In a separate concurrence, Chief Justice Burger admits that "[p]recisely what [the
Act] means is difficult to say." Id. at 663 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Nevertheless, he explains
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By contrast, Justice Rehnquist notes that the varying interpretations
support his claim that the statute lacks sufficient congressional direction
for a court to determine whether the administrative interpretation is rea-
sonable. The flaw in Justice Rehnquist's analysis, however, is that he
fails to explain adequately why in this case deference is uniquely
inappropriate.
Justice Rehnquist correctly notes that Congress failed to make "im-
portant choices of social policy." 5 Moreover, the absence of congres-
sionally supplied criteria to govern the Administrator's decision
regarding the content of promulgated regulations leaves the Administra-
tor to make a choice that Congress was politically unable or unwilling to
make. Where that choice involves the balancing of regulatory costs
against the risks to human lives, it is undoubtedly desirable for elected
legislators to provide guidance to administrative decisionmakers. Ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, however, the failure of Congress to answer
the question of "whether the statistical possibility of future death, should
ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of preventing those
deaths""4°6 rendered the statute unconstitutional. The answer is indeed
"legislative policy" and thus, Congress has delegated an important policy
decision. Yet what distinguishes this legislative policy from other such
policy decisions regularly delegated to administrative officials is not con-
vincingly explained in Justice Rehnquist's opinion.40 7
Significantly, the delegation in question did not permit the Adminis-
trator, in the name of statutory interpretation, either to arrogate subject
matter jurisdiction or to order behavior of a regulated interest in a man-
ner other than that which could be expected from passage of the enabling
legislation. Moreover, the statute both defined the administrative task
(standard setting) and the general category of private activity (employee
exposure to hazardous substances in the workplace) to which the stan-
dards should be directed.4"8 The legislative history revealed that Con-
gress considered and acknowledged the consequences of possible
that he is joining the plurality's attempt "to decode the message of the statute as to guidelines
for administrative action." Id. at 662. In a subsequent challenge to regulations issued under
the statutory provisions disputed in Industrial Union, the Chief Justice joined a dissent by
Justice Rehnquist arguing that the statutory ambiguity amounts to an unconstitutional delega-
tion. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
405. 448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
406. Id. at 672.
407. Cf Nathanson, supra note 402, at 1073 ("Every difficult question of statutory inter-
pretation suggests a congressional failure to communicate its meaning clearly, but that is not
usually regarded as grounds of invalidation under the nondelegation doctrine.").
408. 448 U.S. at 639-41.
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administrative decisions regarding what to regulate, at what exposure
level, and consequently, what costs might be imposed upon regulated in-
terests forced to comply.4° 9
The absence of direction to the Administrator regarding the content
of a safety standard does not challenge the boundaries of the agency's
legislative authority. Moreover, unlike Chevron, the agency's decision
does not represent a departure from a specified or an established regula-
tory methodology. There are no hidden costs in the agency's proposed
regulation. Regulated interests may challenge whether a particular
agency determination conforms with the statute by arguing that the stat-
ute does not authorize imposition of the particular costs that would be
associated with compliance in an individual case. The challengers cannot
complain, however, that they have not had the opportunity to address
the issues associated with both the statutory language and the adminis-
trative application of that language before Congress and the agency.
Judicial evaluation of the reasonableness of the administrative inter-
pretation of the congressionally assigned task in the context of specific
performance is not impossible.41 0 The opinions in Industrial Union indi-
cate that eight out of the nine Justices were able to determine statutory
meaning. Although they disagreed on that meaning, deference to the
administrative interpretation presumably would have produced uniform-
ity. The nature of the disagreement among the Justices is not one that
should render the presumptive rule of deference inapplicable.
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that it is undesirable to fash-
ion a new delegation doctrine that goes beyond the limited applicability
outlined above. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Industrial Union thus
suggests an instance of broader application. Where Congress has evaded
a critical policy decision fundamental both to the administrative imple-
mentation of the statutory scheme and to judicial review of the adminis-
trative exercise of discretion, the Court should declare the statute
unconstitutional.a11 Indeed, as Justice Rehnquist notes, by embarking on
such a course of action, the Court would "reshoulder the burden of en-
409. Id. at 642-52.
410. It is true that the legislative history reveals disagreement among lawmakers on how
the statutory directive may apply in individual cases. Id. at 646-52. Nevertheless, it cannot be
said that there is not adequate support for the agency's interpretation if the agency need not
demonstrate that its interpretation is the only correct meaning to be derived from the statutory
language.
411. A hypothetical example of questionable delegation is legislation that instructs the
delegate to set standards for eligibility to participate in a congressionally established federal
program. The determination of criteria to qualify for federal assistance does not require tech-
nical expertise beyond the competency of legislators or their staffs. On the contrary, the deter-
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suring that Congress itself make the critical policy decisions." '412
The problem posed by this broader formulation of a delegation doc-
trine lies with the ambiguity inherent in the terms used to articulate it.
When is a policy decision critical? Indeed, what is meant by policy
rather than interpretation and application of law to fact? Justice Rehn-
quist returns to the language of earlier nondelegation cases to define the
congressional responsibility of providing an "intelligible principle" '413
and the judicial task of measuring administrative compliance by "ascer-
tainable standards." '414 Since these phrases were first advanced by the
Supreme Court as the basis for evaluating the constitutionality of a dele-
gation, the Court has failed to find any delegation that lacked an intelligi-
ble principle or ascertainable standards.415 In fact, challenges to the
constitutionality of a delegation have ceased,41 6 save for extraordinary
congressional or administrative action that overtly threatens fundamen-
tal notions of separation of powers. 17
mination involves choices of a political, social, and economic nature which are fundamental to
the establishment and implementation of program policy.
For example, the size and cost of the program will depend upon the number of qualified
recipients as determined by the eligibility criteria. In addition, the choice of criteria will affect
the eligibility of particular groups of people, each of which forms a political constituency.
Where the choices raise emotionally charged issues, the delegation of decisionmaking insulates
elected representatives from direct accountability. In the absence of a congressionally pro-
vided justification for delegating such fundamental decisions to the unguided discretion of an
administrative official, the court might declare the delegation unconstitutional.
The alternative judicial approach of deferring to the administrative decision when that
decision inevitably is challenged by a dissatisfied constituency would condone congressional
evasion of a political-legislative decision. Moreover, it would permit the unelected delegate
continuously to make policy that could be radically changed without consideration or approval
by elected legislators.
412. Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Cf McGowan, supra
note 336, at 1128 (suggesting that invoking the nondelegation doctrine would serve as a judi-
cially administered "shock treatment" to Congress).
413. 448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). This language was first invoked by Chief
Justice Taft in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
414. 448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
415. For a criticism of the Rehnquist argument and a discussion of the possible effects of
reviving the traditional nondelegation doctrine, see Pierce, supra note 83, at 489-504.
416. Professor Davis asserts that "lawyers who try to win cases by arguing that congres-
sional delegations are unconstitutional almost invariably do more harm than good to their
clients' interests." National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 353 n.1
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.01
(1958)).
417. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). In Synar, Congress delegated
authority to the Comptroller General to calculate and report projected budget deficits and to
present budget reduction calculations upon which the President is to issue a "sequestration"
order containing the specified budget reductions thereby preventing government agencies from
spending congressionally appropriated funds. The Court found that the Act did not unconsti-
tutionally delegate legislative powers exclusively assigned to Congress, but held that the dele-
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Conclusion
To ensure continued congressional participation in the legislative
process, a presumptive rule of deference requires reinvigoration of a dele-
gation doctrine. The deference-delegation model presented here calls for
judicially prescribed limits to the great legislative power giveaway. As
attention continues to focus on the issues associated with judicial review
of agency lawmaking, the practices of judicial deference demand primary
attention. To seek consistency and predictability in the judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations by adopting a presumptive rule of defer-
ence-remand is to legitimize explicitly most of administrative lawmaking,
heretofore implicitly tolerated.418
The constitutionally prescribed legislative process, however, de-
mands that we not lose sight of the congressional responsibility in fash-
ioning legislation. Consequently, the adoption of deference as a
reviewing norm requires the Court not only to specify the boundaries of
its deferential judicial review of administrative statutory interpretation,
but also to limit the congressional malpractice of delegating broad discre-
tionary authority.
Admittedly, the limited delegation proposal calling for selective stat-
utory nullification will not make the legislative process any less sloppy as
a consequence of the judicial enforcement of a congressional role. The
modem legislative process involves all three branches in the effort to find
as well as to create statutory meaning. The deference-delegation model
defines a hierarchy of legislative responsibility among the branches for
determining statutory meaning. In this hierarchy, the judiciary, while
last for purposes of assigning meaning, has the essential duty of enforc-
ing the legislative responsibilities of the other two branches.
Under the deference-delegation model, even where judicial refusal to
assign meaning may result in the invalidation of a statute, the democratic
nature of the lawmaking process will be strengthened. The model will
improve congressional accountability and judicial predictability without
unduly impeding the efficiency and desirability of delegating legislative
power to administrative agencies. Undoubtedly the inefficiency and com-
plexities associated with our constitutional democracy and political sys-
tem will remain. However, one is hopeful that members of Congress will
less frequently find themselves in the legislators' dilemma-that the Leg-
islature has lost control of the legislative process-summed up by the
gation violated the separation of powers doctrine by vesting executive power in the
Comptroller General.
418. Cf Chadha, 462 U.S. at 985 (White, J., dissenting) ('The wisdom and the constitu-
tionality of these broad delegations are matters that still have not been put to rest.").
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phrase, "now we have them right where they want us."1
4 19
419. It is almost as if the executive recipients of legislative authority can assume that if a
power is needed, it exists-a mentality exemplified by Watergate.

